Please give the following message to the Prime Minister [1] for
his Most Secret and Personal information, in connection with my
telegram of 19th June, Circular Z.127. [2]

'You will wish to have at once some account of our policy in
present circumstances in regard to the French Colonial Empire and
Mandated Territories and of communications we are making to local
French authorities.

2. In general we do not think that with our very limited resources
we can attempt to occupy French overseas territories but in some
cases our control of sea communications should enable us to deny
the resources of these territories to the enemy. We hope it may be
possible to stimulate continued resistance on the part of the
French Colonial Empire forces. With this in view, H.M.

Representatives in French overseas possessions in Africa, Syria
and Indo-China have been instructed to approach local French
authorities and to inform them that while we recognize that the
French Govermnent have been compelled to capitulate under duress
we ourselves, appreciating the heroic resistance of the French
Armies supported by their Allies and knowing that the French Army
has laid down its arms against its will and that of the French
people, intend to continue the struggle. Although the greater part
of France is now in enemy occupation, her overseas territories
retain their freedom and British forces will therefore do all in
their power to assist these territories to defend themselves
against the enemy, and we are confident that their co-operation
will be forthcoming. H.M. Representatives are at their discretion
to point out that both the Dutch and Belgian Empires overseas are
resolutely prosecuting the war against Germany.

3. The latest information suggests that a proportion of the French
Fleet is moving to British or French Colonial ports but we do not
think that in any case we can for long prevent Germany and Italy
from occupying French North Africa and utilizing its economic
resources. If, however, the enemy succeeds in this we should
endeavour to interrupt-
(a) internal communications in this area by sabotage and
subversive activities among the tribes, and
(b) the enemy's communications across the Mediterranean.

4. In more detail the position as we see it in respect of each
part of the French overseas Empire is as follows, though it will
be appreciated that the position is changing from hour to hour-
(a) MOROCCO. Casablanca is an alternative naval base to Gibraltar
should the latter become untenable. We are urging the French to
concentrate the remnants of their anti-aircraft defences and
fighter aircraft in the area of Casablanca. The port might,
however, wen become untenable itself. So far we have not succeeded
in obtaining a clear declaration that the French resistance in
Morocco will continue, though their morale appears to be
recovering.

(b) WEST AFRICA. Owing to the existence of our base at Freetown,
we do not anticipate having to use Dakar but we must deny its use
to the enemy, and our naval forces operating from Freetown should
be able to do this. In some parts of French West Africa there are
encouraging indications that the French would welcome continued
co-operation with us.

(c) FRENCH SOMALILAND. The Italians are likely to attempt to
occupy Djibouti, but there are indications that they will still
have to fight for it and they cannot be reinforced except by air
so long as we hold the Suez Canal. We do not consider this
occupation would affect our position in the Red Sea to such extent
as would warrant any special action.

(d) SYRIA. It is important to our whole position in the Middle
East to prevent the enemy establishing themselves in Syria as such
action would cut our last communications with Turkey and provide
the enemy with valuable base and oil supplies at Beirut. The
French High Commissioner in Syria [3] has informed H.M. Consul-
General [4] that in agreement with the French Commander in Chiefs
he will continue to fight irrespective of any orders he may
receive. The attitude of Turkey, which is of course an important
factor here, continues to be obscure. If no help is forthcoming
from her and the French resistance in Syria collapses, we shall
have to rely on our naval forces to prevent an actual occupation
of territory by the enemy.

(e) MADAGASCAR. We hope to co-operate with the local French
authorities to deny this island and its resources to the enemy.

Failing this co-operation we shall rely on our naval forces to
intercept enemy raider menace.

(f) INDIA. Action to ensure the integrity of the French
possessions will be taken by the Government of India.

(g) CARIBBEAN AND ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON. The present view is
that the integrity of the French possessions can on the whole be
left to the operation of the Monroe Doctrine. In view, however, of
its great importance, special steps will have to be taken as
regards the Dutch island of Aruba in which French garrison was
installed.

(h) INDO-CHINA AND OCEANIA. Japanese occupation would entail their
control of Thailand and bring a new Japanese base at Saigon within
640 miles of Singapore. It would also provide air bases for
operations against Malaya. Certain French islands in the Western
Pacific if occupied by the Japanese would constitute a serious
threat to Imperial communications. Any attempt on our part to
occupy French possessions would probably lead to immediate
difficulties with Japan and our aim must therefore be to ensure
that the United States should make a public declaration as to
their intention to see the status quo in the Pacific and the Far
East preserved. (See paragraph 6 of my telegram under reference).'