Following for the Prime Minister-
BURMA ROAD.

Less than two months remain before the Burma Road Agreement is due
to expire, and we have been considering what steps should be taken
to meet the situation which will arise at the end of that period.

2. Nothing has happened to suggest that the Japanese Government
are seriously prepared to fulfil their part of the bargain. Public
opinion here would make it difficult to justify the extension of
the Agreement. The American public is out of sympathy with us on
this subject, while the Chinese can be relied upon to stimulate
interest should it show signs of flagging.

3. United States Government have indicated their willingness to
discuss with us what measures of support the United States would
give. Nevertheless we do not feel it possible to depend on any
promises of support from United States in advance of the decision
which we shall have to take regarding the opening of the Road,
though we shall naturally do everything to pave the way for any
support from the United States. We regard the prospect of support
from U.S.S.R. as negligible in the existing circumstances.

4. Our decision will obviously have to depend on our war position
at the end of the intervening period. Any set back would still
further prejudice our position in the Far East, and it may well be
that in any case the situation will not have cleared sufficiently
to permit us to disregard considerations that led us to accept
present compromise.

5. On the other hand, failure of Germany either to make full scale
attack on Great Britain or to succeed in one if made, would
presumably have powerful influence on the Far Eastern situation
and might render it easier for us to re-open the Burma Road.

6. To do so without due preparation however would doubtless be the
signal for fresh anti-British agitation in Japan, which might
compel the Japanese Government to take some kind of face-saving
action against us.

7. Preparation for action must-
(1) avoid allowing Japan to make it appear that if we do not keep
the Burma Road closed to military supplies we shall ourselves be
breaking our undertakings towards Japan;

(2) Keep the responsibility of proposing the lines of a general
settlement in the hands of the Japanese; continued lack of any
indication that the Japanese Government are prepared even to
consider with us the question of a general settlement would
provide further justification for our re-opening the Burma Road;

(3) Enable us to maintain a position where we can demonstrate, if
necessary, that certain Japanese authorities have met our
concession by instigating strong anti-British agitation in Japan.

8. With these considerations in mind, His Majesty's Ambassador at
Tokyo [1] has been instructed, unless he sees objection, to
develop the lines foreshadowed in circular telegram D. 450. [2] If
the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs [3] attempt[s] to place
upon us the responsibility of making concrete suggestions for a
general settlement, Sir Robert Craigie has been instructed to take
the line that before we could make any approach to the Chinese or
decide on a contribution to a general settlement which would be
appropriate on our side, we should of course have to know on what
precise basis Japan was prepared to deal with China. Meanwhile we
are considering whether we can devise any plan for a general
settlement which could be kept in reserve for production should
the appropriate moment arise.

9. We should be grateful of [sic] your views.