For the past week we have been waiting on the Security Council.

The delay,
combined with the progress reports already received, indicates
more than a little confusion in Lake Success. However if, as I
hope, the delay means a strengthening of the Council's attitude,
it is well worthwhile. Much depends on the Security Council
maintaining a firm line. I regret, however, the tendency of the
Americans to tie in The Hague Round Table Conference with any
directive on the implementation of the Resolution. [1]

Cutts visited Jogjakarta yesterday with the Deputies of the other
delegations. The purpose of the visit was to enquire into
allegations of recent arrests of political prisoners and into the
general political situation there. The party interviewed the Dutch
Commander, the three members of the Republican Government
remaining in Jogjakarta (Djoenda, Laoh and the Sultan of
Jogjakarta) and other Republican officials including one in
prison. A full account of the visit will be forwarded in the next
bag but in the meantime some of Cutts's impressions were:-

(a) The Republicans are confident that the re-establishment of
their government at Jogjakarta will present no serious practical
political difficulties provided assistance is given in the supply
of material and equipment. They claim that the Republican civil
administration is intact either underground or outside the town
and that there would be no personnel difficulties. The Sultan has
prepared a plan for resumption of authority and would be prepared
to assume responsibility for law and order in the town at not more
than 3 days' notice. He would use the Republican police force,
which is intact outside the town with which he is in constant
touch.

(b) Though this confidence seems justified at the moment, a very
critical time element is involved as economic pressure will very
shortly force most Republican civil servants either to accept work
with the Dutch or to leave Jogjakarta. Djoenda estimates that few
junior officials will be able to hold out beyond the end of this
month while many of the senior ones will feel the pinch severely
by the end of April.

(c) Jogjakarta is a town of terror. Every night there is heavy
firing, and looting and brigandage continue on a considerable
scale. The average middle-class Indonesian lives in terror and
many would leave the town if given the chance. Indeed there is
already a small but steady stream of population away from
Jogjakarta. The Dutch troops, though heavily reinforced recently,
seem powerless to remedy the situation.

(d) The Dutch military authorities are bitterly opposed to re-
establishment of the Republican Government in Jogjakarta, and they
will fight it at every turn of the road.

Attachment 1 [2] is a translation of an article on the Sultan of
Jogja from the Batavian weekly, Siasit, a paper which is under the
influence of Sjahrir. I have pointed out earlier the importance of
the Sultan in any settlement on Jogja and indeed the prerequisite
of his co-operation if law and order are to be restored. The
suggestion in this article that the Dutch have been considering
steps to undermine his authority is paralleled by reports from
Netherlands sources that there are documents incriminating him in
guerilla activities.

On the subject of guerilla activities, the special correspondent
in the interior of the Chinese Batavia daily, Sin Po, reports-

'The Republican guerilla forces in Middle and East Java are still
very formidable. Prior to the outbreak of the 2nd Police Action,
they had ample time to plan their defences and transport their
necessary equipments to the rugged mountain terrains. Their
experience in warfare was especially enriched by the communist
revolt last year. Their forces are now divided into three main
military centres, each under the command of a Military Governor.

Jogjakarta, Kedoe and Banjoemas under Bambang Soegeng; Semarang,
Pati, Madioen and Solo under Gatot Soebroto; and Kediri, Malang
and Sourabaya under Soengkono.'

On the same subject I enclose, Attachment 2 [3], a personal letter
I received yesterday from Ali Budiardjo. This letter is self-
explanatory and as interesting a document as I have seen for many
a day. Its importance lies in knowing the author. Budiardjo has
considerable political status, is an intensely sincere nationalist
and in my estimation one of the most important political figures
although not necessarily one of the most popular in the Republican
movement.

Budiardjo is not [4] with the Central Commissariat of the
Emergency Government in Java which has occupied an area south east
of Jogjakarta. When the Dutch forces occupied Jogjakarta most of
the Republican civil and military personnel left the city in a
hurry carrying as much equipment as they could with them. In the
hasty evacuation military and civilian personnel lost touch with
one another. When the panic subsided the two groups of personnel
came together and established an emergency organization in the
district of Gundeng Kidul.

In Wonosari in this district the guerilla command was established
not only for the Jogjakarta area but also for the whole island of
Java. General Sudirman, who withdrew to the South also arrived at
Wonosari with the other leaders.

The Republican Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the
Masjumi party Dr. Sukiman and the Minister for Justice, Dr.

Susanto, who were in Solo during the attack on Jogjakarta and
withdrew to Madiun in East Java also subsequently succeeded in
reaching Wononsari, where they remained to take charge of the
civilian administration. After their arrival the Central
Commissariat of the Emergency Government in Java was created as a
branch of the Sumatra Emergency Government. At the head of the
Commissariat was General Sudirman. Attachment 3 [5] is a
translation of a message from General Sudirman to the people.

The new Commissariat was able to contact the remaining unoccupied
Republican areas by radio.

Dutch forces, having discovered Wonosari was the centre of
Republican activities captured the emergency capital after a
fierce attack on March 10.

According to a report from Col. Simatupang, who was in the area at
the time, 3 bombers and 6 fighters strafed and bombed the town
from 0600 hours to 1700 hours. Eighteen transport planes of
paratroopers (estimated 500 troops) were joined by infantry forces
from Jogjakarta about 20 miles away.

The Republicans, however, had wind of the attack and had carefully
and systematically evacuated the town the day before. According to
the Republican reports no officials or soldiers were captured but
60 of the local villagers were killed and 30 injured in the Dutch
attack. According to Simatupang's report there is terror
throughout the region.

On the basis of a garbled report in one of the Chinese papers, Dr.

Roem of Bangka has telegraphed a request to the Commission 'to
investigate the truth of report and if affirmed to forward protest
to the Security Council against renewed Dutch aggression, showing
utter contempt of Security Council's resolution'. [6] I shall
endeavour to have a Military Observers' team investigate within
the next few days.

It is not yet known where the next emergency military government
is going to be set up. According to the Chinese paper 'Sin Po'
there are many places in the Gunung Kidur area, where Pondjong,
Semen and other towns are located near the south coast and not
easily accessible to Dutch patrols; any of these towns may be made
a capital city.

According to the paper the Japanese had set up fortifications in
these towns and organized and trained a Seneindra (a youth
organization) and Keibodan (a police organization). The fighting
spirit of these youth groups was reported to be highly regarded by
the Japanese.

In my letter [7] of 1-2-49 I outlined in detail the situation in
Pasundan and reported the movements of Siliwangi troops into the
area. In recent weeks there have been reports from Dutch sources
of negotiations between the Pasundan authorities and the leaders
of some of the Siliwangi. Captain Patrick, one of the ablest of
our military observers has made a quick survey of the situation.

His report dated 13th March and summarised below is based on
reliable sources including an interview with the Battalion
commander of the Siliwangi battalion at present located in South
Bandoeng in the hills-
(a) The South Bandoeng Battalion commander is Captain Achmad
Wiranatukusumah, a relative of Wiranatukusumah, Wali Negara of
Pasundan,
(b) The battalion strength is approx. 1200,
(c) Troops are all in good health and well armed,
(d) Negotiations of the Siliwangi are conducted with the Pasundan
Government and not with the Dutch army,
(e) The whole of the Siliwangi Division is in West Java, is in
good health, of high morale and well armed,
(f) The above battalion moved from Solo. It encountered small
groups of Darul Islam troops and small patrols of Dutch troops,
but suffered only a few casualties,
(g) It is the only battalion so far for which arrangements are
being considered with the Pasundan Government. The negotiations
are being conducted through the High Command of the TNI,
(h) This battalion Commander stated that he had a definite role to
play in the future and that the whole Division would play a
definite and organized part in developments which may take place
in West Java in the near future,
(i) Liaison is maintained between Bandoeng and the Siliwangi
Division by Moeharam Wiranatukusumah, who is a brother of the
Batallion commander.

It is clear from this report that while the Netherlands are
referring to negotiations between the Siliwangi and the Pasundan
Government as an arrangement which will undermine guerilla
resistance, the TNI command and the Siliwangi Division have very
different objectives. The negotiations are probably being
conducted by the Siliwangi as a means of
(a) obtaining a breathing space,
(b) buttressing the pro-Republican sympathies of the Pasundan
Government,
(c) ensuring that a pro-Dutch army will not be established in
Pasundan, and
(d) preparing the way for the Siliwangi troops to become
Pasundan's contribution to a federal army if a settlement of the
Indonesian troop is achieved.

Already many of the Pasundan state police have been recruited from
the Siliwangi boys and are on the closest terms with their old
comrades.

For the time being the situation in West Java and around Bandoeng
is acute. In my opinion Bandoeng is the next most important centre
to Djokja from the point of view of Republican activities. As well
as ensuring that an Australian observer is appointed as soon as
possible to the military team operating from Bandoeng, I shall
take advantage of the first free weekend to make a visit to the
city myself.

I have received further informal advice of the B.F.O. activities
over the past weeks. At the meeting of the B.F.O. with the High
Representative of the Crown at the Palace on March 11 (see my
K.286 [8]) Dr. Beel informed the B.F.O. representatives that he
knew their views were different from his own. He asked them to
refrain from giving effect to their opinions until after the
current Security Council discussions in Indonesia when he hoped to
be able to make a new proposal and to reconcile their opinions
with his own. At the morning meeting of 12 March some opposition
was encountered from Sultan Hamid of West Borneo, Malik of South
Sumatra and Mansoer of East Sumatra. The latter was particularly
difficult and is reported to have threatened his resignation from
the conference. However, as reported to you by telegram the
resolution of 3 March was retained but at the price of no
publicity and no formal reference of the resolution to the High
Representative of the Crown.

Since then Mansoer has been busy calling an all-Sumatran
conference. Invitations have been sent to all areas of Sumatra
including the Republican states of Atjeh and Nias. While the
Republican states will refuse to co-operate it is more than an
idle guess to suggest that the conference may aim at forming a
Dutch-sponsored Sumatran bloc. Primarily this bloc would aim at
weakening the present predominance of the left wing of the B.F.O.

under East Indonesia and Pasundan. Indeed, if achieved it could
lead to the disintegration of the B.F.O.-a disintegration which
already seems inevitable in view of the different personalities
and interests represented. In the long run I believe that
Mansoer and the Dutch have in mind the possibility of detaching
large segments of Sumatra from the U.S.I. under the Linggadjati
provision [9] that the territories will have the opportunity to
enter into special relationships with the Netherlands. But if so I
am sure that Mansoer and the Dutch underestimate the political
difficulties.

At a meeting of the B.F.O. on March 14 the right wing or Mansoer
section also raised the question of new voting members. East
Indonesia saw in these proposals a move to attack the voting
strength of the left wing bloc. East Java was admitted as a full
member to the B.F.O. but the applications of other areas were
postponed.

As part of the attempt to strengthen Dutch influence in the B.F.O.

a People's Representation in the Batavian municipality has been
set up. An interesting comment is set out in Attachment 4. [10]

A progress report, (attachment 5 [11]), has been received on the
wounding of the Commission's military observers in Sumatra on the
road between Medan and Brastagi. It reveals that the first
Netherlands reports that one of their own officers was killed and
the jeep burned were not correct. The incident will service Dutch
propaganda but it is worth bearing in mind that United Nations
jeeps are difficult to distinguish from the jeeps of the Dutch
military police which are also painted white. I have in the past
suggested to our Senior Military Observer that he recommend a
change in markings and I shall endeavour to ensure that this is
done without further delay.

The latest of the periodical reports of the military observers has
just come to hand and you will receive copies in the routine
distribution of Commission papers. You will note that it suffers
from the usual defect of these reports, lack of adequate sources
and lack of opportunity to observe fully.

My own impressions based on all sorts of rumours, discussions,
etc. are that up to this stage at least the Dutch have not started
to win the war. The real danger, however, is that with mounting
casualties Dutch troops will grow more embittered and that terror
campaigns will grow until this country is morally and materially
exhausted. I can only repeat again that the Security Council must
be firm and must give the Commission an opportunity to insist on
an early comprehensive settlement. Time is vital. This is clear
from Cutts's report on Djokja, but all Republican sources reflect
a steady loss of confidence in the Security Council and the
possibilities of negotiations with the Dutch.