INDONESIA

Objectives-
1. To secure maximum conditions for Indonesia.

2. To achieve as much as possible through U.N. and thereby assist
to build up reputation.

3. To allow the Dutch to save as much face as they can within U.N.

and without.

4. In an effort to influence the Dutch both through the three
power committee and without, to bring pressure on U.K. and other
members of the British Commonwealth to support Australia. With
Commonwealth and particularly U.K. backing to work on the Belgians
on the lines that our proposals are the real interpretation of
long-term Dutch interests (and thereby their own) and will secure
conditions in which trade can be resumed on a long-term basis. At
the same time to work on the U.S. through Sayre (primarily).

5. To draw up an agreement on the lines of the U.S.-Philippines
[1] and a second [partially] [2] based on Linggadjati but with
additional articles to narrow down unsettled points.

6. To arrange a special visit to U.K. immediately in an endeavour
to implement point 4 above and to get Belgium either-
(a) to agree that the Committee of Three should issue a suggested
agreement as outlined in 5 (preferably using U.S.-Philippines as a
basis), or
(b) to bring pressure on the Dutch for them to come to such an
agreement outside the Committee of Three; the Committee then to
endorse it.

7. To find out what the strength of the Anglo-Dutch Shell
arrangement [3] is, how long the Dutch can afford to keep troops
in Indonesia and in what numbers.

8. To establish unofficial contact with Dutch left-wing circles
and trade unions. Such contact will be vital at the stage when the
Dutch take an agreement to their Parliament.

9. Reference 6. The visit to U.K. should be sponsored by a
telegram from the Prime Minister to Mr. Attlee. [4] We cannot
afford [to fail]. [5]

[This has been discussed with Messrs Ballard, Shann & Critchley.

We would like an opportunity of discussing it with you.] [6]