His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia has
considered report of Anglo-Dutch-Australian Conference at
Singapore, February, 1941 [1], and submits following
observations:-

MUTUAL REINFORCEMENTS
1. The Commonwealth Government will provide Army units to
reinforce Ambon and Koepang and also an air striking force at
Darwin to operate from advanced bases to be established in
collaboration with the Netherlands East Indies Authorities at
Ambon and Koepang. R.A.A.F. Units will not be permanently
stationed at these localities. Estimate of R.A.A.F. forces
available for Darwin-Timor-Ambon area is as shown in report, that
is, two Bomber Squadrons and possibly an additional reinforcing
Squadron; one of the bomber squadrons, however, consists of
Wirraways, the restricted range of which will confine it to the
portion of the area in the vicinity of Darwin until an
intermediate landing ground is established in the Tanambar Islands
which is projected under Dutch plans. This situation will continue
until the aircraft position improves.

2. In view of additional commitments elsewhere, two Brigade Groups
cannot be provided in Darwin-Ambon-Timor area as estimated in
Report. Only one Brigade Group and one Battalion, plus a Battery,
are likely to be available for this area. It is proposed to make
available a force of approximately 1,200 troops under the Command
of a Brigadier for reinforcement of Ambon and a similar number of
troops for Koepang. The arrangements agreed to at the conference
contemplate that the movement of Australian troops to Ambon and
Koepang is not to take place until hostilities with Japan have
commenced. From a military point of view there would be every
advantage in moving the troops to these localities at once so that
they would be in a position to operate effectively at short
notice. It is appreciated, however, that such a course would have
important political implications and may be regarded by Japan as a
provocative act. Commonwealth Government would be glad to know
whether United Kingdom Government, after weighing both military
and political aspects of proposal, consider that the Netherlands
East Indies Government should be asked to consent to the despatch
of Australian troops to these localities immediately. Irrespective
of arrangements finally decided upon in this respect, it is
proposed to arrange, in collaboration with the Netherlands East
Indies authorities, for immediate despatch to Ambon and Koepang of
equipment, bombs, general stores and supplies for both the
Australian troops and R.A.A.F. Units operating in these
localities.

3. Conference proposed in paragraph 7 of report that Allied forces
at Ambon should be under Dutch control at the outset. Commonwealth
Government's view is that in relation to Australian troops this
should be interpreted to mean a short transitional period, after
which Australian troops would come under Australian control. The
forces at Timor are to come under Australian control on the
arrival of our units.

4. It is considered that there should be unified command of all
troops at Ambon. In view of nature and extent of Australian
contribution, it is thought that an Australian Officer should be
in command, such arrangements to take place after completion of
transitional period referred to above. It is proposed to approach
the N.E.I. Government accordingly.

CO-ORDINATING NAVAL PLAN FOR THE FAR EAST
5. Commonwealth Government note that the Conference did not
formulate a coordinated naval plan for the Far East. The need for
this was emphasised in Commonwealth Government telegrams 87 of
13th February and 97 of 15th February [2], and it is noted from
your telegram No. 116 of 23rd February [3] in reply that a re-
examination of naval dispositions with a view to producing a
complete naval plan was to be made at the Conference. Commonwealth
Government are greatly concerned at the failure of the Conference
to draw up such a plan, the absence of which is a serious handicap
in the organisation of Far Eastern Defence measures.

We would ask therefore that the United Kingdom Government convene
a conference as soon as practicable so that a coordinated Naval
plan could be completed without further delay. It is considered
that this conference should assemble at Singapore. The
Commonwealth Government's views as to its scope and points for
discussion will be telegraphed in a few days. We would ask that
plan of Naval reinforcements east of Suez on a progressive basis,
which has been the subject of discussions between the Australian
Prime Minister [4] and the Admiralty, be made available to the
Conference if practicable.

CAPITAL SHIP ESCORT
6. It is noted that in paragraph 11 (a) of the Report of the
conference, it is proposed that capital ship cover be provided for
troop convoys in the Indian Ocean. Commonwealth Government
consider that this is not sufficient and that capital ship escort
should be provided for the larger troop convoys in accordance with
the principle agreed to at the 1940 Singapore Defence Conference
(see Part 1, paragraph 16 of the Report [5]).

NAVAL FORCES AVAILABLE
7. It is noted that the Conference recommends the return of
Australian and New Zealand cruisers to their own Stations when war
with Japan becomes imminent or earlier if the ships can be spared
from their present dispositions. The Conference considers,
however, that the return of Australian destroyers and sloops at
present serving in the Mediterranean and Red Sea should be
deferred until the Japanese threat becomes more of a reality in
Far Eastern focal areas.

8. Commonwealth Government had previously expressed the view in
cablegram 87 of 12th February that in the event of war with Japan
the whole of our Naval Forces would be required in Australian and
New Zealand waters. Whilst opinion is still adhered to,
Commonwealth Government are prepared to agree, in view of the
shortage of light surface vessels, that the return of Australian
destroyers and sloops should remain in abeyance provided it is
established that their effectiveness in the role for which they
are normally employed is greater in the Mediterranean and Red Sea
areas than in the Far Eastern area. In coming to this decision, we
are influenced by the part that such vessels have played and may
be called upon to play in connection with the activities of
Australian and other Empire troops in the Near and Middle East. In
the event of war with Japan, however, we would wish the matter to
be re-examined in collaboration with the United Kingdom Government
and a decision taken in the light of the relative needs of both
areas and the most effective theatre of employment of the vessels.

ACT OF WAR BY JAPAN
9. It is recalled that the question of actions by Japan which
would constitute an act of war and the steps to be taken to ensure
that immediate counter action is taken against her was previously
raised in connection with the Anglo-Dutch Conversations in
November. Commonwealth Government note the views expressed in your
cablegram No. 4 of 3rd January [6], and also the further comments
made in your cablegram No. 180 of 21st March. [7] The views of the
New Zealand Government contained in cablegram No. 83 of 1st March
[8] are also noted.

10. The Commonwealth Government agree that a decision as to what
constitutes an act of war by Japan should only be made by all the
Governments concerned in the light of the circumstances at the
time. Our Service Advisers, however, have emphasised the
importance from a military point of view of active steps being
taken against Japan immediately, in the contingencies stated in
paragraph 24 of the Report, which my Government agree to in
principle. The need for urgent action is recognised by the
Commonwealth Government and the advice of the United Kingdom
Government would be appreciated as to whether a satisfactory
procedure could be evolved to ensure that a decision to take such
counter measures is given without delay.

11. In regard to the contingencies outlined in paragraph 24 of the
Report, more particularly (c)-Movement of Japanese Warships-
Commonwealth Government would appreciate the views of the United
Kingdom Government as to whether it is considered desirable to
notify the Japanese Government of the interpretation which will be
placed on the movement of Japanese formations in the area defined.

With regard to paragraph 24(d) we would appreciate your views as
to the advisability of notifying the Portuguese Government of the
possible interpretation that may be placed on the movement of
Japanese Forces into Timor.

The Commonwealth Government also feel that acceptance of the
contingency stated in paragraph 24(f) of the Report should be
subject to an assurance being given by the United States
Government that an attack by Japan on the Philippines would be
regarded by them as a casus belli.

SCALE OF ATTACK ON SOUTH PACIFIC TRADE ROUTES:

Paragraph 10(b) of Report
12. This was discussed by Australian and New Zealand Chiefs of
Staff. Commonwealth Government are in entire agreement with
comments of Chiefs of Staff, text of which was conveyed to you in
New Zealand cablegram No. 109 of 23rd March. [9]

ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES BY JAPAN IN NEW GUINEA-NEW HEBRIDES-NEW
CALEDONIA-FIJI AREA:

Paragraph 10(c) of the Report
13. This was also discussed by Australian and New Zealand Chiefs
of Staff, and Commonwealth Government are in agreement with their
views (see para. 4 of New Zealand cablegram No. 109 of 23rd
March). Question of defences at Vila is now under consideration by
Commonwealth Government.

RECORDING PROGRESS

14. Commonwealth Government consider that each of the Governments
concerned should be informed of the progress being made in the
execution of plans, and propose to ask the Commander-in-Chief, Far
East [10] to arrange for this to be done.

EASTERN GROUP SUPPLY COUNCIL
15. Commonwealth Government is prepared to agree that the N.E.I.

should be brought into the Eastern Group Supply Council and their
deficiencies and potentialities for production beyond their own
requirements be coordinated by the Eastern Group Supply Council.

LIAISON OFFICERS
16. Commonwealth Government agree to proposed arrangements for the
exchange of Liaison Officers between Australia and the Netherlands
East Indies. The N.E.I. Naval Liaison Officer [11] has taken up
duty in Australia and action is in course for the appointment of
Australian Naval and Air Force Liaison Officers to the N.E.I.

Arrangements will be made for the appointment of an Army Liaison
Officer on the outbreak of war with Japan.

RE-ASSEMBLY OF CONFERENCE
17. Commonwealth Government agree to the reassembly of the
Conference at any time as proposed in the Report, provided that
any questions of policy that may arise should be referred, in the
first instance, to the Governments concerned, as suggested in your
Office telegram No. 180 of 21st March, 1941. [12]