RETURN OF JOGJA

Discussions between the representatives of the parties on Sub-
Committee I have continued. As yet there has been no major hitch
but progress has not been fast.

2. The following is a summary of the informal discussions since
the last official report (attachment I [1]):-

(a) Republican police force: The Netherlands have objections to
supplying arms, but it appears that there will be a satisfactory
agreement for providing uniforms, 2,400 of which will be available
shortly.

(b) Trucks and jeeps: Still under discussion.

(c) Public services: The Netherlands authorities in Jogja are
preparing lists of all public servants who wish to be evacuated,
and have been instructed to inform the Sultan immediately of any
key personnel whose names are placed on the lists, so that he can
make arrangements for their replacement.

(d) Transport, railway, telephone, telegraph, etc. Discussions
appear to be proceeding satisfactorily on technical details.

(e) Trade: Van Hoogstraten, head of the Economic Affairs
Department is considering Republican lists of future monthly
requirements.

(f) Currency: The Republican delegation feels that the problem is
still full of head-aches. The Netherlands claim they are still
ascertaining the facts of the situation, and s'Jacob says that
they will have no objection in principle to meeting a Republican
request for Netherlands-Indies currency to be used in the first
few weeks following the restoration until it is possible to get
new Republican currency printed.

3. The proposed evacuations from Jogja appear to be the main cause
of delay at present. The Sultan has issued a statement
guaranteeing the 'personal and material safety' of all who remain
in the Residency, irrespective of nationality or employment. The
Netherlands delegation has also issued reassuring, if somewhat
circuitous, statements. s'Jacob assures me an informal start has
been made on evacuations and that, providing a suspension of arms
can be agreed upon, the Netherlands will start evacuations at full
blast on Wednesday next, 25th May. Attachment II [2] is a
translation of Dutch notes on the evacuation from Jogja, prepared
for the High Representative of the Crown.

4. Unfortunately, delays provide further opportunity for
mischievous rumour-mongering, and the present uncertainty in
Jogjakarta makes fertile soil for rumours. This is borne out by
the talks Cutts had with some of the more important Republicans
while he was in Jogjakarta last week. Attachments III [3] and IV
[4] are notes on these talks.

5. A good example of a rumour with mischievous intent was an
article published in 'Het Dagblad' last Saturday afternoon to the
effect that tens of thousands, including Mrs. Sukarno and Mrs.

Hatta were waiting to leave Jogjakarta. Of course neither Mrs.

Sukarno nor Mrs. Hatta had ever made applications to leave and no
one with any appreciation of the situation here could believe they
intended to do so.

6. Another misfortune is the extent to which the Netherlands
military authorities can interfere with the smooth working out of
the preliminary accord. [5] Talks between the Sultan and
Netherlands military authorities on a suspension of arms are
proceeding, with the Commission's Military Executive Board and
particularly Brigadier Prior, playing an advisory role. Prior is
convinced that there are no technical difficulties in reaching an
agreement on the subject or in making arrangements for the
evacuation of Netherlands forces. He feels that the effectiveness
of the arrangements will depend on the good-will shown by both
parties, and is convinced that the Sultan of Jogjakarta for his
part will display all the good-will that is necessary. On the
other hand the Netherlands commander, Colonel van Langen, is
creating trouble. Having presented a plan which is clearly
unsatisfactory, Van Langen so far, refuses to modify it on the
ground that his orders make him solely responsible for the
evacuation of Dutch troops. To Prior's argument that the plan
would create security problems for the Republicans after the Dutch
withdrawal, he brusquely answered he was not interested in what
happened after his troops left the Residency. We have been
endeavouring to short-circuit the Dutch military authorities by
bringing in a civilian member of the Netherlands and in particular
s'Jacob. Spoor has also visited Jogjakarta in the last few days
and Van Royen appears to hope that he will have a favourable
influence on the military people there. Prior will return to
Batavia tomorrow with the other senior military advisers, to
report on the discussions of the last few days.

PEACE AND ORDER
7. Sub-committee 2 has made no progress, principally because the
Netherlands representatives refuse to agree to issue either a
cease-fire or a stand-fast order. Republicans see in the
Netherlands proposals to issue a vague order to cease military
activities a continuation of the policy of mopping-up which has
followed the so-called cease-hostilities orders of 31 December
1948 and 5 January 1949. [6]

8. Cochran has tried his hand at a draft order which is
unsatisfactory to the Dutch because it calls for a stand-fast, and
unsatisfactory to the Republicans because it does not order a
cease-fire. I believe the deadlock will only be broken at the
highest level. Certainly we will have to get away from the present
Netherlands military advisers, while Gieben, their civilian
representative on the Sub-Committee, is regarded by the
Republicans as an old colonial type.

9. As I see it, there are three important aspects of the
arrangements required to put an end to military operations and
guerilla fighting in Indonesia:

(a) both sides should issue a cease-fire and stand-fast order.

(b) areas of responsibility should be allocated and special
security arrangements instituted so that police action can be
taken against groups who refuse to obey the orders.

(c) provision for economic and military cooperation (but not a
joint police force) consistent with point 7 [7] of the 'RR
agreement'.

I have suggested to Leimena that he hold over the cease-fire
deadlock for the time being, on the ground that he has no military
advisers, and talk about the other stages and particularly about
areas of responsibility. Discussion of these topics will clarify
Dutch intentions towards the T.N.I. There are good reasons to
suspect that the Netherlands military authorities believe that the
TNI should either be disbanded or should co-operate with and under
the directions of the Netherlands army command. This is entirely
unacceptable to the Republicans.

10. Difficulties to obtaining a cease-hostilities agreement have
already been fore-shadowed by the reactions of West Java's
territorial commander, Major-General Engels, to the views of the
Pasundan Wali Negara, Wiranatakoesoema. The Pasundan Wali Negara
was reported to have said that he favoured the issuance of a
'cease-fire and stand-fast order' in pursuance of the RR
statements and that he also agreed that the TNI control over
certain parts of West Java should be recognized. Engels retorted
that the Wali Negara had not received any correct information and
denied that the TNI had gained control of any region in West Java.

He claimed the TNI units were having great trouble in defending
themselves against terror groups such as the Darul Islam, and that
in any event, they could not be considered as fully trained
troops.

EMERGENCY GOVERNMENT
11. There is no authentic report yet as to the final attitude of
the Emergency Republican Government to the 'RR agreement'. The
Emergency Government has, however, definitely agreed that the
Sultan of Jogjakarta should take over the Residency and maintain
law and order on behalf of the Government.

ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE
12. With the restoration of the Republican Government delayed
longer than we had hoped, it is impossible at present to predict
the timing of the Conference at The Hague. There is even some fear
that it may be delayed until the end of July or early August. This
would be a serious prospect. The small store of good-will which
has been built up at such pains recently, could easily be
dissipated by the many forces working against a final settlement.

The most hopeful aspect is that Van Royen, the Republican
delegation and the Commission are all agreed that time is against
all parties and that every effort must be made to bring about an
overall settlement as quickly as possible. The Republican
delegation is especially mindful of the need to have the Round
Table Conference before the Assembly meets in September, although
it is also aware of the need for ensuring a proper restoration of
the Government and essential safeguards for participation in the
Round Table Conference.

13. In general the new members of the Netherlands delegation, Van
Royen,
Blom and s'Jacob, appear to have a liberal approach, and are
regarded favourably by the Republican delegation. Talks are
continuing somewhat spasmodically about the Round Table
Conference, and the Republicans have prepared a draft, (attachment
V [8]) which Supomo has talked over with Blom. Supomo believes the
Dutch have no major objections in principle to the draft which
they are considering within the delegation, but that they will
make certain suggested amendments such as a proposal that
minorities should be heard at the Conference.

OPPOSITION FROM SUMATRAN FEDERALISTS
14. Six delegations from Sumatran puppet states have expressed
strong objections to points 4, 5 and 7 of the RR agreement
(Attachment VI [9]). The Netherlands delegation has answered the
charge that the Sumatran delegations were not consulted
beforehand, by pointing out that Van Royen had consulted the
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the BFO, who supported the agreement
on its behalf. Anak Agung Gde Agung assures me that the Sumatran
representatives raised no dissentient voice when the BFO decided
to make an official announcement expressing the great satisfaction
with which it had taken cognisance of the RR statements. The East
Indonesian Prime Minister also says it is typical of the Sumatran
federalist leaders that they waited until they returned to Sumatra
before raising their objection but perhaps that is best explained
by the influence exerted by the Netherlands advisers in the puppet
states. In any event, the split in the BFO, which I have talked of
in my earlier letters seems more likely than ever, although Van
Royen and others may be expected to give the Federalists a pep
talk when they meet in Batavia this weekend.

15. The Sumatra delegations present in Batavia on 13 May have
decided to hold a second Sumatra Conference on 27 May. The agenda
is significant:

1. Discussions of the RR statements.

2. Sumatra's position in the BFO.

3. Sumatra's position in the forthcoming inter-Indonesian
discussion and in the projected RTC at The Hague.

4. Internal organisation and directive regarding Sumatra's future
political development.

I understand that Van Royen will use his influence to try to
cancel this Conference and is counting on the support of Van der
Plas.

RECOGNITION OF TAPANULI REPRESENTATION
16. Attachment VII [10] is a typical double-talk statement
confirming my fears regarding Dutch implementation of article 4 of
the Van Royen statement. Koets, in a press interview on the
recognition, did not explain why the Netherlands had taken action
contrary to the spirit of its recent undertaking but concentrated
on explaining why the Netherlands had only recognized the
'provisional representation' and not an independent daerah.

Following the recognition of the Tapanuli representation, Roem has
received an angry letter from Hatta, and the Republican delegation
is filing a protest this evening. Van Royen has told Roem that the
Tapanuli question has been a particularly difficult one since the
High Representative of the Crown had made promises prior to 7 May.

He assured Roem there would be no further cases of this kind.

NEW HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CROWN
17. As you know, Lovink has been appointed High Representative of
the Crown in place of Beel. According to press comments,
attachments VIII [11] and IX [12], Lovink is not expected to make
Van Royen's task any easier. This is regrettable because Van Royen
already has enough problems with the old Palace Guard, who think
in terms of a transfer of sovereignty in about 5 to 10 years and
cannot understand the changes which have occurred in Indonesia's
political atmosphere since 1939.