Please give the following message, which is of the highest degree
of secrecy, to the Prime Minister [1] for his most secret and
personal information. BEGINS-
1. Following is brief summary of recommendations received from the
Commander-in-Chief, Far East [2], and of our military advisers'
conclusions on these recommendations which have been communicated
to the Commander-in-Chief.

2. Commander-in-Chief considers that factors likely to influence
Japan to risk war with the British Empire are the serious
deterioration of our war situation in Europe, the liquidation of
the China war, Russian-Japanese agreement or seizure of control by
fanatic(al) [3] in Japan.

Comment-We agree generally but think that Russian Japanese
Agreement would not make much difference and that Japan would be
unlikely to reduce her present forces in Manchukuo or Korea
whatever agreement was reached with the Russians.

3. Policy of firmness necessitates closer relations with China,
Netherlands East Indies and Thailand and also-
(a) restriction of visas to Japanese to travel in British
territory and stricter control of Japanese visiting British ports;

(b) extension of system of prohibited and defence areas;

(c) stricter control of release of war supplies which are now
reaching Germany via Japan and Siberia.

Comment-Agree. (a) under active consideration here. Consideration
also being given to neutralization of Japanese system of using
consular representatives for espionage. Reference (b), action
being taken to extend system of prohibited and defence areas to
Sarawak and North Borneo. (c) is under constant consideration;

further progress depends on the cooperation of the United States.

4. Commander-in-Chief advises that firmness and confidence and no
appeasement would be most likely to prevent war.

Comment-This is the agreed policy of H.M. Government in the United
Kingdom.

5. Commander-in-Chief emphasised the importance of close relations
with China in order to sustain her resistance to Japan, and
recommended organization of mission to join Chiang Kai Shek [4]
immediately in the event of war between the British Empire and
Japan. Development of communications with China from Burma and
preparation of plans for support of China through Burma also
urged.

Comment-Military mission (which will probably include an air
representative) is being prepared and held in readiness. If
despatched this mission would come under Commander-in-Chief Far
East. Problem of improving communications between China and Burma
is already under detailed investigation. Meanwhile Commander-in-
Chief is being invited to give details of his proposals regarding
further arrangements for support of China.

6. Commander-in-Chief recommended that our propaganda should aim
at convincing Japan that attack on the Netherlands East Indies
would mean war with the British Empire and attack on British
interests would entail Netherlands East Indies' active
intervention. He recommended similar but less definite indication
regarding our reaction to aggression against Thailand and pointed
out that less rigid attitude of United States to Thailand,
particularly with regard to supply of armaments, would increase
the latter's powers of resistance to Japanese propaganda or
penetration. He raised the question of our policy vis-a-vis Indo-
China.

Comment-Propaganda policy in the Far East now under consideration
here. The United States Government has been approached regarding
relaxation of their present rigid attitude towards Thailand. In
this connection see my telegram D.610 of 14th December. [5]

7. Commander-in-Chief reports that in the event of war Japanese
would even now be up against difficult proposition before the
security of Singapore could be seriously menaced. He suggested the
following action for development of local military resources in
addition to reinforcements from outside Malaya:-

(a) Calling up of local volunteer forces for two months' training
in February and March subject to certain exemptions;

(b) Possible increase in civil armed police and defence corps to
supplement protection of vulnerable points, thereby reducing
immobilization of troops;

(c) Collection of 18 pounder saluting guns for anti-tank and beach
defence;

(d) Increased employment of civil aircraft and personnel and of
resources of flying clubs.

Comment-Agreed.

8. Commander-in-Chief also recommended:-

(a) provision from India without interfering with formation of new
divisions of infantry battalions equipped and trained only
sufficiently highly to undertake static duties in defence of
aerodromes and vital points and for internal security duties, thus
releasing present battalions for mobile role.

(b) that H. M. Government in the Commonwealth of Australia should
be requested to provide at least one infantry brigade group from
Australia.

(c) provision from Australia and India of artillery personnel to
assist in manning 18 pounders referred to in preceding paragraph.

(d) preparation of plan for immediate reinforcement by air and
land forces from India in emergency, such plan entailing no
commitment.

(e) supply from production in the Commonwealth in the first
instance of up to eight 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns and certain
other equipment.

Comment-Commander-in-Chief authorized to make direct approach to
Government of India regarding (a) and (c) and to H. M. Government
in the Commonwealth of Australia regarding (b) and (c). Sub-
paragraph (e) has been dealt with in my telegram No. 510 of 23rd
December. [6] Reference (d), Commander-in-Chief has been
instructed that plan regarding army units from India should be
based on acceleration of despatch of a portion of those
reinforcements already earmarked for Malaya.

9. Commander-in-Chief has also made certain recommendations as
regards replacement and reinforcement of existing resources in
aircraft. These recommendations are now under close examination
here and until this is complete it is not possible to indicate
what action will be taken upon them.

10. Commander-in-Chief advised that political agreement with the
Netherlands East Indies Government that aggression against either
British or Netherlands East Indies territory would be treated as
against both would considerably improve the situation. He added
that Netherlands East Indies Chiefs of Staff showed no dismay at
small forces we might have available and clear determination to
recommend resistance to any aggression against Netherlands East
Indies. Although the local Governor might be less steadfast,
military would welcome closest co-operation.

Comment-Question of political agreement regarding Japanese
aggression is still under consideration.

11. The Commander-in-Chief also emphasized that British-United
States co-operation is the most potent single factor in
restraining Japan from further aggression. He added that whereas
serious deficiencies exist in the Far East, he considers the
position probably better than would appear on paper. While there
are many difficulties he expressed confidence of overcoming them.

He emphasized that the establishment of military forces further
south in Indo-China or their penetration into Thailand would
however entail serious deterioration of our situation. ENDS.