The following is a summary of Schuurman's letter dated December
20th in reply to Cochran's letter December 1[7]th (K211). [1] A
copy was forwarded by air bag to-day.

The visits of Stikker and of the special Delegation clarified the
position of the parties regarding certain basic issues but
discussions broke down because 'at the very last minute Hatta had
to admit that several of his statements were not endorsed by his
Government'. The assurances in Hatta's letter to Cochran [of 13th
December] [2] were too vague to be accepted by the Netherlands
Government as a sufficient basis for resumption of negotiations.

The purpose of the Netherlands letter of December 17th (K210) [3]
was:-

'To solicit an unambiguous declaration of the Republican
Government which could easily have been given had it been willing
to do so as it was familiar with the questions involved'.

2. To the Netherlands letter of December 17th an earlier reply was
requested than was originally intended in view of the following
developments:-

(a) an almost hourly increase in the number of incidents;

(b) reports of concentration of 100,000 Republican troops on the
status quo line and announcement of general manoeuvres of the
Republican army;

(c) an official announcement broadcast on December 16th by the
Republican Radio setting out the Republican position regarding the
Supreme Commander over the Armed forces and during the interim
period of the Republican Army in the Federal forces, in terms
entirely different from those in Hatta's letter of December 13th.

The Netherlands Government could only conclude that Hatta's
opinions were not endorsed by the Republican Government and that
requests for a binding declaration had become pointless;

(d) The announcement that the president and six Ministers would
depart from India 'furnished additional proof that the Republican
Government was not willing to give serious consideration to the
proposals advanced by the Netherlands Government'.

3. Despite Cochran's endeavour to bring the Netherlands letter to
the attention of the Republican Government, no reply has been
forthcoming from the Republic. 4. Regarding the substantive points
raised in Cochran's letter (para 1(c) of K211) Schuurman states
that:

(a) The first condition in the Netherlands letter (para. 1 (e) of
K210) is in no way contrary to the Renville principles as claimed
by Cochran.

(b) Regarding the second and third conditions in the Netherlands
letter which were the basic issues in the dispute, 'The
Netherlands Sovereignty implies that high representative in
certain circumstances should have the ultimate power of
intervention or overrule while no "private armies" should exist.'
Further protracted negotiations would be of no avail if agreement
on these basic issues proved clearly impossible. Though informal
discussion had failed to bridge the existing differences the
Netherlands letter of December 17th offered a final opportunity
for the Republican Government to agree on these points.

(c) In view of the increasing number of truce violations and
evidence that the Republican authorities have issued instructions
for widespread disturbances in the Netherlands-controlled
territory in the very near future the
Netherlands considered a settlement of this question must precede
political negotiations.

5. In all sincerity the Netherlands Government is convinced that
it has exhausted all possibility of reaching an equitable
settlement.

'The certainty that the Republican Government was unable or
unwilling to co-operate to this end has finally forced the
Netherlands Government to resume its freedom of action and to
carry out without further delay the programme which will lead in
the shortest possible time to the establishment of a Sovereign
Government corresponding with the wishes of the large majority of
Indonesians.'