Historical documents
Cablegram D2267 LONDON, 20 December 1945, 9.38 p.m.
MOST IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET
My telegram D.2258 of 19th December. [1]
1. The preparation of peace treaties was further discussed at
Moscow on 18th December. M. Molotov maintained the position he had
taken up in London. The upshot was that the United States
Secretary of State agreed to concede the Soviet formula for Stage
1 (preliminary drafting of peace treaties) and for Stage 3 (final
drafting) provided that the Soviet Government would agree to
accept the United States/United Kingdom view on Stage 2
(expression of views by other United Nations) in the shape of a
conference composed of all five members of the Council of Foreign
Ministers and all states who had contributed substantial military
forces and had actively waged war against any European member of
Axis at which all could express their views. Mr. Byrnes circulated
the following list of these states:
United States of America Greece
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics India
United Kingdom Netherlands
France New Zealand
China Norway
Australia Poland
Belgium South Africa
Brazil Yugoslavia
Canada White Russia
Czechoslovakia Ukraine
Ethiopia
M. Molotov, while accepting the concession on Stages 1 and 3 as a
return to Potsdam decisions, would not agree to more on Stage 2
than to consider what states should be allowed to express views in
each case. He promised to circulate a Soviet list.
2. As regards states who should sign the peace treaties, M.
Molotov said that he saw no need for smaller powers to sign the
treaties at all; the Dominions would not need to sign separately
as the United Kingdom could sign for them. Mr. Byrnes and Mr.
Bevin maintained that every state which had declared war had a
right to sign the relevant treaties if it wished and Mr. Bevin
made it clear that Dominions and India who had signed the
Versailles Treaty and had made very substantial contributions to
common victory would certainly expect to be able to sign
separately.
3. In reporting the above, the Foreign Secretary summarises the
United States position as follows:
Stage 1 The deputies working on 4:3:2 formula [2] in strict
accordance with paragraph 3 (2) of the terms of reference of the
Council of Foreign Ministers. [3]
Stage 2 Council of all five foreign ministers to call a peace
conference composed of states listed as in first paragraph of this
telegram.
Stage 3 Conference to consider and express views upon drafts
prepared by deputies.
Stage 4 Final drafts for treaties to be prepared and approved by
'signatories' to the armistices as defined in the Council's terms
of reference on 4:3:2 formula.
Stage 5 Signature of final treaty texts by all those United
Nations who were in a formal state of war with a particular enemy
country.
4. At a subsequent informal meeting M. Molotov observed to Mr.
Bevin and Mr. Byrnes that the list as in paragraph 1 above ought
to be shortened, and that in particular India should be removed.
India was not an independent country, had no foreign office and
was not in relations with the Soviet Union.
5. Mr. Bevin replied that Indian troops had fought in great
numbers in many theatres of war, India was a member of the United
Nations and had been a foundation member of the League of Nations.
6. M. Molotov rejoined that if India were included he would have
to claim inclusion of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who had also
fought in the war and had also been members of the League of
Nations.
7. Mr. Byrnes said that he understood that India was the only
country to which M. Molotov took exception and pressed for
acceptance of the United. States list with the single deletion of
India. Mr. Bevin insisted that India should be retained. Mr.
Byrnes subsequently informed Mr. Bevin privately that the United
States Government could not accept the addition of the three
Baltic republics to their list.
8. Mr. Bevin comments to us that the admission of the three Baltic
republics to the peace conference might entail their recognition
and perhaps their admission in due course to the United Nations
Organisation. But he feels that if recognition of their new status
within the Soviet Union is inevitable sooner or later, it might be
preferable to recognise them as separate states however
fictitious, rather than to recognise merely their absorption into
the Soviet Union.
9. Cabinet to-day considered the situation. We think it essential
that having regard to India's membership of the League of Nations
and the United Nations and the outstanding part she has played in
all theatres of war, she should not be excluded from the proposed
conference. The Foreign Secretary is accordingly being informed
that if it should be necessary in order to secure the inclusion of
India, we should be disposed not to object to the inclusion of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, that if he desires to make this
concession in order to secure the inclusion of India we should
wish first to consult Dominion Governments and that we are
communicating with you accordingly.
10. Should be glad of earliest possible expression of your views
on this issue as to the Baltic republics. Please reply by most
immediate telegram.
11. On the question of procedure set out in paragraph 3 above we
feel that the United States Stage 4 cannot be accepted.
[AA : A1066, E45/1/30]