This letter reports the continuation of the slow progress recorded
in my last letters. [1] Main attention has focussed on the work of
sub-committee I, on the restoration of the Republican Government
at Jogjakarta. Recent developments, including agreement by the
sub-committee on a second progress report, are set out by Cutts in
attachment I.

Van Royen has now made it clear that the Dutch will not evacuate
Netherlands troops from Jogjakarta until there is an understanding
between the delegations on the terms and conditions for an overall
cessation of hostilities in Indonesia. The work of sub-committee
II, 'on peace and order', has accordingly been pushed more into
the limelight. Here again some progress has been achieved but
only, as I suggested in my last letter, by lifting the talks out
of the hands of Gieben, the Netherlands representative on sub-
committee II. Van Royen and Roem are now being brought into the
informal talks.

It is agreed that implementation of the cease-hostilities order
will require agreement on three basic documents.

(a) the cessation of hostilities order.

(b) a general proclamation supporting the order.

(c) detailed regulations for ensuring a cessation of hostilities
and cooperation to preserve peace and order.

So far drafting has only been attempted on (a) and (b). The latest
drafts prepared by Cochran are set out in attachments II [2] and
III. [3] These, based largely on the earlier Netherlands draft,
are not satisfactory. In particular, the cease-hostilities order
of the Netherlands would be no more effective than the spurious
orders [4] of General Spoor of 31 December and 5 January. However,
the drafting is extremely tentative and it is realized that the
final drafts must await understandings as to the detailed
regulations so that the three basic documents can be considered as
an integrated whole. In any event, in private discussions with
Cochran, I have convinced him that considerable revision is
necessary in the drafting of (a) and (b), and have made detailed
suggestions.

A major hold-up at present is the absence of a military expert on
the Republican side. The Republican delegation has asked for
Colonel Simatoepang and another TNI officer, ,but this request has
been held up by Netherlands, insistence that the TNI officers
should only come to Batavia as civilians. A compromise has been
worked out and we are hopeful that Simatoepang will come to
Batavia early next week. In the meantime, to avoid delay, the
senior military observers of the Commission have been asked to try
their hand on the drafting of detailed regulations.

As suggested in my last letter, the major task will be to ensure
the preservation of the TNI. We shall also have difficulty in
obtaining Netherlands acceptance of Republican areas of
responsibility outside Jogjakarta. Nevertheless, the discussions
are continuing in a good atmosphere and it is appreciated by all
parties that an overall arrangement must be achieved which will
prevent an outbreak of fighting after the parties have left for
discussions at The Hague.

There has been an important development with regard to the BFO
request to participate in the negotiations at Batavia. The
Republicans believe they could win support from the federalists
and are inclined to favour the Commission consulting the BFO.

Formally they are opposed to the BFO being accepted as a party but
would not object to the participation of a BFO delegation in the
negotiations, provided this would not prejudice the rights, claims
and position of the Republic under the Linggadjati and Renville
agreements. [5] They leave the decision on the BFO request to the
Commission which in turn, has agreed that, for the time being,
negotiations should be limited to the two parties to the dispute,
but that when the immediate difficulties have been overcome, the
BFO might be consulted as a delegation without the right to vote.

The Commission has informed the Chairman of the BFO that it 'hopes
to invite shortly representatives of the BFO to a meeting of the
United Nations Commission', but has not indicated the reservations
which would limit such participation. It is understood that the
more progressive federalists will use the Commission's letter
against the Sumatran members of the BFO. You will remember from my
last letter that the Sumatran delegations have called a second
all-Sumatran Conference and are opposing the 'RR agreement'.

Incidentally, it is an interesting example of the influence of the
Republican leaders that Bangka has declined the invitation to this
second Conference.

The Republican draft on the Round Table Conference (attachment V
[6] of last week's letter) has been further discussed between Blom
and Supomo. The reactions of the Netherlands delegation are set
out in attachment IV. [7]

ATTACHMENT

NOTES BY T.W. CUTTS ON VISIT OF SUB-COMMITTEE I (RETURN OF
REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT TO DJOKJA) TO JOGJAKARTA ON 24 AND 25 MAY,
1949

The Netherlands delegation flew to Jogjakarta on May 23, the
Republican delegation and the UNCI party on May 24. At a meeting
of the Sub-Committee on the morning of May 25, progress made in
the three working groups was reported and progress report
(attachment A [8]) adopted. The Netherlands delegation and the
UNCI representatives returned to Batavia on May 25, the Republican
delegation the following day. On May 26 details of the progress
report were released to the press. In view of the publicity to be
given it, the economic and financial sections of the report had
been somewhat condensed. Further details of the agreements reached
on these matters are set out in attachment B [9], which Djuanda
handed me before the meeting.

Although the Sub-Committee only stayed in Jogjakarta for one
night, during which the 7 o'clock curfew kept us hotel-bound, I
managed to have fairly long talks with the Sultan, Djuanda, Laoh,
s'Jacob and Brigadier Prior, from which the following information
and impressions emerged:

I. MILITARY
(a) Suspension of arms
The agreement in the progress report is the result of a good deal
of hard work by Brigadier Prior. Detailed conditions have yet to
be agreed upon, but Prior expected that this would be finalized on
May 25. The first suggestion as to the procedure for a 'Suspension
of Arms' was a Dutch proposal that Republican forces should first
withdraw to a distance of 5 k.m. from all Dutch posts. This was
entirely unsatisfactory to the Sultan, because as a result of the
short distances between Dutch posts in the northern part of the
Residency, it would have involved evacuation of Republican forces
from this section. This would have left the Sultan with no forces
to oppose communist concentrations on the northeast and northwest
boundaries of the Residency upon the withdrawal of the Dutch
troops. The Sultan made a counter-proposal that a clear area of 1
kilometre should be left around each Dutch post. This was
unsatisfactory to the Dutch, as each post would then be isolated,
although the Sultan also proposed that the Dutch would have free
use of the roads. Prior now hopes that the parties will agree to
an arrangement which will avoid all mention of positions and
distances, and that each commander will agree simply to order his
troops to cease any hostile action against the other side and to
avoid contact.

(b) Withdrawal from the Wonosari bulge
The area of the Residency at present occupied by the Dutch
includes a large bulge to the southeast, along the Jogjakarta-
Semanoe road, as far as Wonosari. Van Langen received orders last
week to evacuate this bulge as far north as Patoek, as soon as the
Sultan indicated that he was prepared to take over responsibility
for law and order in that area. This involves evacuating a number
of posts including Wonosari and Gading, where there is an
airfield. The Sultan has written a letter indicating his
willingness to take over this area at 24 hours' notice, and the
Dutch have agreed to evacuate civilians on 28 and 29 May, and
troops on 30 May. In addition the Dutch have agreed, after some
persuasion by Brigadier Prior, to evacuate 3 other posts,
(including Perambanan) near the east boundary of the Residency on
the Jogjakarta-Klaten road. This will give the Republicans a
corridor between their forces on the northeast boundary of the
Residency, opposite the communist concentration around Klaten, and
their main forces in the south. The whole of these evacuations are
scheduled to take 5 days from May 28, and to be completed on June
1. Before the take-over, the Sultan proposes to visit Wonosari
personally to see that everything works smoothly. A strong
military observer team will be established at Gading, to assist as
far as possible. The Dutch are inclined to regard the Wonosari
evacuation as a test for the final evacuation of the Residency. It
will be a test of the Sultan's ability to maintain law and order
after withdrawal of Dutch troops, and of the proposed method of
evacuation and taking-over.

II. ARMS FOR THE POLICE
The progress report merely indicates that there is disagreement on
the question of arms for the police. There is more than
disagreement, as s'Jacob has made it clear that the Dutch will not
consider providing any arms. Under the Sultan's command within the
Residency, there are approximately 4,500 TNI troops, fairly well
provided with arms and ammunition. The Sultan proposes to take
some of these troops as auxiliary police with whom he will take
over the Residency and maintain law and order in the early stages.

A plan has been prepared for establishment of a regular police
force of 2,400, but it will take approximately 4 to 5 weeks to
recruit and organize. This force will thus not be ready until some
time after the return of the Republican government. The Dutch have
agreed to provide uniforms and other equipment for this force but
have taken the position that its arms and ammunition must be
obtained from the TNI. There is naturally considerable Dutch
reluctance to 'arm the Republicans'. The Republicans on the other
hand are conscious of the difficulties, political and practical,
of disarming TNI troops who have maintained their discipline and
morale for the past 5 months, to arm the police. They also point
out that such a move would weaken their over-all military
situation whereas they consider it important to maintain the TNI
intact and under arms until it can be absorbed into the Federal
forces.

Unless the Dutch can be pressed to provide for the police, the
Republican Government will be faced with a knotty problem upon its
return. It will have to establish a regular police force of some
kind, and the only way out may be to recruit this force from the
present TNI, and to arm them with their present arms. This will
mean that former Republican police are left out in the cold.

The Sultan's appreciation of this position may be judged from his
statement at the meeting of the Sub-Committee (attachment C [10])
in which he referred to provision of arms for the police as a
'conditio sine qua non'.

III. CIVILIAN EVACUATIONS
Civilian evacuations from Jogjakarta have been proceeding since
Saturday, May 21, at the rate of 1,000 to 1,200 per day.

Unfortunately the first convoy was reported to have been
'attacked', while Dutch troops claim to have found an aerial bomb
on the road before the second convoy passed over. These incidents
occurred on the Jogjakarta-Magelang road near the boundary of the
Residency, and are attributed to communist forces located near
Moentilan (outside the Residency). s'Jacob informed me that the
'attack' on the first convoy consisted of a little sniping from a
range of more than 1 k.m. There were, of course, no casualties.

The Dutch appear disturbed about the finding of the aerial bomb on
Sunday, but the Sultan suggests that it may have been put on the
road by the people who later found it there. In any case, the
Dutch press made the most of these incidents which also provide
the ostensible reason for delay in increasing the rate of
evacuations to 3,000 per day.

The Dutch have already started military operations against the
communists around Moentilan, which they expect to complete by June
1. Until then, they insist that all convoys along the Jogjakarta-
Magelang road must be given full military protection. With the
personnel at present at their disposal, this cannot be done for
convoys larger than those at present travelling. Evacuation from
May 21 to June 1 (11 days) at 1,000 per day will thus total
11,000. Taking the Dutch estimates of 30,000 evacuees (it
fluctuates from day to day and has risen as high as 45,000), this
would leave a further 19,000, which could be evacuated in a
further 7 days at the rate of 3,000 per day. Civilian evacuations
would therefore be unlikely to be completed before June 7. The
Dutch have insisted that military evacuation cannot commence until
civilian evacuations are completed, though the Sultan and Djuanda
have urged that troops could be evacuated simultaneously with the
last civilians. Allowing 4 days for the military evacuation, this
would take us to June 11, leaving 4 days prior to June 15 to
prepare for the return of the Republican Government. This is the
basis on which the parties, in the progress report, hoped that the
return of the Republican Government might take place about the
middle of June.

The Republicans are still sceptical of the Dutch estimates of the
total evacuations. The Sultan has increased his estimate from
3,000 to 10,000 but remains to be convinced that the latter figure
will be exceeded. In particular, he has received assurances from
the Chinese Vice-Consul that not more than 5,000 Chinese would be
evacuated, whereas the Dutch include at least 15,000 in their
estimates.

IV. INTIMIDATION
There have been numerous Republican allegations that Dutch troops
in Jogjakarta are attempting to 'intimidate' people into the
belief that their lives will be in danger after the Dutch
withdrawal and that they should evacuate. It has frequently been
alleged, for instance, that Dutch troops are responsible for the
firing which (until the last few days) was heard nightly around
the Jogjakarta perimeter, for spreading many disturbing and
provocative rumours and for rampok and disorders in the city. The
following instances are worthy of note:-

(a) Earlier this month, on a night when particularly heavy firing
was heard from the eastern perimeter of the city, Brigadier Prior
made a personal inspection to establish the cause of the shooting.

He found that Dutch posts were firing heavily at random, but that
there was no answering fire. The following morning he reported
this to Colonel van Langen, who refused to believe him and claimed
that his posts had been attacked and had merely returned fire.

(b) The Sultan, members off the Republican delegation and, in
fact, every Indonesian in Jogjakarta with whom I spoke, are
convinced that many reported 'attacks' on Dutch positions are
staged by the Dutch themselves. According to the Sultan, the
'attackers' often arrive and retreat in jeeps and other transport
and use weapons and ammunition which the TNI do not possess, while
they also use signals which are never used by the TNI. Despite
heavy firing, there are usually no casualties in these 'attacks'.

(c) The Sultan believes that the 'attacks' on the two evacuee
convoys were 'staged'.

(d) While I was talking to s'Jacob on the night of May 24, the
Resident (Lyklama) rushed in, and commenced a furious and agitated
conversation in Dutch. It appeared that he was informing s'Jacob
about an attack on his house during the afternoon by Indonesians
using small arms and a couple of hand grenades. There were no
casualties among the Resident's people but he informed us that six
of the attackers were killed. Shooting had occurred during the
afternoon, but I was unable to obtain verification of the attack
or of the six killed. I had no time to investigate further but I
could not help feeling that there was an attempt to impress the
UNCI people present with the 'realities' of the situation, and the
terrors which would face the population after the Dutch
withdrawal.

(e) Numbers of people in Jogjakarta have been visited by Dutch
soldiers and advised to register for evacuation, as their lives
would be in danger upon the withdrawal of Dutch troops. Among
those so advised was Mrs. Ali Sastroamidjojo, wife of the
Republican Minister of Education. In addition I have it from Datan
Taris, formerly Hatta's aide and now in business at Jogjakarta,
that numerous shopkeepers have received the same advice.

(f) During the past few weeks numerous posters and signs have
appeared in various parts of the town, designed to add to the
uncertainty and confusion. One carries a 'communist' threat to
kill Sukarno and Hatta upon their return, while another,
apparently expressing the feelings of Dutch troops, says, 'We will
be back within three months.' A 'communist' pamphlet has recently
received wide circulation. I was unable to obtain a copy. It is
claimed that the quality of the paper, as well as the printing,
spelling and language, invite speculation as to the source of the
pamphlet.

V. SULTAN'S STATEMENT
Attachment D [11] is the statement by the Sultan, which was issued
through his own and Dutch channels on May 26.

VI. CONCLUSION
The parties have not yet been able to agree upon a definite target
date for the return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta.

The question of arms for the police is still unsettled, but this
need not necessarily delay the re-establishment of the Government.

Everything else seems to have been agreed except the actual date.

The Republican delegation has pressed strongly for a definite
date, but the Dutch have resisted so far for two reasons:-

(a) they claim it is not yet possible to estimate the time
required to complete the civilian evacuations in view of
uncertainty as to:

(i) the total number of evacuees,
(ii) the date on which full scale movement can commence.

(b) they wish to see how the evacuation of the Wonosari bulge is
carried out before arranging details for the final evacuation.

s'Jacob has privately admitted, however, that he is not authorized
to agree to a target date. Van Royen apparently does not wish to
fix a date until further progress has been made in Sub-Committee
II as to the form of the cease-fire order to be issued by both
parties.