RETURN TO JOGJAKARTA

As reported in my last letter [1], the evacuation of Dutch troops
and the taking over of the capital by Republican troops proceeded
smoothly. Only one additional incident of importance has come to
light. Apparently, prior to the evacuation of Dutch forces from
Medari on 30 June, a leak was created near the bottom of a 50,000
gallon Diesel oil reservoir in a sugar factory. The leak was
discovered and stopped approximately three hours after the Dutch
had withdrawn, but by that time a large quantity of oil had flowed
into an irrigation stream and thence into adjacent rice fields.

Republican experts estimate that an area of 650 hectares will be
affected for at least one month.

2. When the Commission arrived in Jogjakarta in response to the
Sultan's invitation to witness the return of the Republican
leaders on 6 July, they found a peaceful and quiet city. Since the
Dutch withdrawal, the firing at night has stopped completely and
communist posters publicised by the Dutch have ceased to appear in
the streets of Jogjakarta. According to the Republicans, these
posters were the work of the Dutch, and the PKI (the communist
party in Indonesia) has denied it had anything to do with them.

The Chinese Vice-Consul at Jogjakarta reported that 5,000 Chinese,
who recently evacuated the city, are now anxious to return.

3. Ali Budiardjo, of the Socialist Party of Indonesia, believes
there is no danger from communists in the Residency. His
experience with the guerillas was that feeling against the
communists was extremely high because of the Madiun revolt and
that it was dangerous to be a communist. He admits there is a
small communist concentration near Klaten, but considers it weak.

Budiardjo also pointed out that practically all the Madiun
prisoners released on 19 December were not real communists and
were rapidly incorporated in the guerilla forces of the
nationalists.

4. On the morning of 6 July I was driven around the city by the
Sultan of Jogjakarta. Most of the city is undamaged but in the
southern section where, according to the Sultan, there was
continuous fighting during the occupation, many houses have been
destroyed. We next proceeded to Prambanan on the eastern boundary
of the Jogjakarta Residency. The road along which, according to
Republican reports, no Dutch convoy had been allowed to pass
without attack, is now quiet; we had no armed escort. The town of
Prambanan bears ample evidence of the past six months' fighting.

Every building has been destroyed. However, the market has now
returned to normal and we mingled and talked to the people without
incident. On the way along, we also visited some of the erstwhile
Dutch posts now occupied by the TNI. The garrisoning of these
posts must have been a truly unenviable task for the Dutch troops,
who apparently only occasionally left their strongholds for
periodic sweeps of the surrounding country side.

5. The President and the other Republican leaders arrived at
Maguwo airfield at approximately 1 p.m. on 6 July. The party was
welcomed by the Sultan. After inspecting the TNI guard of honour,
still dressed in their tattered guerilla uniforms, President
Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta greeted a few specially selected
local notables and the members of the Commission before driving to
the city.

6. Crowds line the five miles from the airfield to the
Presidential Palace which was guarded by soldiers stationed at 30
yards interval. The crowd appeared enthusiastic and orderly. Red
and white flags were carried and displayed everywhere even on
cycles.

7. The principal ceremonies connected with the return of the
Republican Government were held at the Presidential Palace.

President Sukarno, replying to a fiery and long-winded address of
welcome by the Vice-Chairman of the Working Committee and a more
restrained welcome from the Chairman of the committee for the
restoration, was brief. He said the Republican Government had been
able to return to Jogjakarta because of two main factors, the
strength of the Indonesian people and the support of the
international community. Such support could be seen, for example,
in the work of the Security Council's Commission in Indonesia. In
conclusion, President Sukarno stressed that only by unity would
the people achieve their common aims. The speech, which was
broadcast and relayed by loudspeakers, was not intended to, and
did not, evoke a strong response.

PROBLEMS OF SUKARNO AND HATTA
8. It is evident that Sukarno and Hatta will face many problems,
particularly in the initial period. There is a bitterness against
the Dutch which did not exist before December 19th, and a
confusion of thinking after six months of dislocation both of
which will make a concerted policy difficult. The military
reaction is a good example. The TNI are convinced they alone are
responsible for the restoration of Jogjakarta and are reluctant to
cease fighting. Their conviction is understandable, as is their
underestimate of the importance of the activities of the civil
administration which made their resistance possible, and of the
international pressures which have effectively restricted the
Dutch. Simatupang, who can be regarded as one of the more moderate
TNI leaders is obviously reluctant to become a member of the
delegation again. His present view is: 'Fighting the Dutch is
better than trying to negotiate with them'. The TNI difficulty
could be solved if the TNI leaders could be convinced that the
Dutch are now pursuing a new policy. Simatupang repeatedly asked:

'But have the Dutch changed?' The difficulty is that the attitude
of many Dutch individuals, of the press and in particular of the
army, [tend to raise considerable doubts as to whether] [2] there
has been any real change of heart. Already, for example, there are
reports from Holland of political machinations designed to
undermine the present policy. Romme, the power behind the Catholic
Party, is continuing as the arch plotter of anti-Republican policy
and his protege Beel and son-in-law Sassen are undoubtedly
energetic lieutenants. There is a real danger that the agreements
already negotiated by Van Royen could be sabotaged after the event
as was Linggadjati. [3]

As I have stated in earlier letters, I believe Dutch policy has
changed but I am worried about the attitude of the Dutch people
generally. The restoration of the Republican capital and the
supply of arms to the Republican police are convincing evidence of
a new approach. I also feel that the failure so far to replace
General Spoor is a good sign, as are the reported resignations of
Major-General Meyer and Colonel van Langen, respectively
territorial commander, Central Java and brigade commander,
Jogjakarta. However, the more concrete signs of a new policy that
can be shown to the Republicans, the less difficulty will their
leaders have in achieving a reasonable cessation of hostilities
and, what is all-important, Republican unity. In particular the
Republicans are looking for assurances on two main points:

(a) Preservation of the TNI and its incorporation as a nucleus in
the federal army, and
(b) The final transfer of sovereignty to the USI this year as a
result of the RTC.

10. Because of the present uncertainty, Dutch cooperation in
maintaining Jogjakarta as a going concern and in helping to
maintain communications between Jogjakarta and other parts of
Indonesia and the outside world, is of special importance. The
bitterness created during the last six months has made it
impossible at this stage for the Republicans to welcome the Dutch
in the Residency. All Dutch inhabitants have been evacuated. This
must gradually be changed if the cooperation and understanding
necessary for a settlement of the dispute is to be achieved.

Unfortunately the local Dutch authorities have been responsible
for a number of incidents which have not helped matters. The
opening paragraph of this letter provides a good example. More
important, by banishing a number of Magelang families to
Jogjakarta, the Dutch have caused a good deal of mistrust and the
suspicion that Jogjakarta is to be sealed off and isolated as was
the Republic before 19 December.

11. Much therefore depends on the ready flow of supplies from the
Netherlands to the Residency. So far, informal agreement has been
reached on practically all the technical details, the re-
establishment of the KLM service being the notable exception. The
Commission agrees that this understanding should be formalised as
early as possible in the interest of both parties. The Republic
requires an assurance that needed supplies will be forthcoming and
the Netherlands an assurance that if supplies are dissipated, the
Dutch will not be held responsible for subsequent shortages. One
possible danger I foresee is that Netherlands authorities may seek
to place the Republic in the same position as the other negaras
they have created and expect them to go cap in hand to their
federal agencies. Such an attitude would of course be bitterly
resented by the Republicans.

12. Assuredly the sooner there is a comprehensive settlement the
better. In the meantime there is a possibility that the Republican
cabinet will be reorganized to give the Sultan responsibility
under the President and Vice-President for administration of the
Residency. Such a move would release Hatta for the vital duties of
negotiating with the federalist Indonesians and subsequently with
the Dutch.

POSSIBLE PROGRAM
13. The KNIP is meeting almost immediately but there is naturally
some delay in assembling important members. The Republican mission
headed by Leimena is reported to have contacted the Emergency
Government in Sumatra on 6 July at 1400 hours. An official report
is expected soon. Until Sjafruddin and some of his associates have
been brought to Jogjakarta, I do not believe that the Government
will be able to take any important decisions. There is no reason
to expect any hitch with Sjafruddin other than the time lag
required to bring him to Jogjakarta. The UNCI plane will be used
to make this lag as short as possible.

CEASE-FIRE
14. It can therefore be expected that the Government will not
decide on the cease-fire for at least some days. Republican
leaders have agreed they will press ahead but I expect delay. As
mentioned earlier in this letter there is a good deal of confusion
in Jogjakarta which will have to be cleared up before a common
policy can be agreed upon, and before the support of the army can
be assured, Sudirman was expected to arrive in Jogjakarta today.

From Simatupang I gained the impression that the army leaders do
not oppose the three documents which have been drafted for the
cease hostilities, but that they do not think they go nearly far
enough. As already emphasized, there are two dangers. Firstly,
opponents of the present Netherlands policy will be quick to
attack the Republic if there is any hitch in the cease-fire and to
make political capital of this at The Hague. On the other hand,
attempts by the Republican leaders to take a strong line on the
cease-fire without careful preparation could seriously weaken
their position and create divisions in the Republic.

INTER-INDONESIAN CONFERENCE
15. There is no reason why the inter-Indonesian Conference should
be delayed and I expect an early invitation to be issued by the
President to all federalist leaders to come to Jogjakarta. There
is reluctance on the part of some federalists to visit the
Republican capital, but it is clearly desirable that the inter-
Indonesian Conference should at least open its sessions there.

Hatta and some of the delegation believe that the Conference can
be completed quickly and need only agree on general principles.

Other members feel that it is desirable to work out detailed
understandings with the federalists so that there can be no
hitches at The Hague Conference. I agree with the second view as
it will obviously be much easier for the Indonesians to reach
agreement at Jogjakarta than at The Hague. It is most important
that Hatta should lead the negotiations on behalf of the Republic
because of his standing and influence with the federalists.

16. The federalists have a working paper on the important subject
of the provisional federal government to which sovereignty will be
transferred by the Netherlands. Their draft is very much
influenced by the BIO decree [4] and federalists are likely to
insist on the establishment of a provisional parliament and even a
provisional senate, both in my opinion an unnecessary waste of
resources in view of the shortage of suitable Indonesian
administrators.

ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE
17. No further details regarding the RTC are available. I still
feel most strongly that there will be delays beyond 1 August. The
size of the proposed delegations is somewhat dismaying. The
federalists propose to send no less than 70 people and the
Republicans are now talking in terms of 40 odd. There will
therefore be a lot of show but the main work will have to be done
in small and select groups.

INTERVIEW WITH VAN ROYEN
18. Attachment I [5] is the translation of an article in the
'Nieuwsgier' on an interview Dr. van Royen gave over Radio
Indonesia. It is a useful contribution at this stage.

VISITING JOURNALISTS
19. In my letter [6] of 24 June, I referred to the fifteen
journalistic 'trained seals' at present touring Indonesia as
guests of the Dutch. Some of their recent work has been most
unfortunate. For instance, H.R. Knickerbocker is credited with
having said in an interview that Sukarno 'reminded him of Hitler'.

The latest effort is an attack, by William Newton of Scripps
Howard, upon the Commission's senior military advisors and
indirectly upon the Commission itself. I attach a translation of
the 'Het Dagblad' report [7] of his despatch. Needless to say,
there is no basis whatever to the charges that reports from the
field are 'distorted' in favour of the Republicans. In point of
fact, consolidation of reports from the field, for the benefit of
the Commission is undertaken by the
Commission's Military Executive Board, and the influence of the
senior Belgian, British and French observers often makes it
difficult to avoid bias in the other direction. Also attached are
Brigadier Prior's comments on Newton's article. [8]

20. Fortunately, the news agencies are all represented here by
experienced correspondents, who have spent considerable periods in
Indonesia and whose objective and factual reporting is doing a
great deal to offset the effects of the fifteen guest performers.

21. You will notice that Newton refers to the 'report' of Captain
C.G. Williams. I should be extremely glad to learn the full facts
regarding this report as requested in my K. 322. [9]