RESTORATION OF JOGJAKARTA

The slow progress of earlier weeks has been even further retarded
recently. Indeed, apart from the evacuation of civilians from the
Residency of Jogjakarta, the restoration of the Republican
Government at Jogjakarta has been in suspense.

2. It would be too much to say there have been major hitches, but
there has been considerable delay in regard to both civil and
military matters. Most important are:-

(a) Postponement of the Wonosari evacuation.

The decision to evacuate Wonosari on 30th May was a voluntary
decision on the part of the Netherlands (see notes [1] by Cutts
attached to last week's letter). Nevertheless, its postponement,
(my K.315 [2]), could create misunderstandings. According to the
Dutch, the postponement was necessary because the Sultan objects
to a 'Suspension of Arms' in the Residency for a longer period
than 10 days, and that consequently it is not possible to
inaugurate a 'Suspension of Arms' more than ten days prior to the
final date of evacuation of the whole Residency, which is not yet
known. The Dutch consider that the military evacuation of Wonosari
should wait until a 'Suspension of Arms' is possible, and be
carried out in one operation with the evacuation of the remainder
of the Residency. Civilian evacuees have, however, been cleared
from the Wonosari area.

s'Jacob has also mentioned informally that one of the main reasons
for the initial decision to evacuate Wonosari prior to the
remainder of the Residency was that the troops there were required
for covering civilian evacuations from Jogja. However, other
arrangements have now been made for this.

(b) Civilian evacuations
s'Jacob informed Cutts on Wednesday, 1 June, that civilian
evacuations since 1 May then totalled 12,000. 1,500 were to be
evacuated on 1 June, and s'Jacob hoped that the rate would be
raised to 3,000 per day from 2 June. However, he remarked that, as
a result of increasing tension in the town, the number of those
registered for evacuation had risen to 49,000.

3. The delay in the restoration of the Republican administration
has provided opportunities for incidents which, if they continue,
may easily prejudice the 7 May-agreement. [3] These incidents
include:-

(a) Raid at the Kepatihan Danuradjanat, Jogjakarta
On 28 May, Dutch forces invaded the Kepatihan Danuradjanat,
Jogjakarta, where officers of the Republican Defense Ministry and
the State police Department were taking preparations, at the
direction of the Sultan, for the restoration of the Republican
Government. The Netherlands forces seized documents and arrested
Republican officials and other persons present. Briefly the Dutch
explanation of their action is that they have never given
permission for the establishment of the Defense Department. They
have now released all but 5 T.N.I. officers who were caught in the
round up and who, according to the Dutch, had no permission to be
in the town.

(b) Arrest of the Sultan's relatives
Dutch troops have arrested the two brothers of the Sultan of
Jogjakarta and other members of his family, allegedly for
subversive activities. These arrests are likely to damage the
Sultan's prestige and could therefore adversely affect a smooth
transfer of authority to the Republican Government.

(c) Injury to Dr Latuharhary
On 26 May a Netherlands armoured vehicle crashed into the back of
the motor car in which Dr Latuharhary of the Republican delegation
was a passenger. Latuharhary suffered from shock, was in hospital
for a few days, but was not seriously injured. It has been
suggested that the driver of the armoured vehicle was, at the very
least, guilty of negligence.

(d) Intimidation of Jogjakarta residents
Numbers of reports have been received from residents of Jogjakarta
that members of the I.V.G. (Information Enemy Territory) have
urged them to leave Jogjakarta. According to these reports the
I.V.G. men have predicted chaos and disorder in Jogjakarta
following the withdrawal of Dutch troops because the latter will
'release the communists and set them on the population of
Jogjakarta, possibly in soldiers' uniform'. There has also been
mention of a third 'police action'.

(e) Reported insults to Republican officials by Dutch officials
and soldiers
4. At the request of the Republican delegation the Commission has
taken up most of these matters with the Netherlands delegation. I
spoke personally to Van Royen, Blom and s'Jacob and was assured
that they had sent two officers to Jogjakarta, especially to
smooth out the difficulties. They also said that they had dined
with Roem and Leimena when the incidents in Jogjakarta were
discussed in a friendly atmosphere. The Netherlands delegation
took the view that the incidents were already as good as over, but
this is an opinion which the Sultan of Jogjakarta and the
Republican delegation do not appear to share.

5. An interesting sidelight on the return to Jogjakarta is a
report of the establishment on Bangka of a 'Committee for
Jogjakarta's restoration' to endeavour to get together at least
half a million guilders to aid in the reconstruction. It is
reported that a considerable amount of the contribution comes from
well-to-do Chinese inhabitants of Bangka.

PEACE AND ORDER
6. Informal talks have continued between representatives on the
'Peace and Order' sub-committee. The Commission, with the help of
its military observers, has submitted a draft of detailed
regulations for the implementation of the agreement to cease
hostilities (attachment I [4]). Unfortunately, Cochran and
Herremans were opposed to including under paragraph 6, the
specific requirement that areas of responsibility should be
delineated. This means, in effect, that the draft merely delays
consideration of this vital issue which, I fear, may lead to a
breakdown in the talks. The Netherlands insist they will remain
responsible for all areas outside the Residency of Jogjakarta. On
the other hand the Republicans claim that point 7 of Van Royen's
statement [5], the realities of the situation, and the importance
of preserving the TNI, require delineation of areas of
responsibility throughout Indonesia. They also quite rightly point
out that the Security Council's directive [6] to ensure a
cessation of all military activities can only be implemented if
there is a clear delineation of areas of responsibility. Cochran
sees the difficulties but is anxious at this stage to protect Van
Royen from Army Opposition which has been particularly strong on
point 7 of his 7 May statement.

7. You will also notice that in paragraph 10 of the draft
regulations I have taken a minority position. The point is that
since 7 May, Netherlands forces have extended their sweeping and
mopping up operations, and in accordance with point 7 of Van
Royen's statement, should be required to withdraw.

8. In addition to my fears regarding 'the areas of responsibility'
issue, talks in sub-committee 2 are likely to be held up by the
absence of a Republican military adviser. Although the Republican
delegation has asked for Simatupang, he is not yet in sight.

Difficulties in the way of getting him down include lack of
communications, Netherlands objections to his wearing his
distinctives in Batavia, and also the complication that, strictly,
his orders should come from the Commander-in-Chief who is
responsible to the Emergency Government. In any event, the delay
is giving rise to mutterings among the Dutch that the Republic is
deliberately stalling, and that the Republican leaders do not have
control of their military forces. Whatever the merits of the
Republican case, it is desirable that Simatupang should come to
Batavia as quickly as possible, and I have stressed this with Roem
and Leimena.

REPUBLICANS TO VISIT ATJEH
9. In order to seek a solution to the difficulties which have been
arising between the Emergency Government and the leaders on
Bangka, some of the Republican leaders, including Hatta and
Sukiman, leader of the Masjumi, propose to fly to Atjeh on Sunday,
5 June. The Commission is placing its plane at their disposal.

ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE
10. The Republicans have been upset by a statement of the Overseas
Territories Minister Van Maarseveen, in the recent debate in the
Dutch Upper House. Maarseveen assured the House that Dutch troops
would not be withdrawn unless law and order in Indonesia were
guaranteed. He explained that the Round Table Conference would
make its own agenda and that besides Indonesians, Surinam and the
Dutch Antilles would be represented. The Republican delegation is
seeking clarification from Van Royen.

11. Van Royen and Blom seem to be sincere in their desire to begin
the Round Table Conference as early as possible. Blom has been
making tentative bookings at The Hague for 15 July. At the same
time the present delays are disturbing and at today's Commission
meeting I suggested that the Commission should consider issuing a
press statement drawing attention to the difficulties which are
holding up implementation of the 7 May-statements and calling on
the parties to overcome them. It was agreed to defer this
suggestion until the end of next week when the position will be
clearer. At present the Dutch can argue that the necessary
evacuation of civilians from Jogjakarta is holding everything else
up.

NEW HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CROWN
12. Lovink has arrived but it is too early to judge his influence
in the Indonesian dispute. Sjahrir cynically pointed out that
Lovink had made a typical speech before he left The Hague. Lovink
explained he was going to Indonesia to establish a new juridical
order and permanent cooperation between Indonesia and the
Netherlands.

13. The powers of the High Representative of the Crown were
formally transferred from Beel to Lovink at a meeting of the
Provisional Federal Government yesterday. The speeches of Beel and
Lovink (attachment II [7]) provide an interesting contrast. The
tone of Lovink's address is far more satisfactory than the sulky
disgruntled note struck by Beel. But it was by no means an 'all
clear for independence' speech. The emphasis Lovink laid on
cooperation for the restoration of 'peace and order' and on the
'Union' is disturbing. Similarly the reminiscence of his boyhood
instruction that the Dutch were in Indonesia for the Indonesians
is an unfortunate example of Dutch paternalism which has plagued
the negotiations from the outset.

B.F.O.

14. The B.F.O. is anxiously awaiting an invitation to discussions
with the Com-
mission. It is unlikely, however, that such an invitation will be
issued before the immediate outstanding problems between the Dutch
and the Republicans have been solved.

15. The second Sumatra Conference concluded its session after
expressing dissatisfaction with the limitations on Sumatran
representation on the B.F.O. and with certain paragraphs of the
'RR statements'. Details of the resolutions of the Conference will
be forwarded with the next bag. East Indonesian leaders appear to
be happy that a split in the federalist organisation has been
avoided.

REPUBLICAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
16. There has been considerable Republican political activity in
the last few days with Dr. Sukiman, leader of the Masjumi, and Dr.

Sudjono Hadinoto, leader of the PNI, consulting with the leaders.

It is clear that these two groups together with such minor groups
as the Republican Christian Party, will support a Sukarno-Hatta
Government and the 7 May-agreement. The Chairman, Dr. Asaat, and
other leading members of the KNIP (Working Committee) are
confident that the Working Committee will also stand behind the
Republican leaders.

17. Sjahrir and his Indonesian Socialist Party are not expected to
oppose the 7 May-agreement, although they are most unlikely to
come out in support of it. Their attitude appears to be strongly
against appeasing the Dutch and they tend to be critical of the
weakness of the present Republican delegation. They stress the
importance of the Emergency Government in the present situation
and appear to be planning political infiltration of the federal
states.

JOHN AARIKS
18. The press has given space to some timely debunking of John
Aariks as a representative of New Guinea. However, the self-styled
'political representative of Irian' has bounced back with a
protest against the intention of the Dutch Government to let the
status and future of New Guinea depend on consultations with
Indonesian representatives. And he has claimed to have already
contacted the U.N.C.I. and that 'the case of his people had its
full attention'.

19. I have two main criticisms of the present situation:-

(a) The Republicans are too ready to appease both the Dutch and
the State Department. They should be insisting now on satisfactory
conditions for the Round Table Conference and on a cessation of
Dutch mopping up operations against the T.N.I. and incidents
apparently designed to intimidate and discredit Republican
officials.

(b) The Commission should be exerting a more decisive influence to
see that the 7 May-agreement and the Security Council's Resolution
[8] are implemented promptly.

20. Van Royen has convinced Cochran and the Republican leaders
that he must be given opportunities to deal with the Dutch
reactionary elements in his own time. Even assuming, as I am
inclined to, that Van Royen is sincere in his final overall
objectives, the present trend is not satisfactory to the Republic
and I agree with you that it is by no means impossible that the
Dutch will continue to delay the Conference until the next session
of the Assembly.

21. It is true that in recent weeks there have been changes in
Indonesia which are on the credit side. Beel has gone, Schuurman
is going, and new advisers are coming out who are expected to be
more favourably disposed to a liberal policy than the old gang.

Spoor's death has left the reactionary Army elements for the
moment leaderless. At the same time, I do not get the impression
that the Dutch in Indonesia, apart from one or two exceptions,
have faced up to the new situation and all the major issues
dividing the parties have been delayed rather than settled. In
particular I expect major difficulties on the subject of:-

(a) areas of responsibility outside the Residency of Jogjakarta
and the preservation of the T.N.I. The Dutch appear to conceive of
all the Republican forces outside of the Residency of Jogjakarta
either taking orders from them, surrendering their arms or
becoming the targets of police actions to restore law and order.

(b) the conditions for the Round Table Conference.

22. Cochran has one point in mind with which I fully agree. The
important thing is the overall settlement, which requires an early
Conference at The Hague.