The following is a summary of a formal statement on the situation
in Indonesia made to the Steering Committee by Van Royen on behalf
of the Netherlands delegation.

(a) In talks with the high representative of the crown the Sultan
of Jogjakarta had expressed the view that incidents might occur in
Java and had proposed discussions between the respective staffs.

(b) The Sultan had presented a plan in the form of an Aide Memoire
which would mean that Netherlands troops would patrol only
Capitals and communication roads.

(c) Notwithstanding a promise to the high representative of the
Crown to avoid disclosing anything in connection with the subjects
under discussion and in contradiction to Article 17 [of Part 2]
[1] of the Manual the Sultan had made a statement [2] to the press
on his return to Jogjakarta.

(d) The Netherlands had reasons for serious concern over the
situation in middle and East Java arising from infiltration
tactics of the T.N.I. and the efforts of the T.N.I. to supersede
existing civil administrations and to prevent by oppressive
methods the administration from performing its functions. The
facts had been repeatedly pointed out to the Republican Government
as well as to the U.N.C.I. over the last two months.

Now 'total dislocation of the administration is becoming apparent
immediately prior to the transfer of sovereignty'...'this
development goes hand in hand with the concentration of communist
forces combined in many places with a gradual communist
infiltration into the T.N.I.'
(e) As stated in the Aide Memoire [3] of the high representative
of the Crown handed to the Sultan on 15th October, the Sultan's
proposals were at variance with arrangements made within the
framework of the cease-fire and were in contradiction with certain
parts in the Roem - Van Royen statements. [4] Moreover just before
the end of the R.T.C. such plans were unacceptable because they
would endanger an orderly transfer of sovereignty.

2. In conclusion Van Royen requested the U.N.C.I. to bring the
statement to the knowledge of the Security Council.

3. In reply Hatta said the present situation in Java was cause for
serious concern and if the Netherlands delegation wished to bring
this to the attention of the United Nations Security Council
through the U.N.C.I. his delegation would have no objection. He
would need to study the statement and the written texts of the
Aide Memoires before being able to formulate his delegation's
views to be referred to the Security Council.

4. Cochran as U.N.C.I. Chairman of the week endeavoured to
dissuade the Netherlands from reporting at this stage and reserved
the position of the Commission as to whether it should forward the
statements of the parties to the Security Council.

5. Van Royen insisted however that his Government did not consider
it in keeping with its sense of responsibility to keep the
Security Council unaware of what was going on though 'no immediate
action would be required on the part of the Council'. He felt that
the most convenient and amicable way of calling the attention of
the Security Council was through U.N.C.I. intervention. Should
U.N.C.I. not be ready to undertake such an intervention his
Government would be prepared to act through its permanent
representative at Lake Success.

6. Hatta also felt that if the situation in Java were to
deteriorate any further the matter should be brought to the
attention of the Security Council even though no immediate action
on its part would be called for. Intervention of the Security
Council in the Indonesian question was of a nature to strengthen
the confidence of the Indonesian people. The situation in Java
could not last much longer without leading to serious trouble and
that was a very strong reason for reaching resolutions in the
R.T.C. at the earliest possible moment.

7. While the Republicans feel they have nothing to fear from an
international discussion of the Indonesian problem at this stage I
am afraid that the reference of the Netherlands statement to the
Security Council would indicate such a lack of confidence in the
outcome of the present negotiations that it might make conditions
more difficult in Indonesia. I am therefore urging that:

(a) The Commission should at least delay any approach to the
Security Council until it has received a report from the Deputies
in Batavia.

(b) No publicity be given to the present fears.

(c) All efforts be concentrated on successfully concluding the
R.T.C. as quickly as possible.

(d) If possible the Netherlands Government issue a reassuring
statement regarding the transfer of sovereignty.