TOKYO, 5 April 1946
Received 7 April 1946

TOP SECRET

1. On Thursday I saw MacArthur. Privately talked for one hour.

MacArthur expressed warmest friendship for Australia and gave me a
most cordial welcome. He assured me that despite his initial
opposition to the establishment of the Allied Council, he would
now do everything possible to make its work influential and
effective.

2. MacArthur's analysis of the existing political situation in
Japan was dominated by his urgent and repeated warnings against
Russian policy towards Japan. He said that Russia's policy was
directed towards sabotage of Allied policy, in order that Russia
might subsequently build here upon the Japanese communist party a
satellite state. MacArthur is convinced that the Japanese
communist party is completely controlled by Moscow. He said that
the Russians here in pursuit of this policy made bitter vituperous
attacks against the Allies and that these attacks were based on
deliberate falsehoods. He believes that Derevyanko though probably
a gallant soldier is hopelessly stupid about non military
questions. This does not prevent him being offensive in his
manners and methods.

3. The first Allied Council meeting was held this morning. This is
an interim report based on memory since transcription is yet
unavailable.

(a) MacArthur in his opening speech made the following references
to the constitution. 'A new constitution has been evolved,
patterned along liberal and democratic lines which the Japanese
Government intend to submit for consideration to the next incoming
National Diet. This proposed new constitution is being widely and
freely discussed by the Japanese people who show a happy
disposition to the subject which has had critical public
examination through the media of the press and radio. Regardless
of changes in form and detail which may well result from this open
forum of public debate and ultimate consideration of the National
Diet and Allied powers, if the underlying principles are
substantially the same when finally adopted the instrument will
provide the means that will permit development in Japan of a
democratic state fully conforming to existing Allied policy.'
(b) You will notice that he made no reference to possible other
drafts nor any specific reference to the right of Far Eastern
Commission to pass on the final draft before it becomes operative.

[2] Throughout his speech, MacArthur made no reference to F.E.C.

(c) He gave some time and emphasis to protest against 'those
members of the commercial world who raise their voices in sharp
and ill-conceived criticism of our occupational policies.'
4. The Russian member disagreed with S.C.A.P. proposal that all
formal meetings of the Council should be in public and proposed
instead that all should be closed and if necessary, press
communiques issued. I suggested a compromise whereby two types of
meetings should be held, one to deal with final discussions of
major principles and the other to deal with preliminary
discussions and technical details. The Russians withdrew the
proposal and the meeting unanimously accepted my compromise.

5. The Russian member requested that copies of all orders from
S.C.A.P. to the Japanese up to date, all papers received from the
Japanese Government in answer to S.C.A.P.'s memoranda and
translations of all orders issued by the Japanese Government in
compliance with orders from S.C.A.P. be made available to the
Council. I supported the Russians in substance with the
qualification that I did not know what physical problems were
involved in supplying the material sought. The Chairman said that
this arrangement was. conceded in principle in MacArthur's speech.

6. The Russian member asked that copies of all S.C.A.P. [projects
should be] [3] brought to the notice of Council members at least
seven days before they were due to become operative. I supported
the Russians views on the importance of giving the Council
adequate time for consideration without committing myself to
support their specific request for seven days notice. The Chairman
said that the Supreme Commander had agreed that all directives in
draft would be submitted to the Council before issue but
insistence on the Russian period of notice might be a restriction.

The matter was carried no further, but remained in the minutes for
submission to the Supreme Commander.

7. The Russian member requested that three deputy secretaries
general be appointed to the secretariat to work under the American
Secretary General, one to represent each of the three powers. I
explained that I was without instructions and suggested
postponement of this question to the next meeting. The Russian
request was duly noted and it was agreed to place this question on
the agenda of the next meeting.

8. When matters on the agenda were exhausted Derevyanko asked that
in view of the 'activisation' of conservative candidates the
Supreme Commander should issue a warning to the Japanese people
before the election that if the majority of candidates proved to
be unacceptable, the election would be regarded merely as a test
and a new election ordered. The Chairman explained that S.C.A.P.

already has power to screen all candidates. Derevyanko urged that
the matter should be treated as urgent and the Chairman, while
pointing out that the Council was not in a position to treat this
as an agenda matter at its opening meeting, said that the Russian
request would be included in the minutes and passed on to the
Supreme Commander.

9. I formed the following personal impressions of the first
Council meeting:

(a) There seemed to be extra strong assumption both in MacArthur's
speech and subsequent chairmanship by General Marquat [4], the
Deputy Chairman, that all initiative should rest with S.C.A.P. and
that the Council should restrict itself to reviewing proposed or
present policy.

(b) There was evident, throughout the meeting, an atmosphere of
marked mistrust between the Russian and United States members.

10. Will you please instruct me on the following:-

(1) I assume that Council members should individually or
collectively seek not merely to review., but to initiate proposals
if they feel such proposals are necessary to carry out effectively
F.E.C. directives.

(2) I assume that I should do whatever possible to reconcile
American and Russian points of view, in particular, that I should
openly support those declarations of democratic principles which
the Russian member seems anxious to make while showing caution in
committing myself to support his specific request to S.C.A.P.

(3) The question of appointing three Deputy Secretaries General
will arise at the next meeting. Should I support Russia of the
opinion that a Deputy Secretary General should be appointed from
each of the three powers to work under the American Secretary
General, though my own view is that such appointments would tend
to create unnecessary administration complications [and] that we
can rely on present Service personnel for satisfactory Secretarial
service.