111 Cablegram From Spender to Menzies
1413. Tripartite Security Treaty and Japanese Peace Treaty. My 1412.
Rusk took the initiative in raising the subject of the signature of the Tripartite Security Treaty. He said he wished to see this Treaty well launched with adequate publicity and that he would be keeping in close touch with me concerning arrangements at San Francisco.
4. In conclusion Rusk referred to the political difficulties of the Philippines and said that, if a formal security treaty between the Philippines and the U.S. would relieve the situation in the Philippines with regard to the Peace Treaty, the U.S. would be prepared to negotiate such a treaty. Nevertheless the U.S. still regarded existing arrangements with the Philippines as satisfactory and did not consider a formal treaty to be necessary. Rusk thought that discussions with the Philippines about a formal treaty would start soon and said any agreement with the Philippines would be along the lines of the Tripartite Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand. Rusk was aware of our conversation with Melby (my 1378) but said that, whilst he could not give me a firm assurance that the treaty with the Philippines would not go further than our own, he did not think it would. My impression is that negotiations are already under way.
I suggested to Rusk that it would be most undesirable from many points of view if the Philippines were, because of their tactics, to achieve a firmer guarantee than that provided to Australia and New Zealand. Rusk saw the point in this remark. He said he would keep me informed of developments.
5. One danger which I see in a Security Treaty between the U.S. and the Philippines similar to our own is in connexion with ratification of the treaties. It is not impossible that, if the treaties were virtually identical, Senate might suggest or insist that our tripartite treaty and the bilateral treaty with the Philippines be combined and ratified as a single treaty.
[NAA: AA1984/25, 1951, iv]