Your D 854 and 855 Trusteeship Agreements. [1]

1. We have now received U.S. comments on the agreement for New
Guinea. [2] The proposed revisions apparently start from the point
at which agreement had been reached with UK officials last June.

Whilst we wish to minimise points of difference with the U.S.

before the Assembly opens, we feel that many of their proposals
are unacceptable.

2. We feel bound to resist American pressure for inclusion of the
phrase 'on behalf of the United Nations' in Article 2 and agree
completely with the view expressed by you on this point in your
855. [3] We have already communicated our views to the New Zealand
Government and are awaiting their comments. Objections to
inclusion of this phrase can be elaborated at length but are based
primarily on the 'Trusteeship' character of the proposed system of
international review as distinct from the 'Agency' concept of the
Mandate system. In our view, under the provisions of the Charter,
administration is a national task and supervision an international
obligation.

3. We are convinced of the desirability within the wide limits of
the Charter of retaining the fullest possible powers of discretion
and initiative in the administering Authority. The Trustee Power
should be at liberty to work out proper principles of
administration appropriate to a particular territory. The
territories under trusteeship will vary so greatly from the point
of view of stage of development attained that it would not be
feasible to lay down general principles of administration which
would necessarily hold good for all trustee territories. We have
in mind the primitive character of the native inhabitants of New
Guinea and the Japanese Mandated Islands. For example, the United
States has suggested provisions requiring administration to
promote full employment, equal pay, wages etc., to guarantee
'freedom of migration and movement' and of press and assembly.

Such provisions take insufficient account of the present condition
of primitive populations living on subsistence agriculture, and
are in so absolute a form as to limit unduly the Trustee State's
discretion. They also take no account of the distinction between B
and C class Mandates. United Kingdom view appears to be based on
experience of B class rather than C class Mandates. The essential
feature of the Trustee concept is the granting of ample powers to
the Trustee Power so that its necessary capacity to act under
changing conditions will not be impaired. Our draft will make that
clear, for instance in relation to the undertaking to apply
appropriate International Agreements (Article 7 of your revised
draft for Tanganyika), and will adopt similar attitude to clauses
(if any) accepting obligation to promote social or political
objectives.

4. In general we are opposed to the repetition or over-elaboration
of obligations already defined or implied in the Charter. We shall
insist upon a short draft. We understand that South African
Government anticipates you will favour South African Mandate being
incorporated in South Africa. If so we are at a loss to understand
why you should wish to support amendment of our draft which
accepts trusteeship. Unless great care is exercised, position will
end by disapproval of South African request, to which we certainly
are not committed.

5. In attempting to make the obligations of Article 76 more
explicit, the U.S. comments place undue emphasis on the provisions
requiring equal treatment of all members of the United Nations.

They recognise the limitations arising from considerations of
'security' and 'public order' and also from necessity for
compliance with the 'law' of the Trust Territory. The Charter,
however, is quite specific in requiring that such equal treatment
is also subject to attainment of the other objectives of the
Trustee system, especially the advancement of the welfare of the
inhabitants.

6. States directly concerned. Our view throughout has been that
this phrase can only cover those States with an interest
recognised at International law. However, we have chosen to
consult with governments whom we believe to be interested,
including U.S. but this is expressly without commitment to any
interpretation of the phrase 'states directly concerned'. In our
case, therefore, the United States will not be at a disadvantage
as compared with any other State in regard to amendments which may
be proposed to our draft. We agree, however, with the New Zealand
Government's comments (Paragraph 4 of 229 to Dominions Office)
that at the Assembly our Agreement should be considered on its
merits and discussion of the 'states directly concerned' issue
avoided as far as possible. We agree with the suggestion made in
the United States Aide-Memoire (See your D.877) that Mandatories
should present draft terms of Trusteeship without specifying the
States which have concurred in the Agreement.

7. We also think no final action should be taken regarding
Trusteeship of New Guinea and other C class mandates until we have
clear view of proposed Trusteeship or joint Trusteeship of
Japanese Mandates (also C class). It is quite impossible for us to
dissociate these subjects completely: we fully expected U.S. co-
operation in relation to New Guinea, especially in view of pending
negotiations regarding Manus Island, and we really feel that there
is obviously no liaison between that section of the State
Department dealing with bases and that dealing with dependent
territories. Perhaps the same situation exists in London as
between officers dealing with Trusteeship and those dealing with
Security in Pacific, including bases: in view of this we ask that
present telegram be shown to Prime Minister.