IMMEDIATE

INDONESIA

Our 25. [1] In the Security Council on 14th January, Van Royen, in
his statement, reiterated that the Netherlands would not comply
with any order for the return of troops to previous positions, and
Netherlands will continue to hold 'those leaders whose release
might at this moment still endanger public security'.

He declared 'it was the unalterable aim of the Netherlands
Government to establish an all Indonesia Federal Interim
Government immediately', and his Government 'trusts' that the
Interim Government will be constituted within a month and that it
will immediately start preparing to hold elections for the
Constituent Assembly. The Netherlands, he said, 'will extend all
possible efforts in order that the elections may take place in the
third quarter of this year, and will do all within its power to
achieve the transfer of Sovereignty (to the United States of
Indonesia) in the course of the year 1950'.

He said that United Nations observers would be invited to the
elections even though he denied that Council has the right to lay
down the timetable. He complained against criticism by members of
the Council who should 'refrain from interference in internal
affairs of a member state'. He again suggested that I.C.J. be
asked to rule on the Council's jurisdiction.

2. Cadogan said that the United Kingdom is 'seriously concerned'
with the failure of the Netherlands to comply with the December
resolution. [2] He was reassured by Van Royen's statement today,
and the recent statement by Queen Juliana. [3] He listed two
requirements:-

(1) Unconditional release of political prisoners.

(2) Local agency of United Nations must be given every possible
facility within reason.

3. He considered that the Council should invite the GOC. and the
Consular Commission to furnish further reports. He said the
Council should be 'realistic'. To demand the immediate withdrawal
of troops would be 'unwise or worse' as it would create the danger
of a vacuum.

4. Alvarez, Cuba, proposed:-

(1) the immediate withdrawal of Dutch forces except in such cases
where the G.O.C. considered retention necessary in the interests
of law and order;

(2) release of political leaders;

(3) free elections under the supervision of the G.O.C. before 1st
July 1949; the Sovereign Constituent Assembly to promulgate the
constitution of the Republic and decide on its integration in the
United States of Indonesia;

(4) Dutch Forces withdraw from Republican territory on the day the
date of the elections was determined and the withdrawal completed
15 days before the end of the elections. Occupation of the
remaining territory of the United States of Indonesia terminated
by the day a duly elected Government took over power and such
Government established before December 24th, 1949.

5. The Cuban representative will support any joint resolution
along these lines, but if such proposal is not introduced, he has
reserved the right to submit a resolution.

6. We described the Dutch statement as disappointing and as making
no real attempt to meet the undoubted general sense of the
Council's wish. It was also misleading in attempting to represent
conditions in occupied territory as nearly back to normal. Quoted
facts to contrary. The actual intention of the Dutch was to try to
get the Council to accept the picture of the situation in which
the Republic as an entity did not figure at all. This was totally
inadmissible. The Council must restore not only political status
of the Republic as free and equal party in the negotiations, but
also, to the extent necessary, its territorial status. This meant
that any arrangements for the withdrawal of forces must be a real
and effective one, and any progressive withdrawal must be complete
by the date of the elections. Furthermore, the Council could not
stop at that, but was now bound also to indicate in the same
appropriate way the actual contents of the final settlement. The
programme outlined by Van Royen amounted only to unilateral
imposition of terms. The Dutch were not capable of it though, and
if they were allowed to try, this would lead to the worst
consequences, both in Indonesia and the whole of South East Asia.

Ends.