Although I did not say so in my last letter [1], I presume you
understood I was disappointed with the Security Council's failure
on 23 March to take a direct line [2] as a consequence of the
Netherlands refusal to comply with the earlier January resolution.

[3] There is a considerable danger that the Indonesian question
will continue its long drawn out and downhill course. The failure
of the Security Council to act positively must have two serious
consequences:-

a) loss of prestige by the Security Council and United Nations
machinery generally,
and
b) increased distrust in Asia of the policy of the Western powers.

2. My fears regarding the Commission's decision to call a
preliminary conference at Batavia are also being borne out. The
replies [4] of the parties to the Commission's invitation were
much as expected. The Netherlands have made a general reservation
which could cover all contingencies and in particular justify the
demand that Netherlands forces remain in Djokjakarta. The
Republicans maintain they can take no decisions until their
government is restored in Djokjakarta. Meanwhile the federalists
and the Dutch press are continuing to clamour for federalist
participation in any talks.

3. Altogether the situation is not promising. We have no
alternative but to make the best of it: to push ahead with the
meetings between the parties as quickly as possible, to endeavour
to obtain agreement in principle at the outset on the restoration
of the Republican Government to Djokjakarta, and then to proceed
to discussion of other matters. Meanwhile we are awaiting the
arrival of Van Royen who is expected about 12 or 13 April. Because
of the importance of the Djokjakarta issue, and because the
meeting in Batavia may be crucial, I am continuing to urge that
the Commission spend the next week in considering in detail the
problems associated with the restoration of the Republican
Government. Unfortunately I can get no agreement to a further
visit to Djokjakarta.

4. I am afraid Cochran is inclined to underestimate the Republican
difficulties. He still speaks as if agreement in principle on the
return of the Government to Djokjakarta would justify the
Republicans giving personal assurances on their attitude to the
conference at The Hague. He also hopes that Hatta will participate
in the talks at an early stage, whereas I can appreciate that
Hatta himself will be anxious to avoid risking his prestige until
agreement is reached on the Djokjakarta issue and preferably until
he has had an opportunity to consult with his cabinet.

5. Sjafrudin's announcement of the re-shuffled emergency
government was carefully timed and underlines the difficulties of
the Republican leaders at Bangka. In this connection attachment 1
[5], a translation from the Sin Po of 31 March, is informative and
is supported by attachment 11 [6], a translation from the
Republican Batavia daily, Merdeka, of 30 March. Sjafrudin's
statement provides the first detailed information of the
personalities in his government. The portfolios have been
allocated as follows:-

Premier, Defense and Information Minister Sjaffrudin
Prawiranegara;

Vice-Premier and Education Minister Mohamad Hasan;

Minister of Interior and Public Health Dr. Sukiman;

Foreign Minister Dr A. Maramis;

Minister of Public Works Dr. Sitompul;

Minister of Justice Susanto;

Minister of Transport Indratjahja;

Minister of Finance Lukman Hakim;

Minister of Red Cross Dr. Kasimo;

Minister of Religion Maskur;

Minister of Social Affairs Sultan Mohamed Masjid.

According to the Indonesian Office in London Susanto will also be
acting Minister of Reconstruction and Youth to succeed former
Minister Supeno, who was captured near Djokjakarta and shot by
Netherlands troops.

6. Clearly the position of the Republican leaders is difficult
and, as I pointed out in last week's letter, the obstacles in the
way of implementing the Security Council's resolution are growing.

At the same time the Dutch are exaggerating the obstacles that
exist at present. I believe the influence of Sukarno and Hatta is
still paramount, and that if the Republican Government returns to
Djokjakarta, it will obtain widespread support so long as its
leaders maintain a firm policy. To balance the picture I am
therefore enclosing as attachment 111 [7] a translation of an
article in Sin Po of 29 March, 'Establishment of communist cabinet
in Republic impossible'.

7. The position in Pasundan continues to be extremely interesting.

In this last week the official Netherlands army communiques and
the Dutch press have given special prominence to the claim that 5
of the Siliwangi battalions in West Java are now cooperating with
the Dutch. The facts as far as I can ascertain are that two of the
battalions have entered into informal agreements with the Pasundan
Government on the latter's initiative. These agreements provide
for
1) no interference by the Dutch army with the Siliwangi troops in
certain areas on the understanding that the Siliwangi troops will
maintain law and order in those areas against Darul Islam groups
and other armed bands,
2) the supply of arms and ammunition, food and clothing to the
Siliwangi battalions in question,
3) the eventual incorporation of the battalions in the federal
army.

The Pasundan Government in initiating the talks has been primarily
concerned with the need to restore order and to protect the local
villagers. On the other hand the Siliwangi battalions which had
encountered strong opposition from Darul Islam were in need of
rest, ammunition and supplies. There is no question of these
Siliwangi units cooperating with the Dutch and unless we can make
progress politically they may soon be fighting them again.

8. In my letter of 22 March I mentioned on page 4 the all-Sumatra
conference called by Mansur of East Sumatra. The conference which
assembled on 29 March, 1949, lasted for four days. As expected the
Republican-controlled areas of Atjeh and Nias did not attend but
all the other territories in Sumatra were represented. American
correspondents present at the opening session of the conference
have reported only lukewarm support for Mansur and Malik (wali
negara of South Sumatra), who wished the conference to come out
solidly against the Republic and against nationalist leaders in
the BFO. However, the conference provided occasion for both Mansur
and Malik to demonstrate their support for the Dutch and for
typical Netherlands propaganda blasts.

9. Attached are two Aneta despatches from Medan, the text of the
manifesto adopted by the conference (attachment IV [8]) and an
account of the final session (attachment V [9]). You will notice
that four of the territories represented abstained from voting on
the decision of the conference. The four delegations were reported
to be in agreement with the manifesto but without delegated powers
of decision. All delegations, however, signed the 'manifesto'
because the statement the conference adopted was not called a
'resolution'.

10. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the manifesto seem the most important.

They open the way for the Dutch to organize the whole of Sumatra
ostensibly in accordance with the wishes of 'all territories'.

11. The following incidents provide additional evidence that the
Dutch are preparing to tighten their grip on Sumatra.

a) Mansur last week prohibited government officials of Sumatra
Timur from membership of the 'National Front Association', a pro-
Republican nationalist organisation which has been operating
peacefully and with considerable following for some time in Medan.

The reason given for the prohibition is 'that the association is
striving for objectives undermining the state'.

b) 'Waktoe', a new magazine and 'Warta Berita', a daily, both pro-
Republican papers published in Medan, have been prohibited from
carriage through the post to the 'newly liberated areas' of
Djambi, Benkulen, Tandjungkarang and Telukbetung, and attempts are
being made by the central post office at Medan to recall copies
posted before the prohibition.

c) 'Waspada', a Republican paper published in Medan was suspended
last week for one month by the assistant resident who has military
authority in East Sumatra, for publishing 'incorrect alarming
reports'. The offence was publishing a news item from the foreign
press which quoted Malik as saying at a press conference at Medan:

'The Netherlands will make a great historical mistake if they do
not take into account the resolution [10] adopted by the
delegation leaders (of the BFO) who urged the reinstatement of the
Republican Government'. It has been explained that Malik actually
said: 'The Netherlands will make a great historical mistake if it
ignored the BFO'. Even the Dutch Batavia daily, the Nieuwsgier,
criticizes the suspension. According to the Nieuwsgier the highest
authorities (the central government) should decide the fate of the
newspaper whatever the convictions of the paper may be and
especially where the issue concerns the quoting of a foreign press
article.

12. Incidentally a Sundanese language paper in Bandung has also
been suspended for publishing in almost identical terms the
foreign press report used by 'Waspada'.

13. Another matter of some interest is the recent alteration in
the title of the senior Netherlands officials in each of the
federal states. Hitherto they have been described as Crown
Commissioners but now their title has been changed officially to
that of 'Representatives of the High Representative of the Crown'.

Supomo, the leading constitutional jurist among the Republicans
regards the alteration as another indication that the Dutch are
determined to hang on to Indonesia and that the so called transfer
of sovereignty will leave important powers with the High
Representative of the Crown. He points out that with the transfer
of sovereignty to the U.S.I. there will be no place in the states
for representatives of the Crown as such whereas 'representatives
of the High Representative of the Crown' could retain some
authority.