I understand that Cochran has now advised the State Department on
lines similar to those set out in your telegram 39 [1] except that
he does not consider the Conference should be held at the Security
Council's invitation. He does not believe that it is necessary for
the Commission to chair the conference though he would not be
opposed to a rotating chairmanship.

2. Cochran regards the proposed conference as merely a detour,
inasmuch as trying without giving up the resolution [2], and feels
strongly that the Commission should not pull all the ropes in
Indonesia to attend but that three deputy representatives should
be left in Batavia to continue the Commission's reporting
activities and to supervise the military observers. He believes
and I agree, that this would serve both to support Indonesian
morale and to keep the conference in the proper perspective in
relation to the Security Council resolution.

3. The Republican delegation today forwarded to the Commission a
translation of Sukarno's letter to Beel (K.280 [3], paragraph 5)
and a report [4] on conversations of Republican leaders at Bangka
with Geiben, Koets and B.F.O. contact committee regarding
participation in the conference. Latter document includes the
following information:

(a) All conversations regarding Republican participation in the
Conference are 'on no account to prejudice the position and task
of U.N.C.I. in the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute in
implementation of the Security Council's resolution';

(b) On 28th February, Koets provided following clarifications:

(I) The purpose of the Conference is the advanced transfer of
sovereignty, real, complete and unconditional;

(II) 'The conference will decide the rules of procedure and
discussion plan on which agreement can be reached';

(III) The Netherlands Government will agree as far as possible
within the limits of its responsibility to abide by the decision
of the conference;

(IV) An early start will be made on the withdrawal of the
Netherlands occupation forces and after the transfer of
sovereignty the position of the remaining Netherlands forces will
be that of a foreign army staying with the approval of the
Government of the United States of Indonesia and acting only in
accordance with the request of that Government. This army will be
progressively repatriated as transportation is available;

(V) The withdrawal does not mean a super state or a stronghold for
Dutch interests but an organ of co-operation in bases of mutual
interest between the two sovereign parties on the basis of
absolute voluntariness;

(VI) The restoration of the Republic and the return of the
Government to Djokjakarta are at present impossible.

4. Both of these documents have been forwarded to the Security
Council as a supplement to the Commission's marginal report. The
impending Council debate may present an opportunity to obtain a
positive Dutch commitment on the basis of Koets's verbal
clarifications.

5. Anak Agung has stated confidentially that he will not agree to
B.F.O. rescinding its resolution of 3rd March (K.280 and K.281
[5]).

6. The story of the B.F.O. resolution is now becoming more
generally known. The United States representative might ask the
Dutch for a clarification in the Council.