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Historical documents

88

12th January, 1928

My dear P.M.,

Defence of Ports: I remember that in conversation with you before
I left Canberra, the fact that you had done nothing to implement
the Australian Coast Defence Report (C.I.D.) [1] seemed to be
rather on your consciencethis combined with your known desire for
economy induced me yesterday to send you a telegram in this
regard, which was inspired by my knowledge that New Zealand were
doing nothing about their Coast Defences on the plea of possible
air developments, that H.M.G. were doing nothing about home and
colonial port defence on the plea of economy, and that the South
African Coast Defence Report (now in process of gestation) raised
some doubt as to the wisdom of going ahead with the conservative
and standardised advice that the C.I.D. had given us.

The question as to where the truth lies as between the contentions
of the Air Ministry on the one hand and the Admiralty and War
Office on the other, regarding the defence of ports, has created a
good deal of dissension at Chiefs of Staff Committee Meetings and
C.I.D. Meetings in recent years.

It has arisen, to my immediate recollection, in the cases of the
defence of (1) Singapore Base, (2) Aden and (3) South African
Ports.

It creates considerable feeling at all meetings at which it is
discussed and it has been the rock on which the Air Ministry and
Admiralty have split on many occasions.

It is essentially a question as between the Admiralty and the Air
Ministry -with the War Office usually taking the side of the
Admiralty.

The ex parte stand taken by each Chief of Staff is quite
noticeable. When it comes to a question on which their particular
service stands to lose or gain prestige, it seems to me that they
cease to think of themselves as joint members of the Chiefs of
Staff's Committee-and revert to being members of their particular
services energetically exercised in defending their young.

It has always been a question that interested me and soon after I
returned, and without any knowledge that the Air-Navy question had
been ventilated while I was away from London, I plunged into it
again with several friends here belonging to the services. My
object was to discover whether it was worth while suggesting to
you (as being outside the fray) to ask H.M.G. officially for an
expression of considered opinion on certain essential and hitherto
undecided points connected with the 'Air versus Ships' and 'Air
versus fixed land defences' controversies.

I soon discovered that the problem had arisen in the last year in
the case of the defence of Aden and the defence of the South
African ports. I write of these two matters in other letters by
this mail.

I regret that I cannot send you the South African Report by this
mail, but I have been asked not to do so-and rightly so-as it
consists to date of the three memoranda of the individual Chiefs
of Staff-they not having been able to agree on the matter. I am
told that it is probable that the three individual Chiefs of
Staff's reports will be sent on to South Africa with a covering
note saying 'Herewith, for what they are worth', and going on to
say that as South Africa is fairly immune from possible attack
through distance and as the Foreign Office assure us that war is
at least ten years off-that H.M.G.'s confidential advice is to
await developments and not in the meantime to spend much money.

There is enough parallel between South Africa's position and our
own to warrant some hesitation on our part before we spend much
money on the rejuvenating of our coast defences on standard lines.

However, as I imagine you will want something official to go on, I
suggest that you might cable H.M.G. and say that in view of the
apparent reluctance all round to spare money on fixed coast
defences and that as the Commonwealth is endeavouring to avoid all
expenditure that is not immediately necessary, what then is the
advice of the C.I.D. as to your going on with the programme they
advised. [2]

Hankey [3] says that in the event of your sending a telegram of
this nature, it is almost certain that the reply of the C.I.D.

would be that they do not consider that the programme is urgent.

I am, Yours sincerely,
R. G. CASEY


1 In 1925 the Committee of Imperial Defence had recommended
increased gun emplacements for the protection of Australian ports
rather than reliance on defensive air power.

2 Bruce preferred to let Australian inter-service rivalry settle
before contemplating action along the lines suggested by Casey.

3 Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet.


Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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