Savingram K1 BATAVIA, 26 November 1949

SECRET

NATIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

The Republicans and BFO delegates met on Tuesday the 22nd November
and adopted a Draft Regulation for the National Preparatory
Committee. The text is given in the Appendix. [1]

2. Rum took the Draft to Jogja on 24th November for approval by
the Republican Cabinet. He will return to Batavia this afternoon
with Hatta, and it is expected that the Preparatory Committee will
be established this evening with Hatta as Chairman. I understand
that there are at present three candidates for the two positions
of Deputy Chairman, namely Rum, Anak Agung and Sultan Hamid, but
it is expected that the two former will be elected and the de
facto leadership of the Committee will be taken by Rum, Hatta's
position being merely nominal.

3. The Committee will be active in three fields-
(a) arrangements for the appointment of the Provisional Government
of the R.I.S.

(b) arrangements with the Dutch for the transfer of sovereignty;

and
(c) current discussions between the existing Delegations, e.g.

Supply and Political Prisoners & Prisoners of War.

4. I gather from Rum that under (b) it is envisaged that the
Preparatory Committee will negotiate with a Netherlands
Delegation, under the auspices of the UNCI. This is somewhat
contrary to the Netherlands conception of procedure in the coming
weeks as set out in s'Jacob's letter of 5th November, 1949
(document S/AC.10/CONF.3/13) and it supersedes the Indonesian
decision given in the letters from the Republican and BFO
Delegations of 12th November (document S/AC.10/CONF.3/13/Add.1).

[2] Conversations with the Dutch indicate that they wish to keep
the UNCI in the background during the coming weeks and at the
transfer and arrange matters directly with the Indonesians. For
Rum, and presumably the majority of the other Indonesians on the
Committee, there can be 'no question' of departing from the
procedure set out in the Draft Regulation. However, this has not
yet been discussed with the Dutch, and the Dutch attitude has yet
to be tested.

5. I am to meet Rum tomorrow and discuss this procedural question
with him and also try to define the heads of discussion during the
coming weeks. Matters in which the UNCI is likely to be most
concerned include:-

(a) military affairs, including the disposition of forces in line
with the TNI undertaking security responsibilities on the day of
transfer, and the supply and equipment of the TNI;

(b) the co-ordination of arrangements for the continuation of
local and federal administrative services; and
(c) police and other security measures in the larger towns at the
transfer and the role of the Military Observers in this respect.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PARLIAMENT
6. The Deputies are still awaiting the Appendices [3] to the
Commission's report to the Security Council, but I understand that
the following arrangements provided for the establishment of the
Provisional Government and Parliament.

7. The President of the R.I.S. will be elected by a body
consisting of two members for each of the first sixteen
territories listed in paragraph 9. In consultation and agreement
with this body, the President will then appoint three cabinet
formateurs, who will be the R.I.S. Premier, Minister for Defence
and Minister for the Interior. The three formateurs will then
independently appoint the Provisional Government. The main
authority of the Government will rest with an inner cabinet
consisting of the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Interior,
Finance and Economic Affairs, under the chairmanship of the
Premier. (This inner cabinet will be empowered to take decisions
in all fields without consultation with either the remainder of
the Government or the Parliament.)
8. The Senate of the Provisional Parliament will be appointed by
the various
member Parliaments or Representative Councils of the first sixteen
territories listed in paragraph 9, each territory being
represented by two Senators. The method of appointment of members
of the Representative Council is left to the discretion of the
various territorial authorities and may be either by popular
election or by election by the Parliaments or Representative
Councils.

9. The Representative Council will consist of 168 members, 97 for
the territories represented in the BFO, 50 for the Republic, 3 for
the Non-Participating Territories (apart from the Padang Recomba,
is not clear which Territories are concerned), and 18 for the
Minorities. The BFO announced the composition of its
representation on November 23; this was fixed according to the
population densities of the various territories. The
Representative Council will be composed as follows:-

1. East Indonesia 17
2. Pasundan 21
3. East Java 15
4. Madura 5
5. East Sumatra 4
6. South Sumatra 4
7. Central Java 12
8. Bangka 2
9. Billiton 2
10. Riouw 2
11. West Kalimantan 4
12. Greater Dajak 2
13. Bandjar 3
14. Southeast Kalimantan 2
15. East Kalimantan 2
16. Republic of Indonesia 50
17. Non-Participating territories 3
18. Chinese Minority 9
19. European Minority 6
20. Arab Minority 3
168
It is expected that the Provisional Government and Parliament will
be formed by December 15.

10. At the moment there is no doubt that Sukarno will be
President, Hatta Premier and Anak Agung Minister for the Interior.

The Sultan of Jogja is the obvious choice for the Minister for
Defence, but there is some possibility that the BFO might support
Sultan Hamid as a bargaining point of Negara policy to secure the
withdrawal of Republican administrative installations from Negara
territories. Hamid has no personal backing but he is able to
capitalise on the present tension between the Negaras and the
Republic.

NEGARAS
11. The Republicans have so far talked over their relations with
the Negaras only with Pasundan, to which they submitted a proposal
providing for the maintenance of the status quo in the interim
period: in Negara territory where Republican administration is
fully functioning a joint board of Republican and Negara officials
would be established, while the Negara would be left independent
in territory where its administration only was operating. The
Republic would further guarantee to cease appointing new officials
and to ensure non-intervention by its representatives and
supporters. The Pasundan Cabinet has not yet replied to this
proposal, but present indications are not too favourable.

12. The position is complicated in Pasundan by the attitude of the
small feudal class, headed by the Wali Negara, Wiranatakusuma,
which has strong sentiments regarding local autonomy. In general,
the Republicans are confident of sympathetic majorities in the
Parliaments and Councils, but in the Governments there is
considerable confusion and nervousness about the future, and a
consequent danger that security will be sought in an affirmation
of Negara rights. With popular feeling strongly anti-Negara,
Republicans fear that such a stand by Negara Governments would
cause serious tension and lead the Negaras to seek protection by
having the KNIL take over security responsibilities in the
territories, a development which would certainly end in widespread
disturbances and a highly unstable political situation in the new
state. At the same time, while avoiding pushing the Negaras to
this extent and precipitating an open split, the Republic must
pursue its anti-Negara policy sufficiently firmly to retain the
support of its followers in Negara territories; otherwise, it
fears, these will join the radical 'opposition' movements or take
independent measures and attempt coups d'etat.

13. The Negaras most difficult to deal with are East Sumatra and
Pasundan; Republicans feel that if they can win over Pasundan, the
majority of the B.F.O. will follow. Their present tactics are to
try and reach some working arrangement through direct discussions
supplemented by pressure from Republican supporters in the Negara
parliaments and emphasis in all discussions on the urgent need for
national unity. It is considered essential that the position be
clarified by popular vote and I understand Hatta has suggested
that elections be held in the Negaras within the first quarter of
1950; which will give the population an opportunity to vote for
Republican parties pledged, in effect, to abolish the Negaras.

K.N.I.L.

14. The position of the KNIL is still uncertain. Following
conversations with Simatupang, Buurman van Vreeden conferred with
his Territorial Commanders on Wednesday and it was decided that
officers should be sent out among KNIL units to instruct and
persuade KNIL to play a regular role in the coming months in
accordance with the RTC agreements and the interests of a united
R.I.S. This decision is yet to be implemented.

15. There are some reports that Sultan Hamid, in line with his
anti-Republican position, is attempting to build himself up, or is
being built up, as the protector of KNIL interests during the re-
organizational period and that failing election as Minister for
Defence, he will seek appointment as Vice-Minister with
substantial powers relative to the re-organisation of the KNIL.

His support in the BFO will depend upon the other members'
feelings as to the possible desirability of the KNIL being given
operational functions in the coming months.

16. I shall cable further developments.