Your Assembly 350 and 354. [1]

1. We are surprised that you allowed Chairman's suggestion to be
acted upon and allowing the matter to be discussed by the United
States and U.S.S.R. in Australia's absence and without public
protest is in complete conflict with Government policy. Great
Powers have no special responsibility in matter of future disposal
of Japanese Mandates. While there may be differences of opinion as
to meaning of states directly concerned phrase clearly does not
mean in this case the so-called Great Powers who have special
voting powers in the Security Council but no other special
privilege.

2. Therefore, as subject is now being discussed by Great Powers,
or some of them, with a view to reaching agreements or
understandings which judging by your reports will prejudice final
discussions later, you should immediately raise matter in
Committee and in Plenary Session and protest at procedure with a
view to having Novikov-Dulles talks immediately terminated.

3. Australia lost initiative both in veto and disarmament by
allowing these matters to be discussed by Great Powers as though
they had some special status in relation to Assembly. In the case
of Japanese Mandates Australia has a special interest by her
geographical position, a special right by her war effort which no
Great Power except America can claim and also by virtue of the
Treaty of Versailles. Consequently no group of nations should
discuss matter unless that group includes Australia. Australia not
only state directly concerned but also state directly concerned in
any interpretation of that phrase. Bargain made between Soviet and
America on subject of states directly concerned may affect
Australia vitally.

4. For instance, Soviet claim regarding future agreements would
seem to imply that they reserve right to claim to be state
directly concerned in case of Nauru. Our position in respect of
Nauru must be maintained and assurance to this effect will now be
required before Government will finally approve agreement for New
Guinea.

5. Private discussion with United Kingdom with view to influencing
attitude of Thomas, who is after all only an observer at talks, is
of no avail. Our views have been clearly put to the United Kingdom
at Prime Ministers' Conference, in telegrams and publicly. In
spite of that Thomas apparently made no protest when told by Gerig
that United States would submit agreement first to Great Powers.

In this matter Australia is the appropriate member of the British
Commonwealth to negotiate if negotiations appear desirable between
parties most directly concerned. We cannot allow United Kingdom to
make bargain on Italian Colonies in exchange for concessions in
relation to Japanese Mandates. They have attempted to do this in
the past and present discussions appear to be with same objective.

It is not sufficient for Bevin to be informed that he must make no
commitment without hearing our views. United Kingdom must not act
for Australia in any sense: we must be party principals in any
discussions including the present Soviet-American talks, or
ourselves act for the United Kingdom in these Pacific affairs.

6. In our view discussions on Japanese Mandates are premature.

Peace treaty negotiations are not as yet even planned and no
formal action can be taken until Peace Conference representative
of those powers directly concerned has made its decisions. At the
same time we approve in principle of American responsibility and
would be prepared to discuss matter in advance of peace treaties.

But we will not accept discussions between groups not including
Australia as party principal.

7. You should immediately call attention of the Committee and the
Assembly to the nature of the Soviet-American discussions which
were intended to settle only question of states directly concerned
in present agreement but which now appear to be concerned with
future disposal of Japanese Mandates. The Committee should merely
note that Soviet is not claiming to be state directly concerned in
relation to present agreements. [2]