Please give the following message to the Prime Minister [1] for
his most secret and personal information immediately.

Following is text of memorandum which has been telegraphed to H.M.

Ambassador at Washington [2] for his guidance in his conversations
with the United States authorities. BEGINS.

In the event of a complete capitulation by France we intend to
continue the struggle. The military situation which would confront
us would be as follows:

General situation
2. All French European and Northern African territory and
resources would become available to the enemy in due course though
the elements of the Fleet and certain forces in the French Empire
might be denied to the enemy. It is by no means improbable however
that the French might be forced to hand over their Fleet and our
enemies would thereby gain a considerable accession of naval
strength. All existing European neutrals with the possible
exception of Turkey would eventually fall under German or Italian
military or economic domination and our position in the
Mediterranean and the Middle East might be ultimately reduced to
denying the Suez Canal to the enemy. The attitude of India might
be doubtful but with the possible exception of Eire the whole of
the Empire would increase their efforts in our support. Japan
might attempt a more actively opportunist policy in the Far East.

Russia would probably become alarmed at Germany's success and
cease to assist her.

Ability to defeat Germany
3. We consider that in these circumstances the defeat of Germany
could still be achieved (but) [3] by (a) combined economic
pressure, air attack on economic objectives in Germany, (and) with
its resultant effect on German morale, and the creation of
widespread revolt in conquered territories.

4. It would be essential to secure the British Isles as main base
for the operation of naval and air forces since we could not
maintain our air offensive against Germany from the American
continent nor employ our Fleet effectively unsupported by the
naval resources of this country.

The final issue will therefore hang at first on our ability to
withstand the great effort which the enemy is likely to make
against Great Britain in the immediate future. If we can withstand
very large scale air attacks against our industry, our ports and
centres of population by denying to the enemy air superiority over
this country and its approaches and so long as we maintain command
of the sea, we hope to resist invasion successfully. In this
connection the direct danger is the extreme vulnerability of our
aircraft industry.

At the same time, we shall have to withstand intensified naval and
air attacks against our sea-borne trade to meet which there is an
acute shortage of destroyers and flying boats.

5. We should be in a good position to control the economic
resources of the Allied overseas Empires, and we could exercise
naval control of the wider oceans and focal points leading to the
blockaded areas. This pressure would not of itself bring about the
defeat of our enemies. To achieve this full pan-American economic
co-operation is essential so that the raw materials of die world
may be controlled at the sources.

In effect, our ability to defeat Germany would ultimately depend
on a complete blockade of Europe which must include the cutting
off of supplies via Russia. Any relief to populations in territory
occupied by the enemy would only serve to prolong the struggle.

6. Without the full economic and financial co-operation of the
whole of the American Continent the task might in the event prove
too great for the British Empire single handed. Nevertheless, even
if hope of victory in these circumstances appeared remote, we
should continue to fight so long as it was humanly possible to do
so.

7. It has been suggested that in the event of the United Kingdom
being overrun by the enemy the struggle could be continued by the
British Fleet from the American Continent. In resisting invasion
however the whole of our naval resources in home waters would be
thrown into defence and a successful invasion would automatically
imply the loss of a large proportion of our Fleet. The remaining
forces operating from America would be faced with considerable
problems of maintenance of supply and manning of it and combined
German and Italian Fleets possibly strengthened by captured units
of the French Navy might extend their activities well beyond the
confines of Europe. Without our air weapon and with our ability to
exert economic pressure through sea power considerably reduced,
our chances of victory would be virtually at an end, even with
full military and economic assistance of the American Continent.

Far East
8. The collapse of France would provide Japan with the temptation
to take action against the French, British or Dutch interests in
the Far East. We see no hope of being able to despatch a fleet to
Singapore. It will therefore be vital that the United States of
America should publicly declare her intention to regard any
alteration of the status quo in the Far East and the Pacific as a
casus belli.

West Indies and South America
9. We regard the maintenance of the status quo in the West Indies
as of military importance but we believe this to be assured by
United States administration's approval of resolutions recently
submitted to Congress re-affirming the Monroe Doctrine, in which
it was stated that the United States could not recognise transfer
or acquiesce in an attempt to transfer any region of the Western
Hemisphere from one non-American power to another.

Assistance we would require from the Americans
10. Our full requirements from the American Continent are clearly
a matter for detailed examination but in broad terms they would be
as follows:-

(a) the immediate and vital requirement would be the provision at
once of first line aircraft (including flying-boats), destroyers,
light naval craft, military equipment and supply necessary to
maintain our defence forces in being while our own production is
being disorganised by the enemy offensive and our reserves
expended. Personnel possibly on a voluntary basis to assist in
mantling ships and aircraft are also needed.

(b) for further prosecution of the war we should require
arrangements to ensure:-

(1) the stoppage at the source of all supplies to enemy countries
and territories in enemy occupation and full co-operation in our
contraband control against the remaining European neutrals
including Asiatic Russia.

(2) the supplies of food, munitions and raw materials, if
necessary on a credit basis.

(3) the provision of merchant shipping to ply between the Americas
and the United Kingdom.

(c) the Government of the U.S.A. should add to their declaration
regarding the West Indies a further declaration to the effect that
any alteration to the status quo in the Far East and the Pacific
would be regarded by them as a casus belli. ENDS.