1. At the membership Committee [1], 12th March, it was decided
that countries represented at Bretton Woods could join the fund on
the original conditions within a period of six months from this
date.

2. I have seen no reason to modify my views as given to the
Government just before leaving Australia.

3. At some time if we do not join within the further time allowed,
we could join thereafter only on terms and conditions agreed by
the fund. These may be less advantageous than the original
conditions.

4. On the vital question of quantitative import restrictions to
safeguard the balance of payments there is no doubt here that the
United States intends to seek conditions and procedures that would
apply to the way in which restrictions would be imposed as well as
to supplying criteria to determine whether balance of payments
difficulties exist.

5. These conditions are unlikely to be onerous and may not extend
beyond prevention of discrimination.

6. On the other hand, if they were not satisfactory and Australia
at any time were refused exchange depreciation by fund to correct
balance of payments difficulties, the only solution would be
through inflation. [2]
7. The possibility of the fund being too
inflexible in its attitude to exchange depreciation or seeking to
discipline members faced by balance of payments difficulties
cannot be disregarded.

8. Final judgment on fund not possible until we know more about
United States loan to United Kingdom, sterling balances, United
States lending and employment policies and International Trade
Organisation.

9. We could join within the next six months with intention of
resigning later if these developments are unsatisfactory.

10. I do not like this course and it must be remembered that
International Trade Organisation may make resignation
impracticable.

11. On the other hand, if we do not join the fund, it seems likely
we shall be excluded from the International Trade Organisation.

12. While I do not urge this as a serious objection, the
Government should not ignore the possibility of loss. Unless the
fund and the bank are well managed, the fund may accumulate weak
or worthless currencies and the bank may acquire frozen loans. It
is partly to prevent this that the fund wants power to discipline
members.

13. The fund and bank are cumbersome instruments and good
management will not be easy.

14. A proposal now under discussion as to whether the twelve
Executive Directors, paid by the fund, should be full time or part
time employees needs consideration. With the fund constituted as
it is, former may be unavoidable. This may make the management
confused and seems too extravagant. [3]

15. Revenue may not be as great as expected. Because of heavy
charges and other obligations borrowing from the fund may not be
great except by countries with weak currencies.

16. While it may help to secure good management, from other points
of view, I find disturbing the practice which seems to be
developing of vital decisions being made at informal meetings by a
few large nations with little freedom left to formal meetings to
make amendments.

17. Because of overriding political considerations or other
complications, the Government may decide to join the fund in the
near future. In that case, I would suggest that the Government
seek whatever assurances it can get, particularly on the vital
question of quantitative import restrictions to safeguard balance
of payments. [4]