RESTORATION OF JOGJAKARTA

Aneta today announced that civilian evacuations from Jogjakarta
were completed on June 9th. The total number of evacuees is given
as 28,000, of whom 24,000 arrived in Semarang. (The other 4,000
dropped off somewhere along the route and can hardly be regarded
as genuine evacuees.) There is little doubt that the total
includes considerable numbers of persons whose homes are in other
parts of Java and who have been living in Jogjakarta by force of
circumstances since the first police action. Thus the total of
evacuees in a strict sense, i.e. people who have left Jogjakarta
because of fear of insecurity under the Republican administration,
would be considerably less than 24,000.

2. In the first paragraph of the second progress report of sub-
committee 1, dated 25 May (attached to 'Notes by Cutts', included
with my letter [1] of 27 May), the parties agreed that 'the date
for handing over authority to the Republican Government depends on
the period needed for the civilian evacuations and for the
military evacuation afterwards'. Under this commitment the
Netherlands should, now that the civilian evacuations have been
completed, immediately commence military evacuation of the
Residency. However, an excuse for further delay may be found in
the remains of 75 Dutch military personnel buried in Jogjakarta
military cemetery. It was reported on 8 June that the Army Graves
Service in Indonesia had commenced the removal of these remains
which was expected to take 10 days. I have stressed with Van Royen
and Lovink the necessity of an early restoration of the Republican
Government. Although it is a long shot at this stage, on the basis
of Van Royen's information, the military evacuation may be
completed by June 20th.

3. An item in this morning's Aneta (attachment I [2]) makes it
clear that the real reason for the delay is the Dutch
determination to obtain agreement in the other sub-committee, on a
formula regarding the cease-fire and maintenance of law and order,
before restoration of the Republican Government.

4. There are reports from Jogjakarta of fighting between the TNI
and communist groups operating from the Klaten area and of an
operation by TNI against a small
communist band in the south of the Residency. The Sultan has moved
2 battalions into the north-eastern section of the Residency to
protect Jogja from the Klaten side.

5. According to the Sultan, discontent is growing among the TNI in
the Residency as a result of the delay in restoring the Republican
Government. There have been a number of desertions from the TNI
and incidents against the Dutch may be expected to increase. The
Sultan is confident, however, that, upon the withdrawal of Dutch
troops from the Residency, he will have the full support of the
TNI and will be able to control the situation. He has already (May
16th) ordered the TNI there to refrain from armed contact with
Dutch troops except in defense of their own security. (See para 1,
page 3, of my letter [3] of 14 May.)
6. It is clear that the raid on the Kepatihan, which was reported
in last week's letter, was undertaken on the responsibility of
Dutch Brigade Headquarters at Jogja. The reason given for the raid
is that the Republicans were illegally organising a Department of
Defense. It is the old story of the Dutch army refusing to
recognise the existence of Republican armed forces. According to
Republican sources 6 officials and 34 other persons were taken
into custody during the raid. The six officials have been
released, but nothing further is known regarding the 34 other
persons. According to the Dutch only the 5 TNI members referred to
in last week's letter [4] (para 3a) are still detained. Lists of
people seeking employment in the Republican Department of Defense
and the Republican Police force, which were seized during the
raid, have not been returned. The Sultan has warned the people
listed, and there is a report that at least two of them have been
subject to further investigation.

7. The Sultan of Jogjakarta came to Batavia yesterday and will
visit Bangka over the week-end. He has expressed to Van Royen and
other members of the Netherlands delegation the greatest concern
at the delay in restoring the Republic and at what he regards as
the deliberate attempts of members of the Netherlands forces to
create unrest and intimidate the local people. Details of these
complaints have been included in earlier letters.

PEACE AND ORDER
8. A new draft 'cease-fire order' has been submitted by Cochran
following discussions in the Commission (attachment II [5]). This
is reasonably satisfactory as far as it goes, and incorporates all
my main amendments. But the important issue is the drafting of the
regulations governing implementation of the agreement to cease
hostilities. Both parties submitted detailed comments on the
Commission's draft. The Netherlands comments are attachment III
[6] while the Republican comments in the form of a revised draft
are attachment IV. [7] On the basis of these, and with urging's
from Cochran, the parties have informally and provisionally agreed
on a compromise draft, (Attachment V [8]) which attempts to find a
middle way between their respective positions.

9. The Republicans were most anxious that the Joint Board should
have power to make decisions in the event of lack of agreement
between the parties on the zones of patrol (para 6). Van Royen was
insistent, however, that the Board should have no more powers than
the Commission's power of recommendation. The Netherlands, in
accepting this draft provisionally, have come further than either
Cochran or I expected. Nevertheless, their insistence on
responsibility for maintaining law and order may yet create
difficulties. There are two serious dangers in the implementation
of the regulations.

(a) Mopping up actions by the Dutch military forces on the pretext
of maintaining law and order.

(b) Attacks on Dutch posts by irregular Indonesian forces, and the
possibility that these irregular forces will in a period of
psychological unrest win over adherents from the TNI.

10. It is certain that we will have an uneasy truce and that the
military situation in Indonesia will be extremely dangerous
whatever agreement is reached between the parties for a cessation
of hostilities. This stresses the necessity of an early conference
and an early agreement on the transfer of sovereignty. In the
short run the most important safeguard against trouble between the
opposing forces is a strong policy by the Commission through the
Central Joint Board and the local boards. Undoubtedly the most
vital task of the deputies of the Commission, who will be left
behind in Indonesia when the Commission goes to The Hague, will be
to supervise the activities of the Joint Board and of the military
observers in the field.

11. You will see that the draft regulations provide for military
observers of the Commission with the local Joint Boards in each of
the residencies. The Commission will therefore require a
considerable increase in the number of its military observers. I
have spoken to Brigadier Prior about this and as soon as
requirements are clearer, will make specific recommendations. I am
in complete agreement with Prior that if additional military
observers are appointed they should be selected with care.

12. To sum up on the work of sub-committee 2, on 'peace and
order', the civilian members of the delegations have now gone as
far as possible with 3 documents covering a cessation of
hostilities. Although neither side is perfectly satisfied with the
draft regulations (attachment V), and both agree some further
drafting will be necessary, they will make no further criticisms
or suggestions at this stage but refer the drafts to their
military advisers. Despite the progress made, I am afraid the
Dutch may continue to hold up the Jogjakarta restoration until the
Republican military advisers have shown their willingness to
accept the documents.

13. There is still no word of Republican military advisers joining
the delegation in Batavia. Latest reports suggest that the delay
in getting Simatupang down is primarily one of communications.

When he received the request from the President to go to Batavia,
he immediately set out to consult his C.-in-C., who is believed to
be in the Kediri area. Simatupang is not expected back in
Jogjakarta before the end of this week. I believe it should be
possible to have Simatupang and one or two accompanying staff
officers in Batavia during the coming week. It is also just
possible that Hatta may bring one or two officers with him from
Sumatra.

B.F.O.

14. The Commission is considering inviting members of the BFO to
attend future meetings of the Commission with the parties. Van
Royen is stressing the desirability of an early invitation and the
Republican delegation is not opposed to participation by BFO
members representing areas outside the Renville boundaries of the
Republic, providing this does not mean participation of the BFO as
a party.

15. At a formal meeting today, the parties agreed to amendments to
the rules of procedure, which will permit the Commission to invite
'representatives of areas outside the Republic' to participate in
the discussions. Herremans has proved extremely difficult on this
issue. In the preliminary discussions within the Commission, he
attempted to insist that the BFO be invited to participate as a
party, but was a minority. At today's meeting he took advantage of
his position as Chairman to express his view that, after
consultations between the Commission and the Chairman and the
Vice-Chairman of the BFO, an invitation would be extended to the
BFO to appoint a delegation to participate in the negotiations.

There would be considerable objection to inviting the BFO as such,
even for simply consultative purposes. Sumatrans have so far
insisted on including in the BFO delegation one representative
from Tapanuli, which is not only contrary to the 7 May agreement
[9] but is outside the Commission's terms of reference under the
28 January resolution. [10] It is more likely that the Commission
will invite individuals, say Malik and Mansur from Sumatra, Hamid
from Borneo, Anak Agung Gde Agung from East Indonesia, and
Djumhana and Ateng from Java. On the other hand, if complications
arise, and conflict within the BFO and Herreman's attitude
indicate they could, Cochran agrees it may be better to avoid
invitations to representatives of other areas altogether at this
stage.

16. It is important that the Indonesians should get together and I
strongly favour an all-Indonesian conference as soon as the
Republicans are back in Jogjakarta. But as it is, I am personally
by no means happy about BFO participation in the preliminary
discussions now. We run the risk of increasing areas of
disagreement and of becoming involved in internal politics which
will interfere with our main tasks. Moreover, any international
recognition accorded the Sumatrans, such as Mansur and Malik, may
only lead to a campaign for an eventual partition of Indonesia.

You will see from papers [11] included in today's bag, (including
details of the Second Sumatra Conference), that the Sumatran
federalists are being aggressive and have opened a campaign for a
federation of Sumatra. I have stressed all these dangers in
discussions with Cochran who agrees on the need for caution.

ATTITUDE OF THE DUTCH
17. There has been a marked change in the official Dutch attitude
towards the Commission. Van Royen claims his task has been made
much easier by the arrival of Lovink and my own observations would
bear this out. In Lovink's presence he also insisted that the
Netherlands Government backed by parliament had decided to
transfer sovereignty and that Holland now stood where England
stood when Mountbatten was sent to India. For the first time since
my arrival in Indonesia relations between the delegations are
cordial.