Begins:

Your D.1129 [2], D.1119 [3] and Despatch D.75. [4] Draft
Instrument of Surrender for Germany.

1. In general the terms of Articles 1 to 11 of the Draft are
acceptable to the Australian Government, but we have strong
objection which we feel will be shared by the European Allied
Governments, to-
(a) the proposal contained in the preamble that the surrender
should be made to the Supreme Commands of the Soviet Union, United
Kingdom and United States acting on the authority of their
respective Governments; and
(b) the proposal in Article 12 for vesting supreme authority with
respect to the administration of the instrument and all related
matters in the three great powers alone.

2. Regarding (a) we recognise the practical difficulties in the
participation of all the Allies in the final transactions related
to the surrender of Germany, but we cannot accept the idea that,
whereas a great number of countries including ourselves have been
fighting against Germany since the outbreak of war on various
fronts and are contributing to her defeat in numerous other ways,
the acceptance of the surrender of the enemy should be limited to
only three powers. In view of practical difficulties we would be
prepared to authorise the Supreme Commander of the Anglo-American
forces engaged against Germany to act on our behalf in accepting
the unconditional surrender and in applying the military measures
necessary to ensure that the surrender was complete, but we think
that such authority should be given formally by the Governments
concerned. If it is impossible to obtain an alteration to the text
of the Instrument we suggest that a declaration might be made
either jointly or severally, by the Governments other than the
United Kingdom, United States and U.S.S.R. whose forces have taken
an active part in the defeat of Germany, simultaneously with the
signature of the Instrument, stating that the Governments
concerned-
(a) authorise the Supreme Command of the Anglo-American forces to
accept the surrender of Germany on their behalf; and
(b) have been advised and concur in military terms of the
armistice.

3. Regarding (b) it is our view that the powers under Article 12
are so extensive as virtually to place in the hands of the Big
Three the determination of the future shape of Central Europe. We
feel that the exclusion of the other Allied Governments from
participation in the control machinery and from any association
with the political and economic directives vitally affecting their
interests must lead to inevitable and damaging resentment, and
will prejudice not only present relations between the United
Nations but the future peace of Europe. In our view an amendment
of Article 12 should still be sought, to provide for
representation of other Allied Governments on the control
machinery or, alternatively, in lieu of an amendment of the text,
that the three Governments should give an assurance by public
declaration that in the exercise of the powers under Article 12,
provision will be made for obtaining the views of other Allied
Governments and for associating them directly with the various
agencies used for carrying out the terms of Article 12. You will
share our anxiety lest objections by the other United Nations to
their exclusion from an effective voice in the settlement with
Germany result in open differences.