Annual Report 1999-2000
It is fundamental to the Governments
uranium policy that exports are permitted only under stringent safeguards. Uranium exports are made only to selected
countries and are covered by a bilateral safeguards agreement. Bilateral safeguards are concluded between
the supplier and the recipient of nuclear items and serve as a mechanism for
applying conditions additional to IAEA safeguards: for example, restrictions on
retransfers, high enrichment, and reprocessing. The safeguards requirements Australia applies to uranium exports
are bilateral; they are elaborated in a series of treaty-level agreements with
each country involved. These
requirements are outlined below.
The key point is that Australias
safeguards requirements are superimposed on IAEA safeguards.
IAEA safeguards provide the basic assurance
that nuclear material is not being diverted from peaceful to non-peaceful
purposes.
It should be noted that IAEA safeguards are
generally not concerned with origin attribution, that is, the flag and
conditions attached by suppliers (for the IAEA there are limited exceptions,
e.g. under certain non-NPT safeguards agreements). This is the purpose of bilateral safeguards agreements.
Australias safeguards requirements are
intended to ensure that:
- AONM is properly accounted for as it
moves through the nuclear fuel cycle; - AONM is used only for peaceful
purposes in accordance with the applicable agreements; - AONM in no way enhances or contributes to any military process.
Australias Safeguards Conditions
The application
of Australias requirements starts with a careful selection of those countries
eligible to receive AONM:
- it is a minimum requirement that, in
the case of non-nuclear-weapon States, countries must be subject to NPT full
scope safeguards, that is, IAEA safeguards must apply to all existing and
future nuclear activities; and - in the case of nuclear-weapon States, there must be a treaty level
assurance that AONM will only be used for peaceful purposes, and arrangements
must be in place under which AONM is covered by IAEA safeguards.
A basic
requirement is the conclusion of a safeguards agreement between Australia and
the country concerned, setting out the various conditions which apply to
AONM. The principal conditions for the
use of AONM set out in Australias bilateral safeguards agreements are
summarised as follows:
- an undertaking that AONM will be used only for peaceful purposes and
will not be diverted to military or explosive purposes, and that IAEA
safeguards will apply; - none of the following actions can take
place without Australias prior consent:- transfers to third parties
- enrichment to 20% or more in the
isotope uranium-235 - reprocessing[13];
- provision for fallback safeguards or contingency arrangements in
case NPT or IAEA safeguards cease to apply in the country concerned; - an assurance that internationally agreed standards of physical
security will be applied to nuclear material in the country concerned; - detailed administrative arrangements between ASNO and its
counterpart organisation, setting out the procedures to apply in accounting for
AONM; - regular consultations on the operation of the agreement; and
- provision for the removal of AONM in
the event of a breach of the agreement.
Safeguards Agreements and their Dates of Entry into Force
Republic
of Korea (ROK)
2
May 1979
UK
24
July 1979
Finland
9
February 1980
USA
16
January 1981
Canada
9
March 1981
Sweden
22
May 1981
France
12
September 1981
Euratom[17]
15
January 1982
Philippines[18]
11
May 1982
Japan
17
August 1982
Switzerland
27
July 1988
Egypt18
2
June 1989
Russian
Federation[19]
24
December 1990
Mexico
17
July 1992
New
Zealand[20]
1
May 2000
Australian
Obligated Nuclear Material
A characteristic of the civil nuclear fuel
cycle is the international interdependence of facility operators and power
utilities. Apart from the
nuclear-weapon States, it is unusual for a country to be entirely
self-contained in the processing of uranium for civil useand even in the case
of the nuclear-weapon States, power utilities will seek the most favourable
financial terms, often going to processors in other countries. Thus it is not unusual, for example, for a
Japanese utility buying Australian uranium to have the uranium converted to
uranium hexafluoride in Canada, enriched in France, fabricated into fuel in
Japan, and reprocessed in the United Kingdom.
The international flow of nuclear material enhances safeguards accountability,
through transit matching of transfers at the different stages of the fuel
cycle.
The international nature of nuclear
material flows means that uranium from many sources is routinely mixed during
processes such as conversion and enrichment.
Uranium is termed a fungible commodity, that is, at these processing
stages uranium from any source is identical to uranium from any otherit is not
possible physically to differentiate the origin of the uranium. This is not unique to uranium, but is also the
case with a number of other commodities.
The fungibility of uranium has led to the establishment of conventions
used universally in the industry and in the application of safeguards, namely
equivalence and proportionality. These
are discussed below.
Because of the impossibility of physically
identifying Australian atoms, and also because Australian obligations apply
not just to uranium as it moves through the different stages of the nuclear
fuel cycle, but also to material generated through the use of that uranium,
e.g. plutonium produced through the irradiation of uranium fuel in a reactor,
the obligations under Australias various bilateral safeguards agreements are
applied to Australian Obligated Nuclear Material (AONM). AONM is a shorthand way of describing the
nuclear material which is subject to the provisions of the particular bilateral
agreement.
This approach is also used by those other
countries applying bilateral safeguards comparable to Australias, principally
the US and Canada. These countries
attach a safeguards obligation to nuclear material which they upgrade, hence
giving rise to the situation of multi-labelling, for example, AONM enriched
in the US will also become US obligated nuclear material (USONM), and its
subsequent use will have to meet the requirements of both Australian and US
agreements. This is a common situation,
that is, a significant proportion of AONM is also characterised as USONM and is
accounted for both to ASNO and its US counterpart (the DOE).
The equivalence principle provides that
where AONM loses its separate identity because of process characteristics (e.g.
mixing), an equivalent quantity is designated AONM, based on the fact that
atoms or molecules of the same substance are indistinguishable, any one atom or
molecule being identical to any other of the same substance. In such circumstances, equivalent quantities
of the products of such nuclear material may be derived by calculation or from
operating plant parameters. It should
be noted that the principle of equivalence does not permit substitution by a
lower quality material, e.g. enriched uranium cannot be replaced by natural or
depleted uranium.
The proportionality principle provides that
where AONM is mixed with other nuclear material, and is processed or
irradiated, a proportion of the resulting material will be regarded as AONM
corresponding to the same proportion as was AONM initially.
Some people are concerned that the
operation of the equivalence principle means there cannot be assurance that
Australian atoms do not enter military programs. This overlooks the realities of the situation, that uranium atoms
are indistinguishable from one another and there is no practical way of
attaching flags to atoms. The
objective of Australias bilateral agreements is to ensure that AONM in no way
materially contributes to or enhances any military purpose. Even if AONM were to be in a processing
stream with nuclear material subsequently withdrawn for military use, the
presence of the AONM would add nothing to the quantity or quality of the military
material (NB as noted elsewhere in this Report, those nuclear-weapon States
eligible for the supply of Australian uranium have ceased production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons).
Accounting
for AONM
Australias bilateral partners holding AONM
are required to maintain detailed records of transactions involving AONM, and
ASNOs counterpart organisations are required to submit regular reports,
consent requests, transfer and receipt documentation to ASNO. ASNO accounts for AONM on the basis of information
and knowledge including:
- reports from each bilateral partner;
- shipping and transfer documentation;
- calculations of process losses and nuclear consumption, and nuclear
production; - knowledge of the fuel cycle in each country;
- regular liaison with counterpart organisations and with industry;
- reconciliation of any discrepancies
with counterparts.
[13]. Consent has been given in
advance to reprocessing on a programmatic basis in the case of five
Agreements: Euratom, France, Japan,
Sweden and Switzerland.
[14]. The above list does not
include Australias NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, concluded on
10 July 1974.
[15]. In addition to the above Agreements,
Australia also has an Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement with
Singapore Concerning Cooperation on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials, which entered into force on 15 December 1989.
[16]. The texts of these
Agreements are published in the Australian Treaty Series. The Australia/IAEA Agreement is also
reproduced as Schedule 3 to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act 1987.
[17]. Euratom is the atomic
energy agency of the European Union.
For further details see Glossary.
[18]. In the case of the
Philippines and Egypt, Administrative Arrangements pursuant to the Agreements
have not been concluded, so in practice the Agreements have not entered into
operation.
[19]. The Australia/Russia
Agreement covers the processing (conversion, enrichment or fuel fabrication) of
AONM in Russia on behalf of other partner countries, but does not permit the
use of AONM by Russia.
[20]. The Australia/New Zealand
agreement covers the supply of uranium for non-nuclear use.
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