2 The Vandenberg Resolution of 11 June 1948 was a declaration of foreign policy which affirmed American faith in the United Nations but stressed United States determination to defend itself through collective security arrangements. It called for voluntary agreement to remove the veto on Security Council actions concerning Pacific settlements and the admission of new UN members, and for maximum efforts to secure agreements on arms reduction and the establishment of UN forces. It also called for United States association with 'such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security' and declared United States 'determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 [of the UN Charter] should armed attack occur affecting its national security' (see note 2 to Document 2 for Article 51).

THE DULLES VISIT TO CANBERRA[1]

The President's Special Representative, John Foster Dulles, visited Canberra for discussions with Australia and New Zealand from 15 to 18 February 1951.

In preparation for the visit the Defence Committee, consisting of the various Chiefs of Staff of the Services and a representative of the Secretary of the Department of Defence, was asked to examine a possible security arrangement in the Pacific. The Committee met on 8 February 1951, and although giving its general blessing to an off-shore arrangement, noted certain problems that might arise and that required further examination. Among these was the position of Malaya, for whose defence Australia had accepted certain responsibilities under ANZAM, and the possible adverse impact that the proposed security arrangement could have on Thailand and on French policy in Indochina. The Committee noted that the United States was considering whether to include Indonesia in the proposed arrangement, and concluded that until the future of West New Guinea was clarified and the political stability of Indonesia was more assured Indonesia should not be included.

Spender was uneasy about the strength of the New Zealand position during the proposed negotiations with Dulles, fearing it might agree to a simple Presidential statement of support rather than a firm and binding treaty.[2] A Presidential statement was known to be favoured by Britain whose influence on New Zealand in regard to this matter was considered by Spender to be far greater than it was on Australia. Immediately before the talks with Dulles, preliminary discussions were held with the New Zealand delegation in an effort to strengthen its commitment to a treaty. It was agreed between Spender and Doidge, the New Zealand External Affairs Minister, that in the event that Japan was to be permitted to rearm, Australia and New Zealand would need a suitable guarantee of their security; that the United States was the only power capable of giving such a guarantee; and that the United States should be pressed to agree to a tripartite security arrangement.[3]

Spender took the submission dated 15 February[4] to Cabinet on the morning of 16 February to obtain agreement for his proposed negotiating position. In doing so, he dealt with two particular UK criticisms of the off-shore pact proposal. He argued that any adverse repercussions that the proposed arrangement could have on mainland South-East Asia could be negated by an accompanying statement that the participants in the arrangement were not thereby disengaging from South-East Asia. As to the UK objection that an arrangement such as that proposed would make it difficult for Australia and New Zealand to meet their commitments to help defend other major trouble spots such as the Middle East, Spender argued that the reverse was the case, that the guarantee of security that the proposed arrangement would provide would make it easier for the two countries to release forces for service outside their immediate neighbourhood.

During the talks on 15 and 16 February, Dulles appeared to be reluctant to broach the topic of the proposed Pacific security arrangement. When Spender and Doidge argued in favour of a tripartite arrangement on 16 February, Dulles spoke about the difficulties that this would cause for the Philippines which had only the informal guarantee of its security provided by the presence of United States forces. Dulles referred to the objections raised by the United Kingdom, against an off-shore pact, and commented that the United Kingdom did not want to see the conclusion of a pact which excluded it, and that it did not want to see a pact which excluded the Asian mainland.[5] Responding to questions about why he had not raised in Canberra the issue of a Pacific security treaty, Dulles revealed that he had left Washington for Japan and later Australia intending to suggest the conclusion of a multilateral treaty based on the United States island chain concept, but he had been so shocked by the objections that the UK Political Representative to Japan, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, had raised to the suggestion, on instructions from London, that he had concluded that his ideas would have to be reconsidered.[6] When Dulles questioned the need for any formal security arrangement such as was preferred by Australia and New Zealand, Doidge suggested that the two countries might be satisfied with a public Presidential statement of support. Spender, however, rejected this as worthless to Australia and a difference of opinion between Australia and New Zealand became apparent.

Spender, who had not previously known of the United Kingdom's intervention pointed out that the United Kingdom was not a principal in the area, while Australia was, and argued that UK objections could hardly apply to a tripartite arrangement. He rejected as politically impossible any Japanese association in a collective defence arrangement with Australia. Spender also informed Dulles that the Australian Cabinet had concluded on 16 February that the type of security arrangements that were eventually to be agreed would determine Australia's approach to the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan as well as Australia's capacity to meet its obligations in the Middle East and elsewhere.[7] After some discussion Dulles agreed to examine a possible tripartite agreement, something simpler than the NATO arrangements, setting the stage for the later possible association of the Philippines, Japan, Indonesia and some Asian mainland countries. On Dulles's inquiry whether Australia or New Zealand had drafted an outline of a possible tripartite pact, Spender suggested that officials should jointly prepare a draft to be considered by the principals subsequently.[8]

Ralph Harry, who had been in Washington when the NATO Pact was negotiated, had in fact already prepared a draft treaty. As both Harry and Watt later recorded, Harry had made a study of the NATO treaty and other treaties to which the United States had subscribed, and had drawn up a draft, based largely on the North Atlantic Treaty, with modifications to meet the different circumstances of the Pacific area.[9] In order to ensure that the United States would find the text acceptable Harry's objective was to 'produce a draft for every point of which there would be precedent in some other treaty to which the US was a party'. When the Australian delegation returned from the discussions with Dulles, Watt commented that the United States was prepared to look at a possible draft and said, 'What a pity we don't have a draft. I think we could be in business'. At that point, by his own account, Harry produced the draft that he had roughed out earlier.[10] The draft, although amended to meet various points raised by the United States, provided a solid base for discussion by Dulles, Spender and Doidge on 17 February.[11]

According to the official record made by New Zealand, Dulles reverted in the discussions on 17 February to the position of the Philippines, arguing that the United States might find it necessary to seek its inclusion in any pact that might be concluded with Australia and New Zealand.[12] Spender then made it clear that he would not veto the inclusion of the Philippines but suggested that the best solution would be the conclusion of a separate bilateral treaty between the United States and the Philippines. Towards the end of the discussions he announced that, subject to United States confirmation of the draft treaty, he was prepared to recommend that Australia should sign a peace treaty with Japan that did not impose limitations on Japanese rearmament. At the conclusion of the meeting on 17 February, the three principals agreed on a text of a draft treaty to be considered by their respective three Governments.[13]

1 No record of the discussions with Dulles seems to have been made by the Australian Department of External Affairs. Nevertheless Brigadier H. G. Rourke of the Department of Defence made some notes of the meetings, which he seems to have joined on 16 February, under cover of a letter dated 21 February (see separate editorial note - Department of Defence Notes on Discussions With Dulles - 16-18 February 1951).

2 Sir Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat, Angus and Robertson in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Sydney 1972, p. 178.

3 See Robin Kay (ed.), The ANZUS Pact and the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Government Printer, Wellington, 1985, p. 590.

4 Document 47.

5 Kay (ed.), op. cit., p. 598.

6 ibid., pp. 161-2.

7 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, vol. VI, part 1, Washington, 1977, pp. 156-7.

8 ibid., p. 163.

9 Watt, op. cit., p. 181.

10 Harry, The North Was Always Near in Australians in Asia Series (No. 13), Griffith University, 1994, p. 12.

11 Watt, op. cit., pp. 181-2.

12 Kay (ed.), op. cit., p. 609.

13 Document 50.