He would not express himself as optimistic or pessimistic about
the outcome of discussions, but said that he had formed a very
favourable impression of Sjahrir and thought [it] was mutual. He
informed SJahrir that he was going to act as 'broker' and said he
had to explain this term to Sjahrir. Clark Kerr said the United
Kingdom Government did not like the term 'mediator'.

He said he considered the Dutch proposals [3] extremely reasonable
and he had advised van Mook (with whom he gets on well personally)
to publish these terms immediately after the first consultations
with Sjahrir.

He had not been in Java long enough to form a real appreciation of
the situation. As I have already reported he promised to make all
information available to me or Brookes.

2. Van Mook. In my telegram 71 I have reported van Mook's very
strong feelings on the question of the Australian attitude on the
matter of Indonesian repatriation and relief supplies but in spite
of this the interview which lasted an hour was personally very
friendly. He was inclined to commit himself more than Clark Kerr
as to the successful outcome of the discussions and said he felt
even if Sjahrir could not get full support and they could not come
to a definite agreement the publication of terms would 'be a
complete justification of Dutch Colonial policy'. He said they had
accepted ultimate right of the Indonesians to self determination,
the open acceptance of which as you know from my previous signals
has been one of main stumbling blocks. He felt even if terms were
not accepted by the Indonesians in toto that there would be such a
body [of] opinion in favour of their acceptance that the
'Government' would lose a considerable amount of popular support
and that a moderate party would be built up, which would work with
the Dutch for implementation of the agreement. He also said he
thought that whereas previously time had been on the side of the
Indonesians, the situation was now reversed because of the acute
economic difficulties with which the Indonesians find themselves
involved. In this connection the first effects of famine are
already being felt in some of the provinces, and transport and
distribution are breaking down. This I confirmed from other
sources.

3. Generally speaking, in conversations I had with other people I
found the atmosphere less pessimistic than on my previous visit,
partly because the Dutch feel themselves in a much stronger
position. I also think that they consider they can expect a
stronger military policy now that Christison has gone. On the
other hand there is no indication that Sjahrir or anyone else has
full plenipotentiary powers and in fact there is really no united
voice at this moment among the Indonesians. Soekarno's influence
is still dominant but he is frightened to commit himself on any
matter of negotiation because he is not sure of the support he
could get either from the left or extremist elements. Sjahrir's
visit is obviously designed to try and get Soekarno to commit
himself as far as possible but it is felt in Java that, after
terms are presented, Sjahrir will still have to consult again with
Soekarno before he can discuss them in detail. You can understand
from this that it is very difficult to carry on negotiations with
a Government which in fact is not a Government but a collection of
individuals united on their main interests but by no means agreed
on, the means by which these interests should be achieved. There
is in reality no one force sufficiently powerful among the
Indonesians to commit itself and be sure of general support.

4. Regarding Australian representation I have already mentioned
that I think it is necessary for Brookes or myself to be
permanently there and AFNEI [4] have requisitioned a house for us
where we can have any conversations we wish. In view of Massey's
pending arrival in Singapore it will be necessary for me to spend
a considerable amount of time here. I have therefore suggested to
you that an additional assistant be sent up to work in Singapore
so that I can be completely free to move between here and Batavia
as circumstances require it. This additional assistant might well
be a member of Massey's staff as he would then be able to get into
the picture locally.

I also think that the Government should seriously consider
appointing a Consul-General at Batavia as British, Chinese, French
and Americans are already represented there. Although there is not
a great deal of commercial business at the moment, Australia's
future commercial interests could well be safeguarded by such an
appointment. He would, with the proper assistance, also be able to
report on political matters which will continue to be important
for some considerable time to come.

[AA:A1838/2, 403/2/2/2, i]

1 Dispatched 7 February, it conveyed Proud's discussions in
Batavia with Clark Kerr and Van Mook about the difficulties with
the repatriation of Indonesians and the shipment of relief
supplies from Australia.

2 See Document 64.

3 Based on Queen Withelmina's original offer of 6 December 1942 of
commonwealth status with Surinam and Curacao, the proposals
included the rights of self-determination 'after a given
preparatory Period', Indonesian citizenship, an Indonesian
parliament and cabinet with autonomy in international affairs
subject to Dutch veto, a constitution guaranteeing democratic
rights, establishment of a commonwealth cabinet for the Dutch
empire, and promotion of Indonesian membership of the United
Nations.

4 Allied Forces, Netherlands East Indies.