2814 result(s) found, displaying 1171 to 1180
- … is noted that the proposals submitted by the United Kingdom authorities 'have been formed in the light of the long term strategic policy in South East Asia, which is to make Australia in any future war the main support area in the Far East'. It … for such matters as uniformity in organisation, training and equipping of forces and in co-ordination of supply, strategic planning must await the clarification of political arrangements for security and the provision of effective … is noted that the proposals submitted by the United Kingdom authorities 'have been formed in the light of the long term strategic policy in South East Asia, which is to make Australia in any future war the main support area in the Far East'. It …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-12/166-chifley-to-williams
- … 39 Background Note by Prime Minister's Department to Cabinet Decision No. 113 1 Canberra, 23 March 1959 Top Secret Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy (Submission No. 59)2 The discussion of the strategic basis paper centred chiefly around what Cabinet regarded as a new approach to the problem of defence-i.e. the … 2013 … 39 Background Note by Prime Minister's Department to Cabinet Decision No. 113 1 Canberra, 23 March 1959 Top Secret Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy (Submission No. 59)2 The discussion of the strategic basis paper centred …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-28/39-background-note-by-prime-ministers-department-to-cabinet-decision-no-113
- … You can bet your shirt on it that all this has registered in Jakarta with Ali Murtopo and his group from the Centre for Strategic Studies. At today's FAS meeting, the Secretary expressed concern about Portuguese Timor. It was he who was keen … our Embassy in Jakarta has passed copies of these two despatches on a personal basis to Harry Tjan of the Centre for Strategic Studies. [NAA: Al0005, 202/1/3, v] 1 Document 73. 2 See paragraph 5 of Document 73. Last Updated: 29 November 2013 … You can bet your shirt on it that all this has registered in Jakarta with Ali Murtopo and his group from the Centre for Strategic Studies. At today's FAS meeting, the Secretary expressed concern about Portuguese Timor. It was he who was keen …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-20/74-letter-from-joseph-to-cooper
- … and risks. Against this background, this report has two main objectives: to assess prospects for the long-term strategic relationship between Japan and China, and the implications for the political and security environment in East … community attitudes and relations with third countries including the United States. The chapter provides a summary of the strategic implications of economic and security issues described in subsequent chapters and also outlines the implications … and risks. Against this background, this report has two main objectives: to assess prospects for the long-term strategic relationship between Japan and China, and the implications for the political and security environment in East …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/asia-s-global-powers-china-japan-relationships-in-the-21st-century
- … and the Republic of Korea. The first ASEAN+3 Leaders' meeting was held in 1997. RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations involve the ten ASEAN Member States and ASEAN's six FTA partners – Australia, China, India, … were launched by Leaders on 20 November 2012. EAS The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a regional leaders' forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation on key challenges facing the East Asian region. Membership of the EAS comprises the ten … States and Russia. TPP The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiations are building on the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (P4) between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, which entered …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/trade-investment/trade-at-a-glance/trade-at-a-glance-2013/Pages/australia-s-participation-in-regional-economic-architecture
- … confrontation. During the talks, we made it clear that we did not accept the views on the long term political and strategic aims for South East Asia which were set out in one of the memoranda 3 made available to us before the talks began. … and that western power would be withdrawn from the mainland and be available in the background. We do not share this strategic concept nor the judgements which lie behind it. What we fear is that neutralisation of the region of South East … not comprehensive and, having regard to the realities, I feel that you and your colleagues may not, in fact, espouse the strategic concept and the judgements in the stark form in which they are there presented. In any case, these are matters for …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/volume-27/Pages/054-letter-downer-to-wilson -
- … is treated the same as any other non–dollar country. The principal distinction is that as with other Communist countries, strategic export controls are maintained and the 'China differential' is also maintained (see para. 6 below). Certain … apply to imports or possible imports from Mainland China of tin, tea and rubber (para. 9 and 10 below). Except for strategic goods the Australian Government in no way interferes with commercial transactions with Mainland China nor does it … Under this system the extent to which Australia receives most–favoured–nation treatment is not easily assessed. Strategic Export Controls: 5. Although Australia has not participated in drawing up the lists of commodities subject to …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/volume-22/Pages/075-submission-to-cabinet -
- … by the Self-Governing Dominions at the Imperial Conference of 1923. 6. On the development and defence of Regions of Strategic Responsibility, paragraph 5 repeats the views stated by me to the Conference on the method of approach to this … 6, and this again is a matter for initial examination by the machinery referred to in Part II. 8. In regard to Areas of Strategic Importance-Other than Main Support Areas, paragraph 7 outlines the broad principles to which the methods and … of the Commonwealth should:- (i) Accept responsibility for the development and defence of their Main Support Area and the strategic zone around it. (ii) Accept the principle of joint responsibility between members of the Commonwealth concerned …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/historical-documents/Pages/volume-12/172-chifley-to-attlee
- … 2017. In 2016-17, Australia's aid program provided $57.7 million in official development assistance to Bangladesh through strategic partnerships with the Government of Bangladesh, World Food Programme, UK Department for International Development … 2017. In 2016-17, Australia's aid program provided $57.7 million in official development assistance to Bangladesh through strategic partnerships with the Government of Bangladesh, World Food Programme, UK Department for International Development …https://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publications/Pages/bangladesh-aid-program-performance-report-2016-17 -
- … Summary of Publication The Sustainable Infrastructure Assistance Program II (SIAP2) is a partnership between Australia, Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which provides technical assistance to the … on the achievements and lessons of the earlier SIAP Phase 1 which ran from 2013 to 2019. SIAP2’s focus is on the GOI strategic priorities related to infrastructure in energy, transport, urban services, and water resources sectors. The Mid … 30 KB] SIAP2 MTR - Management Response [PDF 180 KB] … The Sustainable Infrastructure Assistance Program II (SIAP2) is a partnership between Australia, Indonesia and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which provides technical assistance to the …https://dfat.gov.au/publications/development/sustainable-infrastructure-assistance-program-ii-siap2-mid-term-review-and-management-response -