I have personally conveyed (and expanded verbally on) contents of
Prime Minister's Department's tel. No. 35 [1] to British and
American Chiefs of Staff here and to Harry Hopkins. [2] Harry
Hopkins was clearly disturbed by your decision and said that he
would have to see President at once. He said that the President
was ill, otherwise he would have taken me to see him personally.

Harry Hopkins said that the President was determined to do
everything in his power to maintain what he called the right flank
(Australia) of India-Australia line and to this end he (Hopkins)
believed that there were no limitations in the President's mind as
to what he would send to Australia for this purpose. The President
had already ordered Marshall [3] and Arnold [4] to send sufficient
forces to Australia to do the job, not half of what was sufficient
but more than were sufficient [sic]. Hence, in the first place the
30,000 American troops (for Australia and New Caledonia) that were
due to arrive in Australia in the coming week and the American
division that is to leave the United States for Australia in early
March (see my tel. No. 323 [5]). And these forces would not by all
[sic] means be the last.

At the same time Hopkins said that the President placed very great
importance on Burma and India. The difficulty was to get troops to
Burma and India without undue loss of time, such as would be
involved in sending American troops round the south of Australia
to that area. It was for this reason that the President was very
keen that at least one of the Australian divisions from the Middle
East should go direct to Burma or thereabouts and that at least
its equivalent in American troops should reach Australia from the
United States.

He said that he hoped that the President would send a personal
message to the Prime Minister of Australia to amplify what he had
said.