Historical documents
Cablegram BA52 GAZA, 4 February 1941, 12.10 p.m.
IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET
Reference Latham's suggestion relative to Thailand [1], it will be
recalled from the British Minister's observations before my recent
visit that the Thais did not desire it to be of official nature at
the present time, for reasons stated. [2] While in Bangkok, I
spoke to Crosby, re returning the visit of the Mission and he was
of opinion that while it might be fulfilled at a not too distant
date, the immediate present was not an appropriate time.
While international courtesy requires that the visit of the Thai
Mission to Australia should ultimately be returned, my call on the
Prime Minister [3] when at Bangkok will cover this aspect until
Thailand is ready to receive a Mission and we can arrange for
appropriate personnel.
The dilemma in which the Thais find themselves has arisen from
circumstances beyond our own control. France's obduracy to
territorial adjustments and the U.S.A.'s stoppage of supply of
arms have combined to leave Thailand with a feeling that she is at
the mercy of Japan and is powerless to offer much opposition.
You will recall from staff conversations between the United
Kingdom and Netherlands East Indies representatives that it was
proposed that the crossing of latitude 6 degrees north by the
Japanese forces should be regarded as a hostile act, but the
United Kingdom Government intimated that a decision as to an act
of war would have to be taken in the light of circumstances at the
time, though planning should proceed on the assumption that war
might break out. [4]
While not expressing any definite conclusions at this stage as to
what action would constitute an act of war, I would point out that
staff conversations contemplated in my cablegram from Singapore
[5] will afford an opportunity for the fullest review of questions
of this nature.
If the Thais are to be urged to oppose Japan they will want to
know in the last resort what military and/or material assistance
they can expect.
A visit by an Australian Mission would no doubt make a
contribution to better relations but as the decisive
considerations are military I think that the immediate course is
to press on with staff talks at Singapore to which I attach the
greatest importance and at which, as advised separately [6], we
should be represented by senior officers.
MENZIES
[AA:A981, JAPAN 185B, i]