INDONESIA

As the Minister of State and I promised at Friday's High
Commissioners' meeting we have looked into the question of the
extent to which the Australian Government was taken into our
confidence before our recent approach to Mr. Marshall in
connection with Indonesia. [1]

Up to Friday last we had, as you know, sent your Government no
less than nine separate telegrams about Indonesia since 23rd May.

(The numbers are D.466 [2], 467 [3], 468 [4], 492 [5], 499 [6],
511 [7] 525 [8], 534 [9] and 535. [10]) Our object in sending
these telegrams was of course, in accordance with our usual
practice, to keep Australia, in common with other Commonwealth
countries, currently informed about all major developments in our
policy. I can assure you that we entirely recognise Australia and
New Zealand's great interest in Indonesian affairs (Dr. Evatt
indeed in his statement on the 6th June laid special emphasis on
this [11]) and it is with precisely this interest in mind that we
have throughout covered developments in Indonesia in such detail
in our telegrams.

We have heard from Mr. Williams that Dr. Evatt took the
opportunity of Lord Killearn's recent presence in Australia on his
return journey from New Zealand to Singapore to express the
natural anxiety of the Australian Government over developments in
Java. [12] But I think it only fair to say that except for [y]our
own observations at Friday's High Commissioners' meeting we have
so far received from your Government no comments on the specific
issues which have arisen in the immediate crisis in Indonesia,
although, needless to say, we have throughout been, and are still,
anxious to hear any suggestions which the Australian Government
care to offer about the best policy to follow in the present very
difficult situation.

So far as consultation between the United Kingdom and the United
States is concerned, the telegrams sent to the Australian
Government up to 9th June (i.e. well before our latest approach to
Mr. Marshall mentioned in our telegram No.534) contain the
following specific statements:-

(i) D.468 of 23rd May:-

'H.M. United Kingdom Ambassador, Washington, has been instructed
to discuss position with United States Government and to inform
them of Prime Minister's remarks to Netherlands Ambassador.' (This
refers to Mr. Attlee's warning as to the effect of the use of
force by the Dutch.)

(ii) D.492 of 4th June:-

'U.K. Ambassador Washington has been instructed to ascertain views
of United States Government on Dutch proposals' (for
implementation of Linggadjati Agreement).

(iii) D.499 of 5th June:-

'Dutch have now requested us to use our good offices in
representing to Indonesians desirability of accepting in substance
Dutch proposals of 27th May. They are making similar approach to
United States Government.'
'We have instructed His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador
Washington, to inform State Department of action which United
Kingdom Consul-General has been authorised to take, and to express
hope that they will be willing to authorise United States
representative to take similar action.'

(iv) D.511 of 9th June:-

'United States State Department have sent instructions to United
States Consul-General Batavia to take similar, but not
simultaneous, action, and United States Consul-General will
doubtless visit Djokjakarta. State Department have agreed with us
that no (repeat no) publicity shall be given to either of these
visits.'

I think you will agree that these passages in the telegrams can
have left no doubt (a) that we were maintaining close touch with
the United States Government over the current developments in
Indonesia, and (b) that we had in fact already, at the instance of
the Dutch, agreed with the United States Government to take common
action in Java with the object of persuading the Indonesians to be
reasonable. In the absence of any comment from your Government, I
think that we were justified in concluding that this procedure was
acceptable to Australia, and it was on this assumption that we
acted when it became clear that we must lose no time in
approaching the United States about the next step in our common
approach to the crisis. The despatch of our telegram to Washington
instructing His Majesty's United Kingdom Ambassador to invite the
United States Government to associate themselves with our offer of
good offices was approved only on 16th June, and the urgency of
the situation was increased by the fact that the Dutch Cabinet was
expected to meet within twenty-four hours from that time. It
seemed imperative to take action before then.

In conclusion I would repeat that we here, both in the Foreign
Office and Dominions Office, are fully conscious of the importance
of events in Indonesia to Australia, and most anxious not only to
receive any information which the Commonwealth authorities may
have about the situation there (such as you mentioned on Friday
that they had) but also to give full weight, in framing United
Kingdom policy, to the Australian Government's views.