Cablegram C27 THE HAGUE, 22 October 1949, 6.10 p.m.
RESTRICTED
The following is a summary of Hatta's reply to the Netherlands
statement (my
C.24 [1]).
(a) The Sultan's statement shows he is seriously concerned lest
the disarmament and arrest of T.N.I. troops by the Dutch Army in
East Java arouse repercussions among the T.N.I. throughout Java
and Sumatra.
(b) The basic cause of the difficulties in Indonesia is the
situation arising from the Cease-fire Regulations, in particular-
(i) The positions of the two armies are interspersed.
(ii) While the T.N.I. Units stood fast in their positions in the
mountains or in isolated and concealed places the irregular forces
of the extreme Right and Left groups which harassed the T.N.I. and
the Republic were free to move in all directions and consolidate
their positions.
(iii) There was and still is no movement of supports consequently
the T.N.I. have needed a Civil Administration which appreciates
their difficulties.
(c) At the time the Cease-Hostilities Order was issued the 'status
quo' constituted a disorderly situation. The 'orderly and regular
administration throughout Java' envisaged in the aide memoire [2]
of the High Representative of the Crown is extremely difficult to
institute. Such an administration can be achieved only after the
transfer of Sovereignty to the R.I.S. when the T.N.I. will be
incorporated in the Army of the R.I.S.
(d) The situation in Indonesia could only be maintained for a
short period of about two months and the Republic accepted the
Cease-Fire in the conviction that the R.T.C. could be concluded
within this period resulting in the transfer of Sovereignty to the
R.I.S.
(e) The proposal of the Republic does not imply a surrender to the
Republic of the whole of Java with the exception of the principal
cities and should be considered in the light of the foregoing.
(f) 'It would be a 'beau geste' which would be highly appreciated
and long remembered by the Indonesian people if the Netherlands
Government could see its way to accommodate the Republican
position. Friction between the Units of the Netherlands Army and
the T.N.I. would be reduced and the Government of the Republic
would be able to improve co-ordination between the scattered Units
of the T.N.I. and could begin the training of the T.N.I. for its
future duties after the transfer of Sovereignty to the R.I.S.'.
(g) The Republic is anxious to promote 'an orderly transfer of
Sovereignty' and to prevent a vacuum when the Netherlands Army
begins its withdrawal.
(h) The T.N.I. has requested the opportunity to coordinate and
consolidate its positions in order to prevent Communist
infiltrations in its scattered Units. In the meantime the
(Netherlands) Indonesian Government and its Army is unable to
check the increasing armed movements of the extreme Right and Left
groups.
2. The Netherlands delegation has made no comment but has
postponed temporarily the question of reporting to the Security
Council.
3. The United Kingdom has been seriously concerned by reports from
Indonesia and has been considering the possibility of joint action
with the Americans:-
(a) To urge on the Dutch the early conclusion of the Conference at
The Hague.
(b) To restrain the Indonesians in Indonesia.
I have supported (a) but urged caution in Indonesia.
[AA : A1838, 403/2/2/2, viii]