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64 Curtin to Churchill

Cablegram 56 [1] CANBERRA, 4 March 1944

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL IMMEDIATE

For the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister.

1. I received through the United Kingdom High Commissioner
cablegram Z.121 of 15th December [2], forwarding a summary of the
main conclusions on military matters approved at Cairo. [3] This
message contained a brief statement of the operational measures
proposed in order to achieve the defeat of Japan, and stated that
the main British - United States effort will be made in the
Pacific along the New Guinea Netherlands East Indies - Philippines
axis and against the Mandated Islands. There are also the
operations in the South East Asia Area.

2. Both General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz have recently
expressed views in interviews with the press on the strategy
required to bring about the defeat of Japan. Both have emphasised
the necessity for combined efforts by all three forces-ground,
naval and air. General MacArthur has stated that the strongest
military element of Japan is the Army which must be defeated
before our success is assured and that this can only be done by
the use of large ground forces. Admiral Nimitz has stated in the
press that his objective is to move both ground and air forces
across the Pacific into China, as early as possible, because he
does not believe that Japan can be defeated from the sea alone.

3. I would appreciate fuller information of the decisions reached
at Sextant and the nature of the planning that is in hand to give
effect to the broad strategic conception which was agreed upon
there. I should be grateful if this information could be made
available to me before leaving Australia, as I would like to be
aware of the prospective strategic background of our war effort in
this theatre and to have any necessary consultations with the
Government and its military advisers.

4. In view of the recent attacks on Truk [4] and the movement of
part of the Japanese Fleet from this base, could you inform me of
the opinion of your naval advisers on the probability of Japanese
incursions into the Indian Ocean and whether it is considered
possible they are likely to attempt a diversion to relieve the
pressure in the Pacific. If so, are they capable of or likely to
attempt anything more than raids, what are the probable objectives
and what is our capacity to repel such attacks?

CURTIN

1 Sent through the U.K. Dominions Secretary.

2 See Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol. VI,
Document 340, note 4.

3 A fuller account of the conclusions reached at the November-
December Cairo Conference (code named 'Sextant') was delayed. See
Document 38.

4 See Document 63, note 2.


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Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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