Today Batavia is still buzzing with rumours and information as the
news conveyed in my telegrams K.280, K.281 and K.282 [1] seeps
through. Attachment 1 [2] is a translation of the B.F.O.

Resolution in question. You will see that it is definite enough.

Anak Agung Gde Agung has made it clear that he will stick to it.

2. Cochran appears to be keen on a conference at The Hague,
although his optimism has been diminished by the recent course of
events, and in particular by the realization that some of the
Federalists are puppets in every sense.

3. As I have mentioned in telegram K.283 [3], Cochran's views and
ours do not differ greatly. He agrees-
(1) that the Republican Government should be re-established at
Djokjakarta and that Republican leaders should have full
opportunity to consult together.

(2) the position of the Commission should not be less than
envisaged by the Security Council's resolution [4] and that the
Commission should indeed be in a position to report continually
and to make recommendations to the Security Council if
negotiations do not run smoothly.

4. In short, Cochran would regard a Hague conference as a detour
necessary to help The Hague avoid a piece of bumpy ground, but not
as a new track away from the Security Council Resolution.

5. I do not believe he considers it necessary for the Commission
to Chair the conference, although he would not be opposed to a
rotating Chairmanship. There is little doubt that, at a Hague
conference, the Netherlands would endeavour to push the Commission
into the background and that we might be under some disadvantage
insofar as many of the discussions between Indonesians and the
Netherlands would certainly be in Dutch. To some extent this
disadvantage could be offset by ensuring that there were up to
date translations of all documents and bi-lingual secretarial
staff.

6. Because he would regard a Hague conference as a detour, Cochran
would strongly support a division of the Commission whereby
deputies would be left in Batavia to maintain on the spot
reporting and to supervise the activities of the military
observers. The advantages of such a division would be:-

(a) Support of Indonesian morale,
(b) The Security Council would be kept fully informed of
developments in Indonesia,
(c) The conference at The Hague or elsewhere would be kept in
proper perspective,
(d) The implementation of the Security Council's Resolution in its
main lines could be kept in the foreground.

You might therefore keep the staffing problem in mind. If the
Hague conference becomes more likely, I shall telegraph
suggestions.

7. Attachment 2 [5] is a copy of Brigadier Prior's first report
following an eight-day visit to Sumatra. Prior has made a good
impression and I am hoping his presence will result in more useful
reports from the Military Executive Board.