Following for the Prime Minister. [2]

NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES
Following further developments have now taken place since my
message of 29th April [3], regarding the question of a declaration
concerning the Netherlands East Indies.

(a) Mr. Hull [4] informed the Australian Minister in Washington
[5] on 28th April that, in the circumstances then prevailing in
Japan and the United States, the United States Government believed
that any more public declarations would do more harm than good,
but that they had and were taking every opportunity through
diplomatic channels to make it clear to the Japanese Government
that the latter would be unwise to believe the United States had
lost interest in events in the Pacific area.

(b) Mr. Hull informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington on
3rd May of his conversation at (a) and said that what he thought
would be most useful in the immediate future would be to arrange
for some further United States naval movements to take place.

Pending some such action, he did not feel that a declaration would
be of any real value, though he did not rule out the possibilities
of a declaration at a later stage, and he thought that if and when
such a proposal took shape, the declaration should be on parallel
lines and need not necessarily be made privately.

(c) M. Van Kleffens, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs,
in a farewell broadcast on leaving the Netherlands East Indies, on
6th May, while disclaiming all aggressive or challenging
intentions, promised a resolute reaction to any threat and
declared the willingness of the Dutch to fight if necessary and to
fight in alliance. He mentioned that the British Commander-in-
Chief of the Far East [6], whom he had recently met at Manila, had
indicated in a conversation with the press that a line running
from Singapore to Australia via the Netherlands East Indies must
be treated as one unit and M. Van Kleffens said that an attack
from outside on any point situated on this line must thus be
considered and dealt with as an attack on the whole line, and an
attack which concerned all affected parties alike. He concluded by
saying that something similar would also be felt by the British
Empire, and that all knew that America would give help to those
who showed themselves willing to assist in the struggle against
unprovoked aggression.

II In the meantime, the staff conference at Singapore with the
United States and the Netherlands participation has made
considerable progress. The Netherlands Government, however, have
drawn attention to the absence of any prior commitment or
understanding on our part, and while they are ready to ratify the
conclusions of the Singapore Conference, they would clearly
welcome an assurance that the plans drawn up at Singapore will, in
fact, be fulfilled on our side, should the Netherlands East Indies
be attacked.

III It may be argued that we should be running a risk by entering
into any commitment, since, in the event of war resulting from
Japanese aggression in the Netherlands East Indies, the whole of
our lines of communication from British territory in the Pacific
to the Middle East and the United Kingdom would be open to attack
by the Japanese navy, and, in the absence of United States
assistance, adequate forces could not be spared in the present
circumstances to counter this attack. On the other hand, the
Defence Committee of Cabinet, who have considered this question,
felt that it was most improbable that the United States would not
assist in the situation contemplated.

IV The Defence Committee felt, moreover, that it was unthinkable
for us to hold back in such circumstances. Our alliance with the
Netherlands and the necessity of safeguarding our own
communications would leave us with no choice but to make common
cause with the Netherlands East Indies. Arguments in favour of a
declaration to that effect are:-

(a) A response to M. Van Kleffens' broadcast is likely to satisfy
the Netherlands Government as to our intentions and so facilitate
solution of the questions left outstanding for political decision
by the Singapore Conference. Failure to respond is likely to raise
doubts in the minds of the Netherlands Government as to our
attitude and to weaken the will of the Dutch to resist.

(b) Help which the Netherlands East Indies can give to us in the
air and on the sea is by no means negligible, and their air
strength is increasing.

(c) We have hitherto been unwilling to enter into a commitment
without some prior evidence of support from the United States. But
the action of M. Van Kleffens in coming out into the open
introduces a new element into the situation, and evidence of firm
determination on the part of ourselves and the Netherlands
Government is more likely than anything else to induce the United
States Government to take corresponding action.

V The Defence Committee considered the possibility of private
assurance, but feels that a public statement, by making the
position clear, may have the additional advantage of deterring
Japan and encouraging not only the peoples of the Netherlands East
Indies but the peoples of other countries threatened by Japan. It
will show, also, that our attitude is purely defensive, whereas a
private assurance, if its existence leaked out, might be distorted
and misrepresented by the Japanese Government.

VI We therefore propose subject to the concurrence of the Dominion
Governments that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [7]
should make a statement on behalf of His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom, corresponding as closely as possible to that
of M. Van Kleffens.

VII Such a statement would welcome the determination of the
Netherlands East Indies to resist attack, emphasising that we,
like the Netherlands Government, have no aggressive intentions,
but that we have an interest in any move likely to prejudice the
security of the line which runs from Malaya to New Zealand through
the Netherlands East Indies and that we agree that any attack on
any part of that line equally concerns all affected parties, and
must be dealt with as an attack on the whole line.

VIII It seems clear that the statement should be made very
shortly, so that it may come as soon as possible after that of the
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs.

IX If the Dominion Governments agree, it would be valuable if,
when the statement is made, they would be prepared to give it some
kind of public endorsement.