For Mr. Curtin from Dr. Evatt.

Reference telegrams 75 and 76 to London from Washington. [3] Civil
Aviation.

1. The procedure now being followed by United States in isolating
various countries for two-party talks preparatory to a general
conference appears to leave initiative entirely in American hands
and Berle's memorandum puts forward a policy which, if accepted,
would leave the way wide open for American domination of the air.

2. It seems impossible to accept Berle's memorandum as a basis for
two-party discussions. In the first place we were not in any way
committed by the recent Anglo-American talks in London. Second, on
comparing Berle's memorandum with D.537 [4], we are not sure that
it fully and fairly records the results of those talks. Third, we
do not agree that any of the other proposals made for post-war
international collaboration in civil aviation has yet been ruled
out of discussion. The Anzac Declaration [5], the Canadian draft
convention [6] and the draft outline of an international air
convention prepared by a committee at the British Commonwealth
talks on transport last October [7] are still within the field of
discussion. Further Berle's memorandum does not link the
international control of air transport in any way with
international measures for security-a point which we insisted at
the Empire talks last October was fundamental.

3. So far as we are concerned, we stand by the Anzac Declaration
for internationalisation and commend it strongly to other nations
of the world, and if unable to bring it into effect, would prefer
either the Canadian or the British proposal of last October to the
policy summarised in the Berle memorandum. The present United
States policy seems to be to limit the objectives in the
international discussion on civil aviation to the minimum. Our
consistent view has been that we should aim for the maximum and
that unless a determined effort is made now to obtain a large
measure of international collaboration in this vital subject the
prospects of success in other phases of collaboration will be
endangered. The difficulty of trying at a later date to improve
upon an established system of air transport will be enormous.

4. The development of an air transport industry in Australia and
of aircraft manufacture is vital both for our own defence and to
enable us to make a due contribution to the security of the
Pacific. We can never again depend solely on imported aircraft for
meeting a sudden emergency, nor can we allow our supply lines
across the Pacific to rest solely in the hands of a single power,
however friendly. Therefore, if we cannot get internationalisation
we must ensure full Australian participation in flying national
services to and from Australia. The acceptance of a system of free
competition as envisaged by Berle, however, would virtually mean
the exclusion of Australia and New Zealand from operation of
overseas routes. The United States is now in a position to open
civil trans-Pacific services immediately and doubtless United
Kingdom could also resume flying on the Australia - England
service, but we have neither aircraft nor organisation to
participate immediately. If the United States sustains its point
that an international authority should not control frequencies in
the initial stages but later could prevent new services from
causing unnecessary and uneconomic competition, we would face the
prospect that when we were eventually in a position to fly Anzac
services it might be ruled that the route was already well served.

5. Great danger is presented to the place of British Commonwealth
in aviation by the American approach and the higher objectives of
international collaboration are being abandoned. We have no
information here regarding attitude of Soviet Union to post-war
civil aviation but consider that they too may contest American
attitude.

6. This message is being repeated to Dixon but I propose to
withhold instructions to him regarding a reply to the American
approach until I hear from you.