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Historical documents

270 Evatt to Chifley

Cablegram 359 LONDON, 25 May 1946, 4.46 p.m.

SECRET PERSONAL

1. At the Meeting yesterday [1] the text of final
communiquereports of which you will have seen was agreed.

2. The main discussion was on proposed Commercial talks and
proposal that emerged was that there be Commonwealth talks in the
first week of October immediately prior to the meeting of the
Preparatory Committee of the Economic and Social Council at
present scheduled for 15th October. Nash finds this inconvenient
and will have some discussions while here but will also send
officials to the Commonwealth talks. It is understood that the
Preparatory Committee will be dealing only with non-tariff matters
and that therefore the Commonwealth discussions will have similar
content. I indicated that we may wish for informal discussions at
some other time and that provided these Commonwealth discussions
were regarded as informal with no publicity we would not object.

3. Smuts raised the general question of imperial preference
without expressing any views. Bevin, Addison and Morrison outlined
their attitude by reference to Bevin's statement of 6th December,
1945. [2] Liesching informed us Bevin's statement was made after
consultation with U.S. and therefore must be regarded as an
interpretation of United Kingdom obligations under the Mutual Aid
Agreement.

4. I made a brief statement based on your telegrams and public
statement of November and December. [3] Bevin and Attlee are in
full accord with thesis that we must receive tangible advantages
in exchange for the giving up of any existing rights. Nash
described the New Zealand System of perfect discrimination in
favour of the United Kingdom, general commitments of general
agreement with your views expressed and Attlee said no commitments
of any kind existed. I pointed out the United States arrangement
with the Philippines and suggested that this could be used as a
strong argument to retain the system of Empire preferences as
desired.

5. Addison raised the matter of Commonwealth Communications and
referred to previous Imperial Conference resolutions regarding the
exchange of information. [4] He expressed the view that no changes
in the existing system were necessary and this was met with
agreement from all. I made comments suggesting importance of early
information on matters of direct concern to us and congratulated
Addison on the way the Labour Government had kept us informed
since coming into office.

6. You will be glad at the general feeling of satisfaction over
the Conferences. In the course of a statement I issued in London I
said: 'Mr. Chifley, the Australian Prime Minister took a prominent
part in the early stages of the discussions until his departure
from London, and the feeling of solidarity and comradeship which
became clearly evident in those first weeks marked the whole
course of the talks.'
7. I expect to leave here tomorrow for New York and we both send
our affectionate greetings.

1 i.e. the Nineteenth Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

2 The reference was in fact to a statement by Attlee in the House
of Commons on the U.S. Loan Agreement. He had given an assurance
that there was '. . . no question of any unilateral surrender of
preferences. There must be adequate compensation for all parties
affected'.

3 Evatt referred to Australia's refusal to be associated with the
U.S. Govt's Proposals for the Expansion of World Trade and
Employment, 6 December 1945, and its insistence an approaching the
negotiations with complete freedom of action (Volume Vill,
Documents 374 and 391) and to Chifley's public statement on 7
December 1945 that Australia would enter into discussions without
obligation and that any concessions must be reciprocal.

4 The arrangements for Commonwealth consultation were based upon
resolutions of the Imperial Conferences of 1926 and 1930. All
governments were to be kept informed of negotiations undertaken by
any one government and any other interested government was to
express its views promptly. No government was to take foreign
policy action involving another in active obligations without that
other government's definite assent.


[AA:AA1976/34]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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