440 Critchley to Burton

Letter BATAVIA, 17 June 1949

PEACE AND ORDER

With the completion of the evacuation of remains from the Dutch
military cemetery in Jogjakarta on June 14th, there is nothing to
prevent the immediate restoration of the Republican Government.

However, the Netherlands delegation, while agreeing that a cease-
hostilities order will only be issued after the Republican
Government is returned to Jogjakarta, is clinging to the argument
that there must be a published agreement, regarding the terms of
the order and its implementation, before the restoration.

2. On the other hand the Republicans point out that this argument
is not supported by any of the documents, and that the Republican
delegation has from the outset consistently maintained, in
conformity with Security Council opinion, that decisions could
only be taken after their Government has assembled freely.

Republicans have also, quite reasonably, pointed out that to
decide on the cease-hostilities agreement now and thus present
their Government and the TNI with a fait accompli would seriously
weaken the position of the Republican leaders and greatly reduce
the chances of implementing an agreement.

3. For some time it appeared as if a deadlock would ensue.

Although the matter has not been discussed formally, I feel sure
that the Commission (at least by a majority) would support the
Republican position. Van Royen is aware of this. Consequently, he
has been ready to look for a compromise but has been embarrassed
by the die-hard views of the army and some of the civilian
advisers (such as Gieben). The latter have been quick to argue
that the failure of the TNI officers to come to Batavia
exemplifies the lack of control by Republican leaders over the
army. In my opinion this argument is not justified. The TNI will
not take part in the negotiations until the Republican Government
is operating freely in Jogjakarta and regular consultation between
the Government and the TNI command is possible. For example,
Simatupang undoubtedly feels that, particularly in view of his
leading part in the TNI evacuations after Renville, he should not
take an individual responsibility for the cease-hostilities
agreement now. If the TNI are properly consulted before an
agreement, and if the agreement adequately safeguards the
existence of the TNI, there should be no major problem between the
army and the Government. General Sudirman has as good as said as
much in a private letter to President Sukarno. As late as 17 June
the Netherlands delegation has officially stated that Republican
military advisers will be free to wear their uniforms in
travelling to Batavia and during their sojourn in the town. This
is clearly designed to defend the delegation against any charges
of responsibility for delay.

4. As I mentioned in my telegram No. K.317 [1], Van Royen has also
been concerned at the task of explaining to the Netherlands
Government why (contrary to their expectations) there will be no
agreement prior to the restoration of the Republic in Jogjakarta.

It is surprising that the Netherlands Government should have been
misled on this point.

5. It was to help Van Royen that Cochran made his compromise
proposal that Hatta should write a personal letter to Van Royen
confirming the principles included in the three cease-hostilities
documents already agreed upon by the delegations. The Republican
delegation is not opposed to the compromise and is consulting
Sukarno and Hatta at Bangka today. Meanwhile Van Royen is
explaining the situation and seeking instructions from The Hague.

6. Incidentally, the Netherlands army authorities made a typical
effort to create further difficulties on the cease-hostilities
documents. On military advice the Netherlands delegation submitted
on Wednesday evening, 15 June, revised drafts of the three
documents. Revisions proposed for the cease-hostilities order and
the proclamation, which mainly stressed cooperation for the
maintenance for peace and order, were reasonable and have been
incorporated in a modified form. However, the revisions proposed
for the regulations for the implementation of the cease-
hostilities agreement (attachment I [2]), were entirely
unacceptable to the Republican delegation and the Commission. In
any event, the unsatisfactory sections of these proposed revisions
have been thrown out and only minor amendments accepted. It might
be reasonably conjectured that Van Royen only submitted the
revised drafts to appease the military advisers and Gieben.

7. In view of the decisive stage reached I am enclosing with this
letter a complete set of the latest documents ( Attachment II

(a) the draft cease-hostilities order,
(b) the draft proclamation,
(c) the draft regulations for the implementation of the cease-
hostilities agreement,
(d) the draft of the confidential letter from Hatta to Van Royen,
(e) the draft of Van Royen's acknowledgment,
(f) a draft proposal that a Netherlands-Indonesian manual [4] for
military cooperation be compiled which would supplement the three
draft documents on cease hostilities.
The proposed manual (f) is designed to incorporate the military
details which would otherwise clutter up the three basic
documents.

8. It is most unfortunate that there has been so long a delay in
restoring the Government at Jogjakarta. The longer this continues
the more difficult will be the eventual task of the Republican
Government. There is also a danger of entering a vicious circle.

Delays create mis-understanding among the local population and
strengthen the arguments of the Indonesian groups opposed to
compromise with the Dutch. On the other hand the greater the
activity of the non-cooperating groups, the more necessary it is
in the opinion of the Netherlands to maintain Dutch control. One
of the tragedies of the Indonesian dispute is that Netherlands
activities against the Republic create the main Dutch argument for
the continuation of those activities. And how much easier it would
have been to reach an overall settlement if there had been no
second police action.

9. Sjahrir has adequately summed up: 'The situation is not yet
critical but is nearing a dangerous phase.' It is therefore
essential that international pressure should be exerted to see
that the Republican Government is restored and the R.T.C. held
without delay.

B.F.O.

10. The documents forwarded in the bag include a copy of the
invitation [5] addressed to the Chairman of the B.F.O. to select
representatives of areas outside the Republic to meet with the
Commission. This invitation followed informal discussions between
the Commission and the Chairman of the B.F.O., Sultan Hamid, and
the Vice-Chairman, Anak Agung Gde Agung. The Commission proposed
to invite the representatives individually but Hamid insisted he
should be permitted to select them. Eventually, to compromise, it
was agreed that the individuals chosen by the B.F.O. should be
cleared in advance with the Commission. The Commission made it
clear that it would retain a right of veto and would not accept
representatives from areas outside Republican territory under the
Renville agreement [6], such as the proposed representative Abbas
from Tapanuli. Discussions with Hamid, who is not as politically
mature as the Republicans, was a reminder that the B.F.O. may not
be easy to deal with. However, the Commission intends to select
carefully the meetings and discussions to which the federalists
will be invited and the latter will not have an opportunity to
interfere with the agreements which have already been reached for
a cessation of hostilities. As already reported, the Republicans
expect the B.F.O. (apart from the Sumatrans) to help them against
the Netherlands. Rivai, from South Borneo, has told me in personal
discussions, that outside the capital of Bandjermasin, Republican
marine forces are exerting widespread control and that these
forces are unlikely to obey a cease-fire order unless
representatives of the UNCI (i.e. military observers) observe its
implementation in Borneo.

11. The difficulties between the Sumatrans and the other members
of the B.F.O.

continue to cloud the political future of the federalist
organisation. The tactics of Hamid and Anak Agung Gde Agung will
probably be to avoid decision on the resolutions of the Second
Sumatran Conference as long as possible in the hope that the
R.T.C. will be called before there is a show down. Translations of
the 5 Sumatran resolutions are enclosed as attachment III. [7]

[AA : A1838, 401/1/2/6, ii]

1 Document 436.

2 Attachment I was a Netherlands draft dated 15 June of
'Regulations Governing the Implementation of the Agreement to
cease Hostilities by the Government of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia'.

3 Not published.

4 This was a draft of the manual for military cooperation, the
text of which is given in United Nations, Security Council
Official Records, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 5, pp.62-9.

5 See Document 431.

6 See Document 22, 23 and in Volume XIII.

7 attachment III coveyed the text of the 'Resolutions of the
Second Sumatra Conference'.

[3]). These are:

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440 Critchley to Burton