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89 Price to Australian Government

Letter CANBERRA, 15 January 1949

IMMEDIATE SECRET

With further reference to my letter of the 11th January [1] about
Indonesia I have been asked to send you the following extract from
a telegram from our Ambassador at The Hague [2]:-

'Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me today that instructions
to Van Royen would permit the latter to announce to the Security
Council tomorrow that:

(a) A Federal Interim Government would set up within one month.

(b) Elections would be held throughout Indonesia before October
next.

(c) Full facilities would be provided to observers to supervise
these elections if desired and to watch events generally.

(d) United States of Indonesia to be set up if possible by 1st
January, 1950, but in any case transfer of sovereignty to be
accomplished in the course of 1950.'
In the light of recent developments instructions have now been
sent to the United Kingdom delegate [3] somewhat amending the
instructions summarised in my letter of the 11th January to the
following effect: [this is on the assumption that Mr van Royen
makes a statement on the lines indicated above]:-

The delegate was to express regret at the delays which render it
still impossible at this date for the Security Council to
determine to what extent the resolution of the 24th December has
been implemented in relation to the cease-fire and the release of
political prisoners.

2. He should go on to say that he welcomes the statement [4] of
the Netherlands representative as showing a real desire on the
part of the Netherlands Government to carry out the programme
outlined in the recent speeches of their Prime Minister and
subsequently of the Queen of the Netherlands. [5]

3. Since the United Kingdom Government are anxious that the Dutch
should not rest upon Mr. Van Royen's statement and do little to
fulfil its terms, he should express the hope that it will be
followed by energetic steps on the part of the Netherlands
Government to convert what is at present only a plan into a
reality.

4. He should express the view that in the circumstances the
Council should invite the Committee of Good Offices (or the
Consular Commission) to furnish early reports on the operation of
the cease-fire as a result of the investigations now being made by
the Military observers, and upon the release of the political
prisoners who it is understood are to be visited by the United
Nations representatives. The Council should not lose sight of the
main object, which is that the Republican leaders should be free
to take part in the negotiations for the initiation of the various
stages in the creation of the United States of Indonesia outlined
by the Netherlands representative.

5. On the question of withdrawal, it will be clear from Batavia
telegrams that if pressure for this is successful the only result
is likely to be chaos. There is a very real danger that if the
Indonesian leaders have any reason to believe that the Dutch will
withdraw they will from fear of intimidation and reprisals be
afraid to come forward and to participate in the formation of the
Interim Government. There may then be a stalemate and a
recrudescence of the terrorism which ever since Indonesia became
an issue has undoubtedly militated against a settlement.

6. The United Kingdom Government very much hope therefore that it
will be possible to avoid any kind of resolution relating to
withdrawal. If, however, a resolution is proposed he is to seek
for an adjournment, and telegraph for further instructions basing
his action upon the view that the Council should await the reports
of the Military observers.

1 Document 60.

2 Sir Philip Nichols.

3 Sir Alexander Cadogan.

4 See Document 50.

5 See notes 4 and 11 to Document 48.


[AA : A1838, 402/8/1/1/1, ii]
Last Updated: 11 September 2013
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