Following is most confidential and every precaution must be taken
to preserve its secrecy. Reference questionnaire my telegram
number 441. [1]

I had long discussion with sub-committee of War Cabinet, Simon
[2], Halifax [3], Chatfield [4], Hankey [5], Eden [6] last night.

Following is result.

(3) (Will an early success by Germany against Poland determine
Mussolini [7] to come down on the side of those leaders in Italy
who desire that Italy should come into the war taking the German
side?)
Hopeful view was taken of Italy's continued neutrality on grounds
of increasing information as to hostility of Italian people to
entering war on German side and that Mussolini would not risk
discontent and possibly revolution that would follow war decision:

also that Mussolini as a realist would not desire a German
victory, resulting in a Germany so powerful that Italy would be at
her mercy. Even considered possible that as war progresses, Italy
might come in on our side.

(2) (Is an early success by the Germans in Poland likely to
influence the Turks to refrain from completing agreements with the
United Kingdom and France and to adopt an attitude of strict
neutrality?)
View was that Turkey will sign although insisting on hard bargain,
and in the event of Italy entering war or Roumania being attacked
would take military action.

(4) (How far can the Spaniards' neutrality be relied on,
particularly in view of the Ambassador at Rome communication of
8th September, see Stirling's cable?) [8]

View was that Spain will remain neutral and strong French opinion
to this effect was quoted.

(5) (How serious is the danger of Japan's attempting to fish in
troubled waters and how far would such a danger be offset by the
fact that a move by Japan might lead to United States
intervention?)
Nothing further to add to views in Dominions Office telegram. [9]

With regard to Danubian and Balkan countries, view was that it
will be possible for them to remain neutral and that they should
was in our best interests.

I feel that the picture given above tends to be too optimistic and
in discussion I put the arguments on other side but views I have
indicated were adhered to.

(1) (Is it contemplated that any steps can be taken which would
force the Germans to retain in the East forces beyond those
necessary to contain Poland and to ensure the neutrality of
Roumania?)
Answer is no. Forces necessary difficult to estimate, probably
fifteen to twenty divisions and relatively unimportant air force.

Position entirely altered should Germany decide to attack
Roumania.

(13) and (7) (Is it estimated that serious operations between
Germany and the Anglo-French forces would develop before the
winter? If so, have the French and British sufficient divisions
plus the necessary cooperation available to hold the Germans?) (Is
it considered that the Maginot Line is impregnable, irrespective
of number of German divisions available and the lessons the Polish
campaign has taught us as to the power of a strong air force
against ground troops and communications in interfering with
reinforcements and supplies?)
Not contemplated that major operations could develop in the
winter. Maginot and Siegfried lines are regarded as impregnable.

Only possibility of an attack was through Holland and Belgium, but
considered that it was unlikely that sufficient forces could be
transferred in time and at present no German concentration
reported on either frontier.

Assuming no major operation before the winter following points go
forward to spring.

(6) (In view of the apparent probability that Germany will suffer
a relatively small diminution of her man-power and equipment as
the result of the Polish campaign, how many divisions is it
contemplated that she could transfer to the Western Front?)
Owing to uncertainties as to developments in Poland cannot be
answered at present.

(11), (10) and (8) (How far is it contemplated that Anglo-French
assistance could be given in relatively open warfare that would
take place in Belgium?), (After such attack develops, how much
resistance is it estimated could be offered to it by the
Netherlands opening the dykes and flooding the country and by
armed resistance and Belgium by armed resistance?) and (Assuming
the Maginot Line on the German and French border is impregnable,
is it considered probable that the Germans will attempt an attack
through the Netherlands and/or Belgium?)
In case of attack through Holland and Belgium, it was contemplated
French and particularly British, who would be on the left, would
reinforce the Belgians on a line Scheldt-Leige. Owing to Belgian
neutrality and their refusal of discussions, difficult to make any
preparations. Further attempt is now being made to obtain their
agreement to staff talks. Could obtain no information as to the
value of Dutch armed resistance but flooding of country would
seriously embarrass the Germans.

(12) (Is immediate and extensive action being taken to strengthen
the Maginot Line between France and Belgium from the Ardennes to
the Coast?)
No-but discussions are now proceeding between British and French.

(14) (How far would the British forces be sufficient to take such
a reasonable proportion of the line of resistance to active German
attack as to avoid dissatisfaction on the part of the French as to
the share of the burden they were carrying?)
Considered certain that ten divisions will be in France by spring
and contemplated that at least twenty divisions within twelve
months all fully equipped.

(16), (17) and (18) (With Italy in, would it be contemplated that
any attack would be developed by the French on the French-Italian
border?), (Conversely is it contemplated that any German-Italian
attack would be developed against France?) and (How far would the
necessity of reinforcing Egypt reduce the number of troops
available for France?)
Owing to view indicated above that Italy will remain neutral these
were not discussed.

(19) (To what extent would our power to wage economic warfare be
diminished by dominating position the Germans will hold in the
East enabling them to exercise irresistible pressure on the
Danubian countries including unrestricted river transport of
supplies?)
This is being exhaustively examined by the Ministry of Economic
Warfare and I will advise you later.

Am still closely examining air position and much of the above may
be modified as a result of such consideration.

BRUCE