2 In Cablegram 1304 (6 March) Harrison had advised that the UK Cabinet had considered the security pact and would review it again on 8 March and that Harrison had stressed the urgency of the issue for Australia to Gordon Walker.

3 7 March. It advised that Dulles had talked on 1 March to Franks, the UK Ambassador to the United States, about the State Department's apparent preference for including the Philippines in the security pact. It further advised that, according to a confidential report transmitted by Berendsen to Wellington on 5 March, Dulles had said that 'the United States had decided that it was essential to include the Philippines and that Franks had been so informed and asked to ascertain British reaction. On receipt of the United Kingdom reply Dulles intended to raise the question of a pact in a closed session of Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a first step towards definite action with regard to a Pact'.

4 6 March. It advised that the views of the UK Chiefs of Staff on post-Treaty security and Japanese rearmament were being sent for presentation to the State Department.

5 Australian Associated Press.

6 In Cablegram 1394 (9 March), Harrison reported that he had represented to Gordon Walker all the points made in Document 58. Harrison added that Gordon Walker had said that the delay in the UK reply about the security pact was occasioned by concern about the inclusion of the Philippines, and by Bevin's resignation. Gordon Walker had given to Harrison the 'most definite assurance that there had been no talks with the United States nor were they attempting to 'line up'the United States on this matter'. A draft reply approved for dispatch, dated 14 March indicated Spender's view that his impression was nevertheless 'that the United Kingdom Government was specifically considering an American approach on this subject' and requested any background information available from London.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIR FREDERICK SHEDDEN AND Major GenERAL R. BIERWIRTH[1]

On 9 March Bierwirth wrote to Shedden 'off the record' to provide Shedden with information from the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office regarding the proposed Pacific Treaty. A principle concern of the UK Chiefs of Staff Committee was that Australia and New Zealand would not be committed in advance to provide forces in the Pacific theatre. The Committee felt however that the proposed Treaty had been drafted loosely enough to allay this concern, although as Bierwirth points out, 'In practice, Treaty or no Treaty, the Australians and New Zealanders were not legally committed to sending troops to the Middle East. Any Australian or New Zealand Government would experience the greatest political difficulty in sending troops to the Middle East in the face of an unsatisfactory situation in the Pacific'.[2]

Shedden's reply on 28 March reinforced the outcomes of the discussions with Dulles in Canberra when the commitment of Australia and New Zealand to providing forces for the Middle East was made clear to the US Delegation. Shedden felt that this position had been accepted by the Americans who had inserted the following clause into the preamble of the Treaty, 'Recognising that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific area'.[3]

Bierwirth then examined the Australia House files on the subject and wrote to Shedden on 6 April confirming that Dulles had been 'so worked on' by the British in Tokyo that 'he was fearful that he might cause a breach in the relations between the United Kingdom and the United States should he mention the Security Agreement'. Bierwirth stated that there were possibly five reasons for British opposition, '(a) Britain does not wish United States effort to be diverted from N.A.T.O. (b) Britain is unable to make any large contribution in the Pacific and her absence from the Agreement might advertise her weakness in this regard to the world to the detriment of her interests in South-East Asia. (c) It might affect Australian and New Zealand ability to reinforce the Middle East. (d) The effect upon Asiatic countries of their exclusion from the Pact There was perhaps also an underlying political motive. The Government had been accused of selling out in the Atlantic to the Americans when an American Admiral was appointed Supreme Commander North Atlantic Forces, and they were fearful that they might be accused of something similar in the Pacific'.[4]

1 Major General R. Bierwirth, CBE, was the Australian Defence Representative at Canberra House in London.

2 DRL 45/1951, A5954/69, 1819/5.

3 147/1951, A5954/69, 1819/5.

4 DRL 59/1951, A5954/69, 1819/5.