Australia and Ukraine (hereinafter together referred to as 'the Participants'):

Reaffirming Australia and Ukraine's unwavering support for international law and the rules-based international order, underpinned by the United Nations Charter (UN Charter);

Recognising the importance of safeguarding international legal rules and norms, and pursuing a world where no country dominates and no country is dominated;

Gravely concerned by Russia's unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine through its full-scale military invasion in 2022, which continues to undermine international rules and norms, with serious consequences for global security, including the Indo-Pacific region;

Reaffirming Australia's commitment to supporting Ukraine as it defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity from Russian aggression, consistent with Ukraine's rights under Article 51 of the UN Charter;

Recalling the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine announced together by Group of Seven (G7) Leaders and Ukraine on the margins of the 2023 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Vilnius Summit (the G7 Joint Declaration);

Reaffirming Australia's commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters;

Emphasising Australia's desire to empower Ukraine to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with international law;

Reaffirming Australia's participation in the Coalition of the Willing for Ukraine, and support for the commitment outlined on robust security guarantees for Ukraine in the Paris Declaration of 6 January 2026;

Recognising the security of Ukraine is an integral part of the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, and further recognising the interconnectedness of Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security, and the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine;

Recognising the extraordinary strength and resolve of the Ukrainian people as they defend their sovereignty, territory and democratic principles; and

Noting with concern Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is compounding global food and energy insecurity, affecting some of the world's most vulnerable populations;

Have reached the following understandings to strengthen their security cooperation by pursuing the long-term bilateral security commitments and measures set out in this Agreement on security cooperation (hereinafter 'the Agreement'):

Section 1 - Introduction

1.1 Scope

1.1.1 The Participants acknowledge this Agreement is mutually entered into on the foundations of the Participants' unwavering commitment to international law, including the principles of the UN Charter. The Agreement is underpinned by the assistance Australia has provided to Ukraine since Russia's full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on 
24 February 2022, and the Government of Australia's commitment to support Ukraine as it continues to respond to Russia's illegal, unprovoked and immoral invasion. Russia's invasion has had global implications and highlights the interconnectedness of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security dynamics and challenges. In this context, the intent of this Agreement is to:

1. reaffirm the Participants' commitment to ongoing cooperation on military, security, political, diplomatic, humanitarian and energy issues;
2. acknowledge Ukraine's ongoing defence needs, and endeavour 
   to support them within Australia's strengths, capabilities, and resources;
3. identify potential avenues of Australian military and non-military post-war support to Ukraine, where appropriate, to bolster its capacities to prevent and deter against possible further aggression;
4. support Ukraine's pursuit of peace and security for its citizens, noting the criticality of inclusive peace and security processes that promote women's participation and leadership, while recognising differences in how its peoples – including women and children and persons with a disability – are affected by Russia's invasion; and
5. contribute to efforts to rebuild and reconstruct Ukraine post-war, including knowledge-sharing on democratic governance reform.

1.1.2 Australia will continue to consider ways it can support Ukraine in its efforts to repel Russia's invasion and any future aggression, including for the duration of this Agreement.

1.1.3 For the avoidance of doubt, commitments in this Agreement will be:

1. subject to Australia and Ukraine's international law obligations, including applicable international humanitarian law, international commitments, domestic laws and processes, and capacity; and
2. consistent with Australia's status as a non-party to the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

1.1.4 The Participants acknowledge this Agreement represents the political commitments reached between the Participants and will not be registered with the United Nations under Article 102 of the UN Charter.

1.1.5 In order to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of planning and implementation of this Agreement, the Participants will hold strategic consultations at a high level or a senior level.

Section 2 - Defence and security support for Ukraine

2.1 Defence and military cooperation

2.1.1 The Participants acknowledge continued and meaningful international support to Ukraine and the security and defence forces of Ukraine is a key determinant of their capacity to defend Ukraine against Russia's war of aggression.

2.1.2 The Participants recall the inherent right of all states to self-defence and the illegality of any attempts to redraw borders by force. Australia supports Ukraine's sovereign right to self-defence consistent with international law, including under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

2.1.3 Recalling that as of the day of signature of this Agreement, Australia has provided critical materiel and financial assistance to the security and defence forces of Ukraine, including munitions, guided weapons, air defence systems and armoured vehicles, amounting to A$1.6 billion (approximately €1 billion), Australia reaffirms its commitment to:

1. provide meaningful security assistance, as appropriate and aligned with Australia's capacity, to enable Ukraine to defend itself against Russia's current unlawful aggression, and to deter and repel any possible future aggression;
2. contribute to efforts to build the capability of security and defence forces of Ukraine personnel, such as the support Australia has provided through Operation KUDU, and through exploring further opportunities to support the development of training capabilities and professional military education for Ukrainian forces in Ukraine and abroad;
3. explore potential cooperation in relation to training centres;
4. explore opportunities for joint production of cutting-edge air defence solutions, missiles, drones and other innovative products, 
   in particular via setting up joint ventures; and
5. enhance Ukraine's defence capabilities, including by exploring opportunities to train or exercise together across various services and domains.

2.1.4 Recognising the interconnectedness of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security in the view of the growing threat that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea poses for both regions and global security by direct participation in the war against Ukraine, and Australia's shared interests with NATO and its member countries, Australia restates its commitment to contribute as an operational partner under NATO's Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU).

2.1.5 Recalling Australia's provision of uncrewed systems to Ukraine, Australia reaffirms its membership of the United Kingdom and Latvia co-led Drone Capability Coalition under the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG). Australia remains committed to continue working with Ukraine and Drone Capability Coalition partner members to further support the uncrewed systems capabilities of the security and defence forces of Ukraine.

2.1.6 With a view to contributing to peace and stability and deepening cooperation in the areas of defence and security, Australia will support Ukraine through provision of military training, exchange of lessons learned and capacity-building activities. This includes working together with partners – noting Australia is a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner, having entered into a Participation and Financial Arrangement with NATO regarding Australia's support for NATO's NSATU as an operational partner.

2.1.7 Ukraine greatly values Australia's contributions to the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL), including as the first non-NATO contributor to PURL alongside New Zealand. These contributions are an important demonstration of solidarity with Ukraine and reaffirm Australia's readiness, together with partners, to help address Ukraine's critical defence needs. Through PURL and other mechanisms, Australia remains committed to supporting the reliable supply of critical military equipment to Ukraine and strengthening Ukraine's defence capabilities.

2.2 Defence industry cooperation

2.2.1 The Participants recognise Ukraine's defence industry is a powerful asset for Ukraine, during its defence against Russia's unlawful invasion and in a post-war peace – contributing to Ukraine's economic recovery and serving as a deterrent of future aggression.

2.2.2 Australia will continue to engage Ukraine as regards opportunities for defence industrial partnerships and joint collaboration, including the exchange of defence and military technology, and assistance to support the needs of both Participants. This may include exploring opportunities for collaboration on production, repair, maintenance, or supply chain projects – potentially on the territory of Ukraine – which, without prejudice to any other areas of future cooperation, may cover uncrewed systems, maritime domain, air defence and missiles, and other critical areas.

2.2.3 Australia will work with Ukraine to identify potential joint projects in defence industry and will consider appropriate financing frameworks to support their development.

2.3 Rehabilitation and recovery of the Ukrainian security and defence forces

2.3.1 The Participants will work together in rebuilding the infrastructure of military healthcare facilities, medical education and training institutions.

2.3.2 The Participants will also collaborate to develop broader rehabilitation and reintegration options in support of Ukrainian veterans who are no longer serving.

2.4 Security cooperation

2.4.1 The Participants will work together to counter threats to the national security of Australia and Ukraine, in particular in the fight against terrorism and its propaganda, countering radicalisation, hybrid threats and preventing and deterring threats to critical infrastructure, including through information exchange and other forms of interaction.

2.5 Intelligence and information sharing cooperation

2.5.1 The Participants will consider opportunities for intelligence cooperation. This intelligence cooperation may include activities as mutually determined by the Participants that accord with domestic law and detect, prevent, or deter hostile state or non-state actors' subversive or malign activities.

2.5.2 The Participants will discuss steps for facilitating greater information-sharing between various Ukrainian and Australian Government agencies, including considering scope for future development of a relevant information-sharing instrument.

2.6 Border security and customs cooperation

2.6.1 The Participants acknowledge the importance of international cooperation to prevent and respond to increasing threats to Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific border security and Customs matters. Ukraine welcomes Australia's engagement with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to support and train the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine as it addresses urgent border security needs at Ukraine's Western and Southern borders.

2.6.2 The Participants will continue to collaborate in the field of migration and asylum, including establishing effective policies to address irregular migration. This cooperation will include ongoing efforts to address global migration challenges through major regional dialogues like the Budapest Process that Australia co-funds, as well as the IOM Inter-Governmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees mechanism.

2.6.3 The Participants intend to contribute to enhancing the integrity and resilience of the global supply chain by engaging through and leveraging the global customs frameworks and tools, as set by the World Customs Organization (WCO), in recognition of the WCO's role as the pre-eminent global technical organisation dedicated to setting best practice customs standards and delivering capacity building for development:

1. as members of the WCO, the Participants remain committed to 
   the 2015 WCO Punta Cana Resolution, as well as other WCO Declarations, Recommendations and Resolutions; and
2. the Participants also commit to the actions outlined in the WCO's Fragile Borders Action Plan, which provides guidance on customs' role in fragile and conflict-affected border situations.

2.6.4 The Participants will continue to provide access to their respective immigration programs and visa systems to citizens who wish to travel to, enter, or remain in each other's countries, and will consider options to streamline these arrangements where possible, subject to the requirements of these programs and systems.

Section 3 – Non-military support for Ukraine

3.1 Energy assistance and nuclear safety, security and safeguards

3.1.1 The Participants recognise Russian attacks on Ukraine's critical civilian energy infrastructure and nuclear facilities are unacceptable and must end.

3.1.2 Ukraine welcomes Australia's contributions to the Ukraine Energy Support Fund to date, which was jointly established by the European Commission and the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine to identify and meet Ukraine's highest priority energy needs via local providers.

3.1.3 The Participants will continue to engage on the evolving energy situation in Ukraine and explore options for potential further practical assistance.

3.1.4 The Participants affirm continued support for the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its periodic deployment of expert teams, in line with international humanitarian law, to provide independent, impartial and objective assessment of the nuclear safety, security and safeguards status of Ukraine's nuclear power plants, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. The Participants recognise Ukraine's sovereign right to exercise regulatory control over all nuclear activities, including the operation of nuclear power plants within its territory.

3.1.5 The Participants emphasise the restoration of nuclear safety and security is impossible without the full withdrawal of Russian military personnel and other unauthorised personnel from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and its immediate return to the full sovereign control of Ukraine. Australia commits to supporting international diplomatic pressure and sanctions to achieve this goal.

3.1.6 The Participants will continue to advance collaboration on nuclear safety, security and safeguards as envisaged under the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Ukraine on Cooperation in the Peaceful uses of Nuclear Energy that entered into force in 2017. This collaboration may include nuclear safety, radiation protection and protection of the environment, safeguards and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities, and use of radioisotopes and radiation in agriculture, industry, medicine and environmental research.

3.1.7 The Participants may explore avenues for cooperation in the supply of uranium for application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as part of Ukraine's efforts to diversify the fuel cycle for its nuclear power plants, in accordance with applicable international agreements and safeguards obligations.

3.1.8 The Participants recognise Australia's extensive experience in the development of renewable energy, including large-scale solar and wind generation. The Participants may consider sharing relevant knowledge and best practices to support Ukraine's clean energy transition and the long-term diversification of its energy mix.

3.1.9 The Participants may explore opportunities for cooperation in the training and professional development of energy sector specialists, drawing on Australia's academic and industry expertise in geosciences, energy transition, energy systems planning and management, and critical mineral mining and processing.

3.2 Humanitarian assistance

3.2.1 The Participants recognise Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine has produced a serious humanitarian crisis, with mass displacement and restricted humanitarian access to Ukrainians most in need.

3.2.2 Ukraine welcomes the humanitarian assistance provided to Ukraine to assist with the alleviation of this humanitarian situation following Russia's invasion. This assistance has helped to meet the needs of war-affected and displaced populations in Ukraine, including through ensuring access to food, water, shelter, healthcare and protection services.

3.2.3 Ukraine welcomes Australia's joining of the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children. Australia remains committed to continue working with Ukraine and Coalition partner-members in a collective effort to bring Ukrainian children home to Ukraine.

3.2.4 The Participants will continue to engage on the evolving humanitarian situation in Ukraine and explore options for potential further assistance.

3.3 Cyber security cooperation

3.3.1 The Participants recognise the pressing need to detect, disrupt and deter malign cyber operations and malicious use of cyber capabilities attributable to Russia, its allies and other hostile state and non-state actors. Subject to their domestic and international law obligations and requirements concerning security of information, the Participants will engage in information sharing about cyber threats, vulnerabilities and methods of responding to cyber incidents to proactively identify and deter the irresponsible use of cyber capabilities by Russia against the Participants and other partners.

3.3.2 The Participants will seek to work together to bolster cyber resilience by exchanging cyber advice, including on how to reinforce Ukraine's information technology (IT) infrastructure and how to modernise Ukraine's cyber and information security architecture.

3.3.3 Australia will share international best practice from its 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy as it seeks to become a global cyber security leader.

3.3.4 Australia will continue to use its autonomous cyber sanctions framework, as appropriate and applicable, in an effort to disrupt and deter the spectrum of perpetrators of malicious cyber activity, including those which may seek to target Ukraine.

3.3.5 Ukraine is ready to facilitate the exchange of experience in countering cyber-attacks during hybrid warfare and can provide recommendations on strengthening the protection of information and communication systems, considering its own experience in countering malicious cyber operations.

3.4 Economic cooperation, recovery and reconstruction

3.4.1 Australia acknowledges the profound challenge of meeting Ukraine's longer-term reconstruction and recovery needs. Australia will endeavour to assist Ukraine where Australia assesses it has both relative expertise and capacity. This includes working with Ukraine to develop well-functioning capital markets and access global financial institutions and insurance mechanisms to attract much-needed foreign investment and grow domestic finance in support of Ukraine's development and reconstruction.

3.4.2 Considering Ukraine and Australia are trading nations, and their economic growth and prosperity are inextricably linked to trade, and recognising the important economic and people-to-people relationships between Ukraine and Australia, as well as the importance of ensuring Ukraine's economic resilience and recovery in the face of damage caused by Russia's aggression, the Participants will:

1. work to strengthen Ukraine's economic stability and resilience, including through reconstruction and recovery efforts, and will promote Ukraine's economic prosperity;
2. cooperate on the attraction of private capital and investments in projects for the restoration, recovery, reconstruction and modernisation of Ukraine; and
3. further enhance and liberalise trade, including through the World Trade Organization and the Ukraine-Australia Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation, done at Kyiv on 17 March 1998.

3.4.3 The Participants welcome the multilateral initiatives established to support Ukraine's reconstruction and recovery, including the continuing work of the World Bank and the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development in sourcing the funds required for Ukraine and its people to prosper post-war.

3.4.4 The Participants will also continue to engage on the evolving financial situation in Ukraine and explore options for potential further financial and budgetary assistance, as appropriate and aligned with Australia's capacity.

3.4.5 Noting Ukraine has become one of the most heavily mine-affected countries globally, the Participants reaffirm the Lausanne Call for Action concluded at the 2024 Ukraine Mine Action Conference to highlight the importance of mine clearance in protecting the peoples of Ukraine from the devastation caused by landmines and other explosive remnants arising from Russia's invasion. The Participants will explore opportunities to exchange perspectives on these issues and undertake practical cooperation in mine action, as aligned with Australia's capacity and capability.

3.5 Countering Russian information manipulation and interference

3.5.1 The Participants underscore the serious threat posed by the circulation of foreign information manipulation and interference, and that authorities and malicious actors who intentionally spread false information should be held accountable.

3.5.2 The Participants recognise Russia continues to falsify and manipulate information to support its illegal invasion of Ukraine, and they will look to support each other's respective efforts to counter the influence of Russian propaganda and information manipulation and interference.

3.5.3 Subject to domestic and international law requirements concerning security of information, and where appropriate, the Participants will exchange information on information security threats and trends, including, but not limited to, any foreign information manipulation and interference campaigns in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic.

3.5.4 The Participants recognise the importance of holding actors to account for Russia's harmful information manipulation and interference, including by imposing targeted sanctions to the extent permissible and where appropriate.

3.6 Civil maritime safety and security

3.6.1 The Participants acknowledge Russian attacks on Ukrainian shipping infrastructure and Ukrainian-affiliated commercial shipping vessels in the Black Sea not only prevent the import and export of vital commodities needed for Ukraine, but threaten global food security and have severe humanitarian consequences for other countries who depend on Ukraine as a leading exporter of grain and one of the guarantors of global food security.

3.6.2 Australia will continue to identify suitable opportunities, aligned with its national interests, to advocate for the maritime safety and security of Ukraine, including but not limited to, at the International Maritime Organization as the specialised UN agency with responsibility for the safety and security of international shipping.

Section 4 – Political and diplomatic support for Ukraine

4.1 Just peace

4.1.1 The Participants understand Russia's unprovoked and illegal invasion is an existential threat to Ukraine, and a significant threat to the security of Europe.

4.1.2 The Participants recognise the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity by Russia is also a threat to the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, and will continue to urge all countries not to provide any kind of support for Russia's aggression.

4.1.3 The Participants affirm their ambition for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace that respects Ukraine's rights under international law, including the UN Charter.

4.1.4 Australia will work with Ukraine and partners, including in the Indo-Pacific, to secure a comprehensive, just and lasting peace, which has broad international support.

4.1.5 Australia will also seek to support Ukraine as it progresses the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. This aligns with Australia's National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2021-31 and builds on Australia's association with the 2024 NATO Policy on WPS, which highlights the impacts of Russia's invasion on all segments of the Ukrainian population, including women and girls, and the important role women play in response to conflict.

4.1.6 The Participants recognise the importance of preserving and observing the rules and norms underpinning international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians, children, humanitarian personnel, and prisoners of war. The Participants reaffirm their endorsement of the Declaration for the Protection of Humanitarian Personnel. The Participants will consistently call out Russian acts inconsistent with these rules and norms.

4.2 Sanctions and trade bans

4.2.1 The Participants recognise the value of sanctions in restricting Russia's access to the finances, goods, technologies and services it requires to sustain its illegal aggression against Ukraine and to deter future attacks. In response to Russia's invasion, Australia has imposed broad-ranging sanctions on Russia and its supporters, and will continue to collaborate closely with partners to impose maximum costs on Russia for its aggression, including through sanctions and trade bans.

4.2.2 While Russia's aggression against Ukraine continues and until a lasting and reliable peace in Ukraine is established, Australia will remain committed to immobilising Russian sovereign assets in Australia's jurisdiction belonging to Russian Government entities and Russian state-owned enterprises which have been sanctioned under Australian law. Australia will remain committed to pursuing robust sanctions against sectors of the Russian economy, including key individuals and entities (whether in Russia or outside) who are supporting or profiting from the war. Australia will also take determined action with partners to tackle sanctions circumvention, as well as to reinforce its own domestic resilience against Russia-linked illicit finance and elites.

4.2.3 The Participants commit to the continued sharing of information and assessments, and to work towards deeper coordination on sanctions targeting and implementation in order to enable efficient sanctioning of individuals and entities assessed as fuelling Russia's invasion, subject to compliance with domestic and international obligations.

4.3 Legal accountability

4.3.1 Consistent with Resolution A/RES/ES-11/5 of the UN General Assembly, the Participants recognise Russia must be held to account for any violations of international law in or against Ukraine, including its aggression in violation of the UN Charter, as well as any violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and that it must bear the legal consequences of all of its internationally wrongful acts, including making reparation for the injury, including any damage and loss, caused by such acts. The Participants are founding members of the Group of Friends on 'Accountability following the Aggression against Ukraine' launched in 2022 to promote and coordinate the suite of accountability measures on the situation in Ukraine.

4.3.2 The Participants will, consistent with international law, seek to hold to account those individuals responsible for war crimes and other international crimes, including the crime of aggression, committed in or against Ukraine, including by supporting the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and the International Criminal Court (ICC) to ensure allegations of war crimes and other international crimes are fully and fairly investigated by independent, effective and robust legal mechanisms.

4.3.3 The Participants welcome the progress made towards establishing the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine as a necessary mechanism to ensure accountability for the crime of aggression against Ukraine. The Participants will continue to engage on ensuring launch of the Special Tribunal's operations. The Participants will also continue to engage on the Enlarged Partial Agreement on the Management Committee of the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.

4.3.4 The Participants will cooperate in terms of technical assistance and other support for forensic examinations to bring to justice those responsible for any war crimes and other international crimes, including the crime of aggression committed by Russia in or against Ukraine.

4.3.5 The Participants will, as appropriate, continue to engage with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ICC. The Participants respect the independence of the ICJ and ICC, and their respective roles in upholding international law and the rules-based order.

4.3.6 The Participants recognise the importance of an international compensation mechanism and will continue to work together, along with G7 states and others, towards the establishment of such a mechanism to provide compensation for damage, loss and injury caused by Russia's aggression, the need for which was recognised by the resolution of UN General Assembly A/RES/ES-11/5 "Furtherance of remedy and reparation for aggression against Ukraine" of 14 November 2022.

4.3.7 Ukraine welcomes Australia's joining of the Register of Damage Caused by the Aggression of the Russian Federation Against Ukraine. The Participants welcome the adoption and opening for signature of the Convention establishing an International Claims Commission for Ukraine, which constitutes the second pillar of the international compensation mechanism. The Participants will continue to work together, along with other partners, towards the operationalisation of the Claims Commission, with a view to delivering compensation for damage, loss and injury to the victims of Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

4.3.8 The Participants will explore appropriate options to ensure Russia pays for damage, loss, and injury it has caused. Australia, working with its partners, will continue to explore all lawful options, consistent with international law, for the funding of compensation for damage, loss, or injury caused by Russia's internationally wrongful acts in or against Ukraine.

4.3.9 The Participants will continue to support accountability processes at the UN Human Rights Council, including the work of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into alleged violations and abuses of human rights, violations of international humanitarian law and related crimes in the context of the aggression against Ukraine by Russia. The Participants recognise these efforts underpin accountability and justice for the victims and survivors in Ukraine.

 4.3.10 The Participants acknowledge the importance of holding Russia to account for its illegal invasion of Ukraine and other violations of international law, as well as those individuals responsible for international crimes, committed in the context of Russia's aggression against Ukraine.

4.3.11 The Participants' cooperation may also include supporting common standards for investigations and training in international humanitarian law, as well as assistance to national legal systems in ensuring war crimes are brought to justice at the national level.

4.4 Democratic governance and reform

4.4.1 The Participants affirm their commitment to the fundamental values of democracy vital for Ukraine's current and future security and prosperity.

4.4.2 The Participants acknowledge a democratic Ukraine with resilient and accountable institutions, robust rule of law, vibrant civil society and cohesive communities is less susceptible to being undermined by hostile powers or states, including Russia.

4.4.3 Australia will explore options to support Ukraine as it embarks on its post-war reform agenda, drawing on insights from the work of Australia's Strengthening Democracy Taskforce and practical opportunities to build democratic resilience.

4.5 Future consultations

4.5.1 Any future aggression against Ukraine by Russia, or by any other country acting as Russia's proxy, that violates the UN Charter and fundamental principles of international law would again gravely undermine global security, including the security of Australia.

4.5.2 In circumstances where current hostilities have formally ceased, and in the event of any future armed attack on Ukraine by Russia, at the request of either Participant, the Participants will consult within 24 hours to discuss measures or support that may assist to counter the armed attack (acting consistently with paragraph 1.1.3 above).

4.5.3 In order to ensure the widest and most effective collective response to any future armed attack, Australia and Ukraine may amend these provisions in order to align with any mechanism that Ukraine may subsequently agree with its other international partners, including the participants in the G7 Declaration of 12 July 2023.

Section 5 – General

5.1 Timeframe of the Agreement

5.1.1 This Agreement will remain in effect for ten (10) years from the date of signature by both Participants.

5.1.2 At the same time, in accordance with the G7 Joint Declaration of 12 July 2023, the Participants share the opinion this Agreement is without prejudice to Ukraine pursuing a pathway towards future membership in the Euro-Atlantic community.

5.1.3 The Participants can jointly decide to extend this Agreement through written consent no later than six (6) months prior to the lapse of the ten (10) year period.

5.2 Amendment and termination

5.2.1 This Agreement may be amended or supplemented, including by adding annexes thereto, at any time, by the mutual written consent of the Participants.

5.2.2 The Participants will, if necessary, designate authorised bodies for the development and implementation of this Agreement.

5.2.3 The authorised bodies of the Participants may, subject to respective government approvals, conclude separate international instruments on specific areas of cooperation within the framework of the implementation of this Agreement.

5.2.4 In the event Ukraine becomes a member of NATO before the end of this Agreement, the Participants will decide on the future status of the Agreement.

5.2.5 This Agreement may be terminated unilaterally by either Participant, at any time, by giving written notice to the other Participant. This Agreement will automatically terminate six (6) months from the date of receipt of such notice.

5.3 Interpretation

5.3.1 Any differences in the interpretation or application of the Agreement will be resolved by amicable consultation between the Participants, and will not be referred to any national or international tribunal or third party for settlement.

5.4 Commencement

5.4.1 This Agreement will come into effect upon the date of its signature by both Participants.

Signed on 23 September 2026, in duplicate in the English and Ukrainian languages, the English version of which will prevail in the event of any discrepancy.