(Due to arrive Melbourne-27.6.25)

My dear P.M.,

I met Sir John Baird [1] on 20th May. He put a large number of
questions to me about conditions in Australia. He indicated that
his close contact with the members of the Government and members
of Parliament generally would be of value to you in Australia, in
that it would enable him to keep, for your benefit, in close touch
with the machinery and trend of thought in England. He used the
words that he would be able to talk to Bruce, the Privy
Counsellor, with perhaps greater freedom and usefulness than to
Bruce, the Prime Minister. He gave me to understand that he was
not prepared to spend more than a certain sum which he did not
specify, but which Lord Forster [2] had told him was sufficient.

He proposes to take three Daimler cars out with him. He will take
such staff and servants as Lord Forster advises him are necessary,
over and above those that he hopes to take over from Lord Forster.

He was not surprised that 'The Times' had not given better
publicity to his appointment, as he said there were reasons why he
was not persona grata to the late Northcliffe press.

He admits he knows nothing of Australia and he has taken the
sensible line with the various Australian Press representatives
who have interviewed him, that he has no views on Australia, as it
is so long since he was there, that his knowledge of conditions
there will be valueless.

The remark that almost everyone makes who knows him is that he is
a 'nice little man'.

Hankey [3], I am glad to say, takes me increasingly into his
confidence. I show him my file of letters (not letters such as
this, which go on a personal file) to you at intervals, to let him
see what sort of material I am sending you, and I am perfectly
frank with him as regards all I hear and do. He now has the P.M.'s
authority to show me anything at all, except of course that I am
not to have possession of copies of Cabinet minutes, although I am
(in confidence) allowed to become acquainted with their
deliberations. Naturally I make as little mention as possible to
people here as to what papers I see, as I don't want any queries
raised as to why it is thought necessary for me to see all the
material I do.

Amongst other things, Hankey now has the P.M.'s permission to let
me see the weekly reports of the Special Branch (at New Scotland
Yard) on revolutionary organisations in Great Britain.

This is more a matter of interest than anything else, although
something of value to us may come to the surface at times.

Scotland Yard's knowledge of what goes on in Communist circles is
remarkable. From the last few weeks reading of the bulky weekly
report that is circulated to the Cabinet, it is hard to believe
that any revolutionary or subversive activity could be hatched
without their knowledge.

It would only weary you to report on this subject. I will merely
watch for any points that might affect Australia.

Hankey tells me that the turnouts that the Press get from time to
time about Austen Chamberlain [4] resigning are without
foundation. There is no doubt that he is meeting some opposition
from Birkenhead [5], Churchill [6] and, probably, Amery [7], in
his efforts to get a Security Pact through the Cabinet, and it is
also probably true that more than one Cabinet Minister would like
to be Foreign Secretary. But Chamberlain could by no means be said
to have failed, and it would be unlike him to resign on account of
a little passive resistance to his scheme.

The best 'inspired' opinion that I can get is that there is very
little sign of 'clique' in the Cabinet, other than between
Birkenhead and Churchill, who usually hunt as a pair.

I don't think I have ever mentioned Tom Jones [8] to you. He is
nominally Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, but in reality (and
in great confidence) he writes the bulk of the Prime Minister's
speeches, and keeps the P.M. informed on a large range of
subjects. He is in the room above me, and is a mine of information
about people and movements. A self-educated Welshman of great
personal attraction, sound, calm judgment, well-read and, as a
side line, with considerable artistic leanings and knowledge. He
is in the confidence of a wide range of people, from the P.M. and
Hankey downwards-or outwards.

It is quite noticeable, and has been commented on, that New
Zealand invariably agrees with any proposal put forward by H.M.G.

The phrase that occurred in a recent telegram from N.Z. to H.M.G.

is quite typical: 'The N.Z. Government have no observations to
make on the subject and are content to leave the whole matter
absolutely to the discretion of H.M.G.'

I am glad to say that it is now pretty well established as to how
the 'Nicolson' document became public property. [9] The answer
only tends to make one more cautious of the press than before, if
that is possible. I was warned early in my time here that one had
to choose between loyalty to the F.O. and being a 'good fellow'
with the press in giving them hints and clues. There was never
better advice.

Sir William Tyrrell [10] said in conversation recently that he
regarded the modern press as a 'stinking fish' profession, which
battens on sensationalism and misconception. He said that the
older he got, the more he realised what a large proportion of his
time was taken up in combatting misconception in people's and
foreign countries' minds, engendered by false or half-true press
reports. His strong remarks are no doubt prompted by the recent
'Nicolson' document episode and the unsavoury connection of the
press with it.

The Governorship of Kenya is going begging at the moment. Smuts
[11] wrote to Hankey urging him to make an effort to get it for
himself (Hankey), but he will not, of course, do so. Amery is
going to offer it to Grigg [12], but I doubt if he will accept as
he is all aflame with 'migration and increased trade within the
Empire', and is busy sharpening his sword in preparation for an
all-in political campaign on this worthy subject. He talks and
thinks of nothing else, and is marshalling his prospective
supporters and increasing his knowledge of the subject before he
pulls the trigger.

As you will have realised, this job has grown imperceptibly out of
being straight liaison with the F.O. to being liaison with F.O.,
C.O., C.I.D. and Hankey. This has not come about from my seeking,
but as a natural growth. I mentioned this to Hankey lately, when
taking stock of the position, and he said he preferred to call it
'liaison with H.M.G.'. This, I think, is too wide. I have nothing
in between to suggest as a name yet-and I don't think yet that the
name matters much, but when the time comes to put another label on
the appointment, it should, I think, include more than the F.O.

only.

This liaison is a curious thing. Sitting in an office only a
hundred yards away from the F.O., it is very difficult to get a
correct and live picture of any event from reading their
despatches and cables in and out. One has to supplement reading
print by going and talking to the man concerned. This disability
must be intensified many times at the other end of the world, and
can only, I should think, be got over by a rapid and continuous
interchange of cabled question and answer, during any crisis.

Hankey said to me recently that, as far as he could see, the
liaison was working well in these times of peace, but he said that
it would be put to the test in time of a real crisis. When such
crisis comes about, I hope Henderson [13] will bombard me with
cabled questions, as only by so doing can I readily put myself in
his place and send the necessary cables elucidating the position.

If he keeps me continuously informed of the facts and colour that
are lacking at your end, I have then no excuse for not keeping him
completely in touch. But I can well imagine that the success of
the liaison experiment may be impaired if I am telegraphically
garrulous and he is departmentally silent and relying on my
unaided efforts to supply information.

It is interesting to think that if you got notice the day before
of a Parliamentary question on foreign affairs, and cabled me at
once, I could find out and cable you the answer in time for
Parliament the next day.

On any subject of importance and urgency, I can get a 'clear the
line' message through to you in under half-an-hour (G.P.O., London
to G.P.O., Melbourne), and presumably you can get a message to
London in the same time.

I enclose sheet of press cuttings on your recent remarks on
Dominions and Foreign Policy. [14] They attracted considerable
attention here and I have been questioned by all manner of people
as to what was behind them.

Amery's comment was that he thought that both a liaison officer
and someone with diplomatic status corresponding to that of an
Ambassador would be required in course of time. The 'Ambassador'
could not be housed in the Cabinet Offices and could not delve
into the F.O., C.O. and C.I.D., as I am doing as liaison officer.

He would have to have at least one 'Counsellor' or liaison officer
to do exactly the work I am doing now.

With regard to Dominion co-operation in the conduct of Foreign
Affairs, Tyrrell holds the view that we should all let well alone
for a bit. He thinks the subject has had more prominence recently
than is necessary. He realises that the Dominions dislike the
possibility that they might be dragged into a war at the tail of
the British chariot, and, because of this, are laying particular
stress on the fact that their Parliaments are the only bodies that
can commit them to war. He thinks, however, that the aspect of the
Imperial connection that has existed since the war is too new for
even the wisest men to be able to suggest hard and fast machinery
to deal with it. He would like sufficient time to pass with the
existing simple and flexible mechanism to enable the metamorphosis
to come about gradually and the solution to evolve slowly without
any cut and dried scheme.

Tyrrell is one of the old school, and I think really looks with a
good deal of horror on the assumption by the Dominions of the
right to run their own shows. He raises the point of the status of
a Dominion diplomatic representative in London and many incidental
difficulties.

Amery still talks of a quick round trip to South Africa, Australia
and back by Canada, leaving some time before the House rises in
July. I don't think he has yet made up his mind, and probably will
not do so for another month.

You probably know of the hold that this country has over France in
the shape of a mountain of French Treasury bills in the vaults of
H.M. Treasury. I did not realise it until the story was told to me
by a Treasury man in so many words. The scheme is said to have
been put up to Lloyd George [15] by Blackett [16], the then
Controller of Finance at the Treasury, as a last resort that we
could use to bring France to heel. France continually duns Germany
for reparations, which she wants in francs and not in marks. We
have something over 500 million worth of negotiable French
Treasury bills, which we have precious little chance of being able
to fund or cash in. We could hand all or part of them over to
Germany (in return for some substantial quid pro quo) who could
use them to pay reparations (55% of which would go to France). Or
we could put them on the market and crash the franc at any moment.

We could thus do Germany an extremely good turn, or France a bad
turn, with little or no real cost to ourselves. Which is a lever
that France, of course, realises and which no doubt restrains her
from kicking over the traces.

A good story is being told about Lionel Curtis [17], who is
supposed to have said to a friend after a long period of silence:

'And now, of course, the mantle of Milner [18] falls on ... me.'

I am, Yours sincerely,
R. G. CASEY