My dear P.M.,

BRITISH BLOCKADE RIGHTS AT SEA

You will, I feel sure, be as astounded as I have been at this
subject becoming a matter for serious discussion. [1] It is just
as if the chastity of some old and high respectable matron was
suddenly to become the subject of active debate. And when one has
got over the surprise and indignation of the subject being
discussed at all, one is oppressed by the weight of evidence that
can be marshalled against one's fixed ideas.

I will not repeat, or even attempt to summarise, the arguments
that are put forward, as they are fairly concisely presented in
the Cabinet papers that I forward this week under another cover.

However, I will allow myself a little criticism on broad lines
before the subject becomes so overlain with rhetoric and invective
that the wood is obscured by the trees.

First off, it seems to me that those who are for a drastic
alteration in our policy are basing their case on rather slight
and rather partisan evidence as to American motives and feelings
on this and other naval matters. On the evidence I would say that
Sir Esme Howard [2] bases his arguments to a great extent on
Colonel House [3] who, as Page pointed out in his 'Letters' [4],
is 100% American. Hankey [5] says that he sees the cloven hoof of
House in the whole agitation. He says that, wherever House is,
there discussion arises regarding our blockade policy, and he
quotes instances of this obsession both during and since the war.

He even suspects that General Preston Brown [6] (see C.P.258) was
put up to propagandizing at the British Military Attache at
Washington in this regard by House.

A talk that I had with Vansittart [7] ran as follows. He is the
very intelligent head of the American Department of the F.O., and
in this matter sides with Tyrrell [8] for a thorough soul-
searching with a view to approaching America with the idea of at
least compromising on the subject of Blockade.

I said that I couldn't see that the American threat of a super-
Navy need necessarily be linked up with our insistence on our
traditional Blockade rights. If we were at war and America
neutral, then presumably our Navy would be in part held by the
enemy and, anyhow, would be more or less dispersed over the world,
so that America would need a fleet of considerably less strength
than ours in order successfully to combat our blockade claims
regarding their (American) shipping. And even short of a parade-
in-force of their naval strength, they hold the trump cards, as a
determined and sincere threat to close their doors on us in war in
the matter of war supplies would be quite sufficient to force us
to leave the American mercantile marine alone, whatever the
destination of their cargoes.

Vansittart said that this was so, in fact, but that it was their
advice that the Big Navy party in America were basing their claim
for support in the matter of a big increase in naval construction
on the necessity of 'calling our bluff', and that if we were able
successfully to negotiate with the U.S. Administration on the
question of blockade, we would cut the ground from under the feet
of the Big Navy people.

However, I can't see that this is a watertight argument.

Presumably the Big Navy people are not fools and their real reason
for wanting a super-Navy is probably a combination of the
stirrings of American Imperialism, together with a fortuitous or
otherwise connection with the steel and armament firms. These real
motives are not those on which to base a popular appeal, so it
would seem reasonable to suppose they choose one that involves a
little popular twisting of the lion's tail. If we, by the
sacrifice of a weapon that went a long way towards winning the
last war and will presumably be not altogether valueless in the
next, cut this argument out of their mouths, it seems to me that
it will not take them long to find another, and we will have made
our sacrifice in vain.

I cannot believe that America's serious reason for the proposals
to build a super-Navy is based on the combatting of our blockade
policy in war.

The Big Navy people, the F.O. tell me, are composed of retired
Admirals, '100%' Americans (who say, like any other parvenus:

'We've got the money, why shouldn't we have the biggest and best
of everything'), and the steel and armament manufacturers. They
have as a coterie no settled political convictions but go to both
party conventions and let both parties compete for their support,
which is considerable. They are probably rather more Republican
than Democrat, but their views cut across the normal party lines.

The F.O. say that even the rawest-mouthed of the Big Navy people
do not venture to think possible a war with Great Britain. If
challenged by an Englishman they would probably shift their ground
a little and point to the 'Japanese menace', and, if pushed a
little further, they would come out flat and say-that there are
twice as many white people in the U.S. than in the whole British
Empire put together, and that they've got the world's wealth, so
why shouldn't they, if they wish, aspire to police the world as we
have hitherto done but can no longer afford to do satisfactorily.

And, they might add, 'We want to keep you British in order and
show you that you can't bounce us any longer'.

As Vansittart continued, there was really but little comment at
first in the U.S. on the failure of the Coolidge Disarmament
Conference. [9] People said that it was a pity and that it was
probably a case of too many technical experts, but that at any
rate no harm was done. Then came Cecil's resignation [10] and his
strong condemnation of H.M.G.'s policy and conduct of the Coolidge
Conference. Then (vide Vansittart) the Americans opened their eyes
and began to wonder where the nigger had been in the woodpile -
they began to wonder what was really behind what they were told
was our stiff and uncompromising attitude. The Big Navy people in
the U.S. used this to the uttermost and have been busy
capitalising on the consequent rumours and uncertainties ever
since, until the man in the street in America is in the frame of
mind that he says, 'Well, whatever the future, it's best to be on
the safe side and have some more ships-its our right and duty to
be at least equal to England in all respects'.

The F.O. are at one on the statement that Lord Cecil's resignation
was the one incentive necessary, after the failure of the Coolidge
Conference, to bring about a recrudescence of the Big Navy
activities-a rather ironical anomaly.

Although it might be inferred from the tone of the article in the
'Nation' of 17th December that the Liberals would endorse a change
in our policy, I am told from a reliable quarter that Lloyd George
[11] is against any change. The Labour Party would, I am told,
support a change in our blockade policy.

You will gather from this letter, for what very little it is
worth, that I react, as I think you will at first blow, from any
change in our blockade policy. But this is not to say that I am
not profoundly impressed by the arguments of the other side. The
whole question wants more data from America and most exhaustive
discussion here.

You will have seen, in the Press reports and elsewhere, mention of
the visit of Mr. Wickham Steed (sometime Editor of the 'Times') to
the United States on a lecturing tour at the invitation of the
Union of Churches of America. His main object was to try and get
the idea accepted (or at least started) that the United States
should place a ban on trading with or otherwise, aiding any nation
declared an aggressor by the League, or if that is thought to be
going too far in entanglement, at least that the U.S. Government
should make a declaration to the effect that American nationals
traded with an aggressor at their own risk. Wickham Steed claims
to have had considerable success on these lines and it is
apparently a fact that he has induced Senator Capper [12] to
introduce a resolution or a bill (I am uncertain which) into
Congress somewhat on these lines. Wickham Steed saw Mr. Coolidge
and had an hour or two's conversation with him, and states that
the President took the idea quite well. He subsequently told the
Press that he had been interested to hear Mr. Wickham Steed's
ideas but was not as yet convinced of their practicability.

I had heard of the above from several sources, but the above is as
it was told to me yesterday by Sir Austen Chamberlain [13] who had
an hour and a half with Wickham Steed the day before. He says he
is a tremendously vain man, and that he has to discount his own
account of his success. However, for all that, Sir Austen is
definitely interested in the movement and thinks that it may have
a hearing on the Blockade claims business, if Wickham Steed's
suggestions are implemented, and he looks forward to Sir Esme
Howard's despatches from now on to see what sort of ground the
seed has fallen on.

Naturally my conversation with Sir Austen mainly centred round
this Freedom of the Seas question. He did not put up any arguments
that are not set out in his memorandum amongst the print on the
subject that I send you. He gave me clearly to understand that his
mind was far from made up on the subject and that he was not going
to be rushed by his Department, some members of which thought that
the matter was a more urgent one than he himself was convinced it
was.

In any event, he said, it was a question of such importance that
it cannot be rushed and it is inconceivable that we should be able
to thrash it out before March and that, in his mind, was too near
the Presidential election for it to be practical to approach the
Americans.

I am, Yours sincerely,
R. G. CASEY