RESIGNATION OF BEEL
The news of the week in Indonesia is Beel's resignation which has
now become public. From the papers and cuttings which are included
in the bag, you will find much comment; but you will be interested
to notice how few tears are being shed. Inflexibility is not the
chief quality required of Dutch administrators today.

There was much talk of Spoor also resigning, but it now seems
certain he will stay on. For one thing, there is no other job for
Spoor to go to. If only for financial reasons, he would be loath
to resign. Van Royen has told Roem that Spoor has promised to
carry out the Government's decisions 'as a soldier'. The comment
might well be made: 'about time!'.

Beel has resigned because his promise that Dutch troops would not
be withdrawn from Jogjakarta will now be broken-a promise which
was fully backed at one stage by the Netherlands Government. With
the coming of Van Royen one cannot help feeling that new winds are
at last blowing in Indonesia. But the resignation of Beel and the
past activities of Spoor and others not only underline the
difficulties of the past but warn that the future will not be
easy.

SUB-COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND ORDER
The new winds in Indonesia have gently fanned the work of the sub-
committees, which were established last Monday. There has been
progress but no startling results. Sub-committee 2 on 'Peace and
Order' held its first meeting last Tuesday, 10 May. At the outset
the situation was tense. The Netherlands delegation dug up an old
bone by urging the Republican delegation to give directions for
the cessation of guerilla activities before the return of the
Government at Jogjakarta. This nonsense, however, was quickly
squashed by the Commission and the Dutch delegation's ready
acquiescence revealed it had been flying a trial balloon, and my
guess is a military balloon at that.

This initial difficulty solved, the next problem was to find a
formula which
would permit a cease-fire order for the Jogjakarta Residency and
pave the way for the restoration of the Republican Government. The
Dutch had made it clear they were opposed to a cease-fire order in
one area so long as the Republican delegation claimed it could not
issue an order for the whole of Indonesia. A possible impasse was
overcome by our suggestion of 'a suspension of arms' in the
Jogjakarta Residency. A 'suspension of arms' means the same thing
as a cease-fire but can be agreed upon by local commanders without
authority from the Government. Sub-committee 2 completed its
Tuesday meeting by requesting sub-committee 1 on 'return to
Jogjakarta' to take up this question as early as possible and to
make necessary recommendations to the parties for the
implementation of the 'suspension of arms' in the Jogjakarta
Residency.

In the subsequent meeting an attempt was made to reach agreement
on a cease-fire order. An Australian draft (attachment I [1]) with
a few minor modifications was acceptable to the Republican
delegation. On the other hand, the Netherlands delegation disliked
reference to the resolution [2] of 28 January and did not seem to
relish an early initiative from the Commission. The Netherlands
delegation therefore proposed what might be termed an 'under the
table' discussion with one or two members of the Republican
delegation.

In the course of these subsequent conversations it has presented
its own draft (attachment II [3]). Needless to say this draft was
opposed by the Republican delegation. As you will see it is an
unfortunate reminder of the old colonial mentality which sees the
Dutch as the maintainers of law and order and the Republican
supporters as the disruptors of the peace. However, by dint of
patience, in their private discussions Leimena, as [leading]
Republican [representative], and Dr. Gieben, as [leading]
Netherlands [representative] on this sub-committee, have reached
the following understandings [4]:-

1. the cease-fire order should be issued simultaneously by both
governments,
2. as far as possible the orders should be identical,
3. a preamble as in the Netherlands draft, for example, would not
be included in the order as such, but would be used in an exchange
of letters or in some other formal expression of agreement on
cease-fire,
4. reference to radio broadcasts, propaganda, etc., included in
the Netherlands draft would also be left out of the cease-fire
order, but these subjects might be included in another context,
5. the order should be as short as possible.

The outstanding points of disagreement were the Netherlands
objection to an order merely to cease fire and stand fast and the
desire of that delegation to list in detail the guerilla
activities which must be stopped. Naturally, the Republicans feel
that if guerilla activities are to be listed in detail it is
equally necessary to list in detail the military activities of the
Netherlands against which the Indonesians raise objections.

The 'under the table conversations' will be continued tomorrow
when it is hoped to draft a new cease-fire order which will
dovetail the Australian and the Netherlands drafts. Leimena also
hopes that the conversations will extend to considering 'areas of
responsibility' and other issues which must arise if the cease-
fire order is to be properly implemented.

SUB-COMMITTEE ON RETURN TO JOGJAKARTA
Sub-committee 1 on 'return to Jogjakarta' flew to the Republican
capital on Wednesday and met in the 'Kepathian' that same
afternoon. Without discussion it was agreed to accept the
Australian provisional agenda (attachment III [5]) as a basis for
the sub-committee's work. It was also agreed that the various
items on the agenda should be considered initially by three
working groups, each group consisting of the representatives of
the 2 parties. Items 1, 2, 3, 12 and 13 were allotted to the
'political working group', 4, 7 and 8 to the 'economic working
group' and 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 to the 'technical working group'.

According to a progress report from Cutts, who has been Chairman
of the sub-committee, the results achieved so far in the
discussions of these groups have been as follows:-

Political working group.

1. 'Suspension of Arms' order: s'Jacob, the Netherlands
representative, has given verbally to the Sultan of Jogjakarta,
Republican representative, the Dutch suggestions on this subject.

While the Sultan finds no objection in general, he has refused to
make any commitments until he can consult the Republican
commanders in the Residency. Nothing can be done about this, until
the Dutch grant immunity to the Republican commanders. The Dutch
local commanders have sought instructions from Batavia. Meanwhile
the Dutch have issued an order to their troops to undertake no
further active operations and to maintain defensive positions
only. The Sultan, after being informed of this, has undertaken to
have a similar order issued to the Republican forces.

2. Republican police force: The Sultan has handed the Dutch a
paper on this subject. The Dutch regard the Republic's request for
arms for the police as excessive and this appears to be the only
likely point of disagreement. The difference may not be as serious
as it sounds as the Sultan is likely to prefer to take over
initially using the TNI as auxiliary police and leaving the
organization of the civil police until the return of the
Republican Government. In that case, arms would not be required
immediately, although uniforms would.

3. Civil servants: The Sultan has suggested that civil servants
working with the Dutch be given the choice of remaining on with
the Republic or being evacuated and that those who chose to stay
be guaranteed against victimisation. s'Jacob understands that the
proposed guarantee is only one of personal safety and not of
livelihood. He considers this inadequate, and unless the guarantee
can be made on more general terms, considers there will be
thousands of evacuees. He is therefore endeavouring to clear up
this point.

The problem of civilian evacuations is being regarded seriously by
the Dutch, who have guaranteed that anybody who wishes to leave
Jogjakarta will be evacuated. They estimate that nearly 30,000
people will choose this. Apart from Dutch and Eurasians, most
evacuees would be people who have worked for the Dutch in fairly
humble capacities. s'Jacob feels that if those who remain can be
guaranteed safety of livelihood, the number of applications for
evacuation will be reduced considerably. The Sultan is quite
reasonable on the point but regards it as essentially a Dutch
problem. He will probably be prepared to give a guarantee which
will satisfy the Dutch but neither he nor the Republican
delegation are nearly as concerned about this problem as the
Dutch. They do not accept the figure of 30,000-no one seems to
know how it is calculated-but think 3000 would be nearer the mark.

4. Co-ordination: This subject has not yet been discussed. The
Sultan feels it should be decided by the two delegations rather
than by the sub-committee.

5. Withdrawal of Netherlands forces and restoration of Republican
administration. This item, which it was thought in anticipation
would have most difficult technical and political angles seems so
far to be giving little trouble. The parties are agreed on the
principles of a plan for withdrawal, and Brigadier Prior is
helping considerably with his suggestions and persuasions. The
plan for withdrawal is linked to some extent with the problem of
civilian evacuations and it cannot be finalised until it is known
what evacuations are necessary.

Economic Working Group
The Republicans have given the Dutch a paper on the economic items
(Attachment IV [6]). The Republican representative does not think
there will be serious difficulties in reaching agreement.

Provision is suggested for the free movement of goods and persons
into and out of Jogjakarta, but apart from paragraph B(1) [7]
there is nothing about trade with the outside world. The Dutch may
be expected to haggle over the quantities the Republicans have put
forward under Item 7. [8] The Republicans are also concerned about
the initial supply of Republican currency which the Government
will need on its restoration. Apparently new notes will take some
weeks to print, while the amount in the possession of the Dutch is
not nearly sufficient. The Republican representative is therefore
investigating the possibility of obtaining a loan of NICA currency
to tide the Government over its first few weeks. Another point
worth noting is the Republican proposal that all accounts be
settled between the Republic and the United States of Indonesia
after the establishment of the latter.

Technical Working Group
Water. Arrangements have been made for Republican officials to
start work immediately with the local Dutch water authorities so
as to be in a position to take over as soon as possible.

Power and Light. The local power supply is privately owned (a
Dutch firm by the name of ANIEM). The Republican representative is
to discuss with the company in Batavia whether it wishes to carry
on under the Republican administration or to hand over to the
Republican Government. The Dutch have agreed that if necessary
they can supply electricity to Jogjakarta from their power station
at Djaelak near Semarang.

Irrigation. The intake for the irrigated areas around Jogjakarta
is outside the Residency, but the Dutch have undertaken to
maintain the supply as heretofore.

Roads. The Dutch have agreed to supply materials, equipment and
vehicles necessary to repair the roads. Quantities will be
discussed by Republican officials with the local Dutch road
authorities.

Road Transport Equipment. The Dutch are willing to make vehicles
available. They have agreed to supply extra vehicles for transport
of food by road until the railways are able to handle this again.

Railways. The Dutch have agreed to hand over all the material and
equipment necessary to enable the Republic to run railway services
within the residency of Jogjakarta. Apparently there is no
difficulty about this as the rolling stock which belongs to the
Residency is identifiable. The Dutch have also agreed to carry out
all heavy repairs necessary to put the railways in working
condition. As far as through traffic is concerned, a special
arrangement will have to be discussed. Movement of traffic into
and out of the residency will be free, but there will be technical
restrictions on the movement of rolling stock which should not
seriously limit the effective use of the railways.

Telephone, Telegraph and Radio Facilities. All installations and
services within the Residency will be handed over to the
Republican Government which will agree to operate them in
accordance with the same regulations as are applicable throughout
the rest of Indonesia.

Air Traffic. There will be no difficulty regarding Maguwo
airfield, but the Dutch have asked, so far without response, for
an undertaking that the Republican Government will not start any
new commercial airlines. The Dutch have also intimated that K.L.M.

is willing to continue its service to and from Jogjakarta and
asked that they be given the opportunity to do so. So far as I
know the Republicans would have no objection to this.

Postal Facilities. The Republic will agree to use Dutch stamps for
postage to places outside the Residency, but will use Republican
stamps for internal postage.

Workshops and Repair Facilities. The Dutch will hand over adequate
repair facilities and spare parts. The actual schedule will be
worked out on a technical level.

Fuel and Office Equipment. The Dutch have agreed to supply
whatever is necessary and quantities will be agreed on a technical
level.

SITUATION IN JOGJAKARTA
Cutts has some interesting observations to make on the situation
in Jogjakarta
generally:

1. The Commission members on sub-committee 1 are agreed that
Jogjakarta under Dutch rule is a place to be avoided. The hotel is
appalling with grubby accommodation and inadequate meals. The 7
o'clock curfew is rigidly enforced and there is very little life
in the town after 5 o'clock. Although the army would possibly make
special arrangements for the Commission's staff to move about
after curfew, they would only do so with considerable reluctance
as they do not want incidents and they consider it highly
dangerous to be out after curfew.

2. The atmosphere of Jogjakarta is definitely unfriendly towards
the Commission. The local army and civil authorities are aloof and
have not yet acknowledged the presence of the Commission's staff.

The hotel is full of Dutch people who glower over their soup and
carefully avoid contaminating contact.

3. Feeling is running high among Dutch military personnel of all
ranks to an extent that will make their actual withdrawal and the
Republican take-over an extremely ticklish operation. The greatest
care will have to be exerted to avoid serious incidents.

4. At the same time local Dutch civil and military authorities are
for the moment at least suffering from shock as a result of Beel's
resignation and may be more malleable than they normally would
have been.

5. The difficulties of the military problem have been accentuated
by fighting which has occurred while the sub-committee was in
Jogjakarta. On Tuesday and Wednesday nights attacks were made on
Dutch posts guarding the water works north of the city and
considerable damage was done. On Wednesday night and Thursday
morning there was also an attack on Dutch positions south of the
city. There is some doubt as to whether these attacks were made by
the TNI or communists. Considerable communist forces are believed
to be concentrated north of the city towards Kaliurang, which
would put them near the water works. The Dutch have been using
artillery which is audible from the hotel, while tanks and
armoured cars have been racing purposefully through the streets.

6. Fear and uncertainty prevail in Jogjakarta. All doors and
windows of houses are locked.

7. It appears that the news of the recent preliminary accord was
received in Jogjakarta with considerable suspicion. Even the wives
of Republican leaders were cautious rather than elated. The
absence of any direct reference to a Dutch withdrawal gave rise to
a belief that the Government would be restored with Dutch troops
remaining in Jogjakarta, while lack of reference to the status of
the remainder of the Republican 'Renville Territories', has also
caused some misgivings. There are, of course, no Republican
newspapers or other Republican propaganda to correct the false
impressions while the reactions of the Dutch troops have
heightened the doubts.

8. The political atmosphere in Jogjakarta is at present confused.

According to the Republican delegation the Government can
definitely count on the full support of the Masjumi and the PNI
and the members have been optimistic as a consequence. On the
other hand the Government will certainly meet with considerable
leftist opposition on its return, and some members of the
communist forces have infiltrated into the city itself. According
to Cutts there is also little wild enthusiasm among the ordinary
Republicans whose attitude is now tinged with scepticism and
disillusion. Undoubtedly, however, an effective and early Dutch
withdrawal and the return of Sukarno and Hatta could have a
dynamic effect on the situation.

THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE
Van Royen has had a preliminary talk with Roem about the R.T.C. So
far Van Royen has only given what amounts to a list of headings of
matters that will have to be considered. From these it is not yet
possible to assess the Netherlands approach to the conference but
Roem expects that in later discussions Van Royen will be willing
to indicate the Netherlands ideas about the Union, etc. On the
specific question of the participation of the Commission, Van
Royen admitted that although it was a bitter pill the Netherlands
Government had accepted the position of the Commission as set out
in the 23 March Directive [9] of the Security Council.

For what it is worth I am setting out below the list of headings
given by Van Royen with an occasional rough and ready comment
based on the rather confused verbal reports of the talk. If the
meaning of the list is not clear, blame Roem-or perhaps Van Royen.

(Translations and interpretations from Dutch are always likely to
cause complications.) In any case I hope to be able to clarify the
list later.

1. The question of the BFO.

2. A national Committee functioning as the provisional government
to be considered as representing the peoples of Indonesia. There
must also be a legislative assembly.

3. Both sides to ratify the results of the Round Table Conference.

(Van Royen visualises that the conference itself might take six to
eight weeks and the ratification an equally long time. Roem agrees
regarding the length of the conference but thinks that the
ratification should be completed in three to four weeks.)
4. Documents and legislation binding the parties, must be
documented. The main items will be-
(a) the Round Table Conference results,
(b) the ratification,
(c) the transfer of sovereignty,
(d) the Union Statute.

5. The charter for sovereignty would have the following contents:

(a) sovereignty shall be transferred,
(b) the Union must be established,
(c) the rights and obligations of the former Netherlands-Indies
shall be transferred to the United States of Indonesia,
(d) existing legislation shall be maintained until changed by the
competent organs.

(Roem believes (b) means Van Royen agrees the Union should be
established after the transfer of sovereignty.)
6. The provisional constitution of the United States of Indonesia.

The competence and obligations of the Crown and the Governor-
General to be transferred to the federal government. Consequently
foreign relations and the Supreme power over the federal army
shall be exclusively in the hands of the federal government.

(The main issue here is the powers of the federal government as
compared with the state governments and the Netherlands anxiety to
insure that the Republic will not maintain its own foreign
relations, etc.-points on which the Republican delegation is
unlikely to disagree.)
7. Provisions for the new constitution. Is it desirable that the
new constitution be laid down in the Dutch law? (The Republicans
are emphatic that politically and legally it should not. Van Royen
did not press the point but suggested that it could be decided by
lawyers.)
8. Transition regulations on which agreement is necessary with the
Netherlands-
(a) co-operation in foreign relations,
(b) self-determination of the people and contracts with autonomous
regions,
(c) citizenship,
(d) position of civil servants,
(e) withdrawal of the armed forces.

CONCLUSION
Generally the situation is more hopeful than it has been but the
main problems are still ahead. The Dutch appear to be serious
about restoring the Republican government and we are hopeful there
will not be too much difficulty in agreeing on the details.