Your 260.[1]

It is unlikely that we shall have much to report on the points raised in your para 2 until next week as State Department Officials are still preoccupied with immediate Korean problems.

2. Following are preliminary comments:

(a) Japanese Treaty. (See also our 453 paragraph 2.) Fearey somewhat more optimistic than Bre[am][2] although cautious about possible attitude of defence authorities. He is inclined to think that, if situation in Korea brought under control in the near future, steps might still be taken to go ahead with Peace Treaty. State Department position remains that Security position in Japan would be stronger under peace treaty than under continuance of occupation.

(b) Pacific Pact. It would seem to be a useful opportunity for putting informally to State Department view point.

(1) That some regional arrangement or even prior consultation between our two countries might have been helpful to them in meeting the sudden crisis;

(2) That as it was they had to act on their own and hoped to get backing afterwards from the other countries;

(3) That to have some machinery for automatic consultation between United States and Australia might help to meet further crises.

We have been impressed by the obvious anxiety of the State Department to obtain backing as soon as possible for their Korean move through United Nations and their genuine gratification at Australia's prompt response.[3] We gather from Satterthwaite that the Korean incident has given fresh impetus to consideration of our Minister's initiative and ideas and that the above points are already being canvassed in several quarters in State Department.[4]