Your telegram 44. [1]

The reference in my telegram to 'awkward questions regarding
Republican
participation' in suggested negotiations was based on the
following factors:-

(a) The Republican leaders at Bangka are regarded by the populace
as being more or less under duress. While they might make
arrangements to return to Djokjakarta and resume the
administration there, any 'negotiations' before such return could
involve a loss of prestige.

(b) Negotiations, to be effective, require the participation of
the Republican Government as such. This involves meetings
beforehand between two members at Bangka and all or most of those
with the Provisional Government in Sumatra, those with the
guerillas in Java, Djokjakarta or elsewhere. There are practical
difficulties in the way of arranging such a meeting in
Netherlands-controlled territories, and the political difficulties
are even greater.

(c) Assuming that the Republican leaders at Bangka agree to
negotiate despite (a) and (b), the negotiations might be rejected
by the Emergency Government. There has been already some criticism
of the Bangka leaders taking decisions for which the Emergency
Government was given power on 19th December. A conflict at this
stage would weaken Republican authority and increase difficulties.

2. The Dutch appear to be completely bogged down, but have so far
shown no change of heart. As frequently repeated, only this and
pressure can bring a solution. Weakness by the Council at this
stage would encourage the Dutch in their obstinacy.

3. If the Chinese/Canadian proposal [2] is adopted, I shall
endeavour to obtain a quick agreement on the return of Djokjakarta
to the Republicans (a compromise does not seem practical) or an
early report to the Council. A dead-line set by the Council would
be useful.