I hope that my telegrams, though fragmentary, may have given you a
reasonably coherent picture of the Java situation as I see it. I
must emphasise 'as I see it', because while I realise that what
you want is fact and not opinion, facts are nearly unobtainable
here and an opinion is about the best I can send you.

On reading my telegrams to you, there is only one opinion I would
want to qualify. In my first days here I think I was rather too
credulous and uncritical in accepting Dutch and British official
stories of Japanese complicity in the present troubles. The
evidence of present Japanese collaboration with the Indonesians
now seems very fragile, though undoubtedly the Indonesians are
using arms handed over to them by the Japanese in some areas.

May I try to summarize my impressions:-

The general Military and Political situation in Java
The official hand-outs give an incomplete and sometimes seriously
inaccurate picture. The general disorder, the shootings and street
battles, the burning bitterness between Dutch and Indonesians-
these are played down in official reports. For example, during the
last three days firing in Batavia has been almost continuous and
officers and other ranks have been advised or ordered not to
venture out after dark. There is every indication that violence
and bloodshed will increase.

The British Attitude
I believe a distinction should be drawn between the military and
political objectives. The military objectives are in themselves
straightforward-to capture the Japanese, to release POW's and
internees, and to get home. The political objectives are to
restore the status quo here and thereby maintain friendship
between the Netherlands and U.K. in Europe.

I find very sharp differences between the military purpose, as
typified by General Christison, and the political purpose, as
typified by Mr. Dening and Mr. Walsh.

General Christison realises that political and military programmes
interpenetrate at every point, and I believe that he is extremely
unhappy about the political advice he is being given. So far he
has felt bound to accept it, since he 'is only a soldier', but
personally I think he has the deep conviction that only United
Nations action can save the situation. I feel he is a very honest,
liberally-minded man, with a sensitive understanding of the basic
problems in human relations that are at stake here. He is unversed
in the jargon of politics: in which Dening is so expert. Perhaps I
can express my relations with Christison and Dening best by saying
that since Dening's departure three days ago there has been a
dramatic change in the General's relations with me. Instead of
being official and strained they have become intimate and most
cordial. I need not impress upon you that the faintest official
hint that there might be a fundamental difference of view between
Christison and Dening would be fatal to my good relations with
Christison, which I feel it very important to try to maintain.

Christison is going through some pains to try to arrange, on his
own initiative, that I have a long private talk with General Sir
Miles Dempsey [1] under the most favourable conditions. Dempsey is
his superior officer coming here from Malaya today.

Dening is, I feel, giving Christison and the U.K. Government most
unfortunate advice. He is eagerly, if not ably, supported by
Walsh. Dening and Walsh have devoted much time to giving me a
series of University Extension Lectures on the overwhelming
advantages to Australia of restoring Dutch rule here. Dening's
qualification seems to be (1) that he has spent many years in the
Far East and long ago got to understand the 'Eastern Mentality'.

This is a matter of learning a few simple rules of psychology
which will serve you through life; (2) a knowledge of the Foreign
Office line. Dening explained to me that this was only 'one of his
headaches' and Walsh went on to explain that Dening was very
anxious to get away as soon as possible to 'fix up' Siam. In a
word, I think the British political line here shows (1) a complete
failure to understand or care about Australia's interests, and (2)
an outlook and policy which will increase, and not lessen, all the
dangers that lie in the inexorable heightening of national
consciousness in South East Asia. There is, incidentally, a sharp
conflict between the official Dening-Walsh assessment of the
Dutch, and the very different assessment of those British officers
who have actually to collaborate with the Dutch in various tasks
here. The Dening-Walsh enthusiasm is elsewhere notably absent.

The Dutch Policy
As I have indicated in my telegrams the Dutch leaders seem to be
bewildered and pessimistic. They are full of resentments against
the British and of hatred for the Javanese 'extremists', which
term easily comes to include all Javanese who take an anti-Dutch
line, perhaps 90% of the nation. If, in 1942, at a time when the
Indonesians were considered friendly and tractable, it was
impossible for the Dutch to make an effective military stand in
the defence of these Islands, I feel that their future military
position, if they are returned here as a sovereign power, without
responsibility to the United Nations, will be infinitely worse. If
they were reluctant to arm the Indonesians before, how much more
reluctant will they be now, when, according to Dutch accounts, the
Javanese have learnt so much of the military arts from the
Japanese. I believe that the return of the Dutch to full sovereign
rights here under the cover of British military strength will
produce unlimited trouble.

There is a humanitarian problem not wholly unconnected with the
political problem. The plight of the Dutch and Eurasian internees
and POW's is pitiable. The condition of those that have not been
rescued is appalling-the constant fear of massacre, the endless
waiting for the help that does not come. I believe that the
behaviour of the Dutch women during internment is one of the
finest and most stirring stories of the triumph of the human
spirit over every sort of pain and physical indignity. There are
times when I feel there is only one thing that matters, and that
is, the immediate rescue and rehabilitation of these people. I
think that if Australia could offer temporary asylum to, say,
fifty thousand of these people it would be a humanitarian act that
would produce valuable political results. It would greatly impress
the Dutch and the British and not antagonise the Indonesians. It
would show Australia's intimate concern with what happens here
without involving us in military commitments.

The Indonesian Nationalists
As an emotional mass movement, nationalism, in the sense of
opposition to the restoration of Dutch Sovereignty, is nearly, if
not quite universal. This spirit is expressed in the most
fanatical form in the Youth Movement, whose members in their
general behaviour remind me very much of the Nazi Youth
Organisation I knew in Germany in 1938. Sjahrir himself deeply
deplores this pre-occupation with national as distinct from class
objectives. He wants to lead not a nationalist but a social and
economic revolution. He is much influenced by Marx but is a
Trotskyist rather than a Stalinist, since he keeps on insisting
that what Indonesia can accomplish is limited at every point by
the social and economic policies of U.S.A. and Britain. Perhaps it
is not important to examine Sjahrir ideology with great care,
since I doubt whether he or his 'cabinet' exercise any real
authority outside Batavia. Indeed, even in this city some of the
members of the Soekarno 'cabinet' seem to be de facto heads of
their departments. I should not be at all surprised if by the time
this report reaches you Sjahrir cabinet had been replaced.

I am convinced the Indonesians are not capable of governing or
defending Indonesia without continuous guidance and technical
advice.

Conclusion
If I may venture to express my own view of this situation it is
this; that however complicated the situation is in itself,
Australia's interests in it are comparatively simple. We cannot
afford to have South-East Asia, and much less the South-West
Pacific neatly divided into separate sections, in each of which
some European Power enjoys complete sovereignty. For if there is
another great war, each European Power will find itself so heavily
pressed in Europe that it will be over-committed in the Pacific.

If this was the position four years ago, it will be aggravated in
the future. In the Islands Dutch Sovereignty is likely to be
precarious, the ill-will between Dutch and Indonesians so bitter
and deep-rooted, that the N.E.I. will be a focus of conflict
between East and West. And from that focus the infection may
spread with menacing speed to many other countries in South-East
Asia.

That is why, in my view, collective responsibility and collective
action is so urgent here.

W. MACMAHON BALL

[handwritten postscript]

'My apologies for typing. Fairly clear no stenographer here.'

W.M.B.